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Social-psychological research suggests that parties in conflict develop a conflict identity which becomes independent of the conflict itself contributing to the breakdown of agreements and the continuation of the conflict. This identity, formed of collective memories, negative stereotypes, existential fears and strong emotions, requires more than a passing nod to reconciliation in a peace settlement. Yet neither policy-makers nor political science research have paid much attention to these dynamics. Traditionally considered as a complement or final stage of the conflict resolution process, reconciliation activities have not been viewed as integral to increasing the durability of peace settlements. However, if the “mind and heart” remain armed, the hand will always find a weapon, even after the most rigorous post-conflict peace-building programmes. The central argument of the thesis is that institutionalising and implementing reconciliation measures are fundamental to increasing the durability of settlements. Utilising a new dataset, the thesis provides a statistical analysis of 259 peace agreements in 41 conflicts between 1945 and 2011 in order to test whether incorporating commitments to reconciliation activities in peace settlements reduces the likelihood of settlement breakdown. The dynamics as to how reconciliation activities can transform conflict identities and in turn lead to supporting peace agreements are investigated through using process tracing in the case studies of Israel-Palestine, Northern Ireland, and Bosnia Herzegovina. Based on independent survey research of participants of joint reconciliation activities supported by additional interviews and evaluation reports, the cases demonstrate the process by which former enemies can become advocates of supporting non-violent approaches to conflict resolution. Expanding the literature on conflict recurrence, post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation, with implications for both policymakers and practitioners, this research suggests that reconciliation is more than just a nod to politically correct terminology but joins security and state-building measures as a key element of post-conflict stability.

Is it justified to hold that each individual has a (moral) human right to subsistence goods? O’Neill’s ‘claimability objection’ provides a negative answer to this question (O’Neill, 1986; 1988a; 1996; 2000; 2005). This argument can be divided in two parts. (1) It is justified to hold that the right-holder S has a right to P if and only if the duty-bearer is determined. Call this the ‘claimability condition’. (2) It is unjustified to hold that each individual has a human right to subsistence goods because it is systematically unclear ‘where claims should be lodged’ (O’Neill, 1996, p. 132). This argument has been received with perplexity and critical rejection in the literature. It has provoked a whole industry in human rights writing. Unfortunately, O’Neill has not developed her original statement in response to this discussion. Contrary to the main tendency in the literature, my aim is to provide a systematic defence of the claimability objection. This defence contains two related arguments. Concerning the first part of the claimability objection, I argue that the highly influential ‘interest-based argument’ against the claimability condition is untenable, but it is necessary to show why the claimability condition is justified. I argue that it is justified on the basis of the action-guiding character of rights. Concerning the second part of the claimability objection, I argue that O’Neill’s rejection of the human right to subsistence is prima facie justified if human rights are institutional-independent rights. However, any serious defence of the claimability objection must address three influential counter-arguments that assume different conceptions of human rights: the ‘institutional-independent argument’, the ‘practice-based argument’ and the ‘non-conventional argument’. I show that these arguments fail to undermine the claimability objection. In brief, this dissertation makes an important contribution to the literature by challenging the standard (critical) reception of the claimability objection.

The past two decades have seen tremendous efforts by International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and the UK government to increase UK public support for international development. Yet hopes of increasing support for development have not materialised. When measured, poll data indicates that levels of public support have barely shifted, from 1999 to present, remaining around 70% (OECD, 2003; TNS UK, 2010). The most recent polling asserts that UK public concern for global poverty has significantly declined, from 70% in 2011 to 46% in 2014 (Bond, 2016). Findings also demonstrate that levels of support are not commensurate with increased awareness (Glennie et al., 2012; Hudson and van Heerde-Hudson, 2012; Lindstrom and Henson, 2010). This suggests a significant disconnect between public support and public understanding, and the public awareness campaign agendas of INGOs, and the UK government’s policy endeavours to build public support. This thesis is an attempt towards understanding part of this disconnect by focusing on the UK Department for International Development's (DFID) policy endeavours towards public support. My research conducts a critical policy analysis, employing a discourse analytical approach, departing from the existing attitudinal data approaches. Specifically, I apply Bacchi's (2009) ‘What's the Problem Represented to Be' (WPR) framework, together with Foucault's governmentality insights. I look at two time periods, 1997-2003, following the establishment of DFID, and 2010-2015 under the Con-Lib Coalition government's leadership and examine how public support is constructed as a ‘problem', as a means of shedding light on possible reasons for the lack of increased public support. The findings show that public support is constructed as a ‘problem' meriting attention in three main ways: as a ‘problem' of public ignorance; of public accountability; and of emotions. The analysis reveals strikingly, that a number of the discourses operating that comprise the ‘problem of public support' target DFID policy workers, rather than ‘the public'. In fact, the actual public remain out of sight. I demonstrate how this construction of public support as a ‘problem' is an extension of governmental power, which serves to among other things, depoliticise development objects, ‘recipients' and ‘donors', and reinforce existing inequalities, rather than challenge them. In turn, this means these three components of problematisation legitimise the role of DFID. My findings show that these problematisations of public support promoted in DFID's work, if embodied, at best, may stifle public support, and at worst, may reduce it. Therefore, these problematistions require urgent attention if future efforts at building public support are to ‘succeed'.

Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the evaluation of models of political economy in normative political theory. These debates raise questions of both a substantive and a methodological nature. On the substantive side, an important question is 'What restrictions, if any, need to be placed on corporations and other types of firms in order for a social system to conform to the demands of justice?' From a methodological standpoint, a central question is 'How should we conceive of the choice between different types of political economy or social system?' These are the two main questions that I shall address in this thesis, offering my answers in three parts from a broadly Rawlsian perspective. In Part I, I address the methodological question and defend a flexible approach to evaluating social systems that allows for 'recombinant possibilities'. In Parts II and III, which make up the bulk of the thesis, I turn my attention to the substantive question. In Part II, I set out the theoretical underpinnings of my argument. I argue that Rawlsians should include a principle of political equality within a lexically prior principle of justice, and then specify some constraints that this places on constitutional design. In Part III, I build on these arguments to make the case that the very existence of large firms poses a threat to the realisation of political equality, and therefore justice, regardless of whether they are owned by many small shareholders (as in a property-owning democracy) or controlled by their workers (as in a liberal socialist society). This concern about large firms has been largely overlooked by Rawlsians. Accordingly, I end with some suggestions as to how these theorists might usefully supplement their existing institutional recommendations by combining them with a neglected model of political economy.