The introductory chapter of the work sheds light on the philosophical background of the intellectual-question. To this end, the author draws critical arguments from classical works such as Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics, Rousseau's On the Social Contract, focusing his attention on the tension arising among intellectual vanguard, on the one hand, political power and emancipation, on the other. Given this philosophical frame of reference, the first part of the study constitutes a critical presentation of Marx's and Engels's commitment to the proletarian movement of the 1840s with special emphasis on their role in the Communist League. According to the author the fact that Marx and Engels finally entered the League represents a decisive turn from the role of the philosopher-interpreter and educator to the role of the philosopher-lawgiver and governor. The second part of this work deals with the participation of Marx, Engels and Bakunin- in the First International and, furthermore, with the Marx-Bakunin controversy. The indisputable datum that Marx and Engels were against a Blanquist or a Bakuninist type of elite organization, the author suggests, does not mean that they were against any kind of intellectual and political vanguard. In fact, the author argues, intellectual leadership and proletarian self-emancipation do not necessarily contradict each other. To support this argument, a direct juxtaposition has been suggested between Marx's and Engels's aristodemocratic version of the intellectual-people relation and Bakunin's apparently ultra-libertarian and actually quasidictatorial approach to the same relation. The third part of the study includes a further analysis of the intellectual-question, as this was posed in the framework of the European proletarian movement, and a critical presentation of the Russian Populist and Social Democratic intelligentsia. Moreover, the author takes advantage of the aristodemocracy-concept in order to evaluate particular versions of the intellectual-proletarian relation as appeared in the field of the Russian Populism and Marxism during the end of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth century. It is, finally, in the concluding chapter of the whole work, where the author argues that en route to the October Revolution, and especially during the years 1905-1917, the aristodemocratic transition to the people's self-emancipation and determination proved to be an unfulfilled utopia for intellectuals and proletarians alike.

Once the exclusive expressions of the few, modern constitutions have long been a world prose genre. In Western intellectual, political and imperialist discourse the global present of constitutions represents a proliferation of superior practices and universal values born uniquely of European thought and culture. This thesis proposes that constitutions derive their universal truths and their powers not from this (a)historical centre, but in contingent relation to the beliefs, experiences, exigencies and aspirations of the cultures they address and form (as the People). Constitutions function in this respect as rhetorical argumentation. As culturally informed, constitutional history embodies a dynamic, contested and uneven space of relationships not explicated by a linear evolution. Thus, I propose an interwoven and unpredictably circulating world space of knowledge continually shifting its shape throughout the modern era. These propositions are explored through four constitutional texts. Chapter 2 is a genealogy of “the People” in the US Constitution(s), concentrating on the constitutional sanction of slavery, the abolition amendments and civil rights court cases. Chapter 3 elucidates the interrelationship between the declaration of enlightened autonomy in the 1827 Cherokee Constitution and the consequent re-writing of US constitutional law and history required to disguise avarice beneath moral superiority. Chapter 4 considers the constitutions of Vietnam and the creation of a national People as inseparable from struggles against external forces. Chapter 5, on the 2004 Interim Constitution of Iraq, examines the Western creation of an abstract “Iraqi People,” kept distinct from the divisions and aspirations of actual peoples. As read texts and as cultural objects constitutions exist in multitudinous, simultaneous, social, legal, political and intellectual realms of interpretation and perceived value. The interdisciplinary approach taken here is therefore essential and demanded. I conclude that the struggle of human communities has brought progress in world constitutionalism; power reluctantly accommodates the expectations of those that sustain it.

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This thesis evaluates two competing approaches to developing a theory of global justice. The relational approach grounds justice in features of relationships, associations, and common institutions. The non-relational approach, in contrast, grounds justice in universal features of human beings, considered apart from their relationships with others. Which of the two approaches we adopt will have implications for the resulting theory of justice (although the distinction between the two approaches does not map straightforwardly onto that between cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan theories of global justice). David Miller's liberal nationalist (and non-cosmopolitan) theory of justice is a prominent example of the relational approach. Miller support a sufficiency based conception of justice at the global level, but restricts stronger egalitarian principles of justice to the domestic sphere. Brian Barry's cosmopolitan theory of justice is a prominent example of the non-relational approach. Barry supports egalitarian principles of justice at the global level. Given certain assumptions shared by parties to the current debate within political philosophy, we can expect any reasonable theory of global justice to be able to support some minimal conception of human rights. Miller's theory fails to do this, for reasons that stem from his adoption of the relational approach. The relational approach also suffers from many other problems, including a lack of objectivity and a tendency towards conservatism. The non-relational approach, as represented by Barry, does not suffer from equivalent problems, and should therefore be seen as preferable.

This thesis focuses on the personalisation of mediated political communication and contributes to the personalisation scholarship by adding to it a non-Western perspective. Specifically, that from the communist and post-communist societies, by using Croatia, the latest member of the European Union, and its communist predecessor Yugoslavia, as a case study. The thesis starts from the premise that the political communication is more personalized, i.e. focused on individual political actors and their personae, in communist and post-communist societies, than in Western ones with which personalisation scholarship dominantly deals with. It is also hypothesized that it may have graver consequences than in the West. For example, it may weaken political institutions, sustain authoritarianism, lead to manipulation and deceit of public etc. Accordingly, main research question asked in this thesis is: What are the similarities and differences in the ways in which the personalisation of mediated political communication develops over time in a communist non-democratic system, a post-communist new democracy, and an established Western democracy? The question is answered through a longitudinal content analysis of Yugoslav/Croatian daily newspapers and fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis. The empirical analyses revealed that the personalized political communication indeed develops in a different way, and is connected to different conditions, in the transitional society, than is the case in established Western democracies. The most important finding of this study is that the mediated political communication was, unlike in Western democracies, de-personalized over time. The theoretical discussion of the possible causes and effects of personalisation in communist and post-communist societies contributes to the development of personalisation theory, and the empirical study provides original evidence of how and why mediated political communication was personalized in non-Western contexts. Furthermore, two new theories are formed that may help explain the personalisation trends in transitional societies. These are continuation theory and democratization theory.

The thesis sets out to rework aspects of the Marxist state debate of the 1970's in the context of the contemporary development of the British state. The argument is conceptual and empirical. The thesis analyses the crisis of Keynesianism and the rise of monetarism during the 1970's and the pursuit of monetarist policies during the 1980's. The development of the state is seen as being determined by social conflict, the most fundamental form of which is the money power of capital: the money power of capital is constituted at the level of the world market and mediated through the state. The thesis contends that the single most important event for the development of the state has been the break-down of Bretton Woods in 1971 and 1973. The global power of money impinges on the state in the form of financial difficulties which restrict the integration of labour into the capital relation on the basis of social reform. Following an analysis of the crisis of capitalist accumulation and the constitution of this crisis in the form of a global pyramid of debt, the thesis analyses the politics of the social contract and the development of the state under the Thatcher governments. The thesis comes to the conclusion that monetarist policies did not involve a frontal attack on the working class but, rather, an attempt to recompose class relations on the basis of the categories of property owner and citizen. The thesis shows that monetarist policies failed to resolve the crisis of capitalist accumulation. The class struggle over the political integration of labour involved the political reproduction of the contradictions of capital. The political significance of monetarism lies in its attempt to subordinate political criteria to the money power of capital. Monetarist policies entailed, fundamentally, an attempt to recompose the form of the state as the concentrated force of the money power of capital. The thesis shows that the recomposition of the form of the state is fraught with contradictions. The subordination of political criteria to the money power of capital has led to the recomposition of labour as the antagonistic subject of debt.

This thesis is organised in three movements. The first (chapters 1 and 2) comprises a critical discussion of Marx's writings on social classes, and the relations between classes and political forces, along with an examination of some modern Marxist positions. The main proposition argued in this movement is that class analysis, if it is to achieve political relevance, must avoid the 'reductionism' which makes political forces merely the 'expression' of pre-given class interests. The second movement (chapters 3 and 4) develops a conceptualisation of the economic class relations (possession of/separation from the means of production) of contemporary British capitalism. It is argued that the possession of the means of production as capital is increasingly impersonal, and the agents of this impersonal possession (multi-divisional joint-stock companies, financial institutions) are examined in some detail. From the analysis of this movement, conclusions are drawn concerning the problems and opportunities facing the 'socialist project' for the transformation of economic class relations. The third movement (chapters 5 and 6) analyses the political conditions under which a transformation of economic class relations might be achieved. This analysis comprises: (a) a discussion of the concept of 'social collectivities', as an intermediate concept between economic classes and political forces; (b) an examination of the process of formation of social collectivities as support-blocs for political forces, first in general terms and then concretely in relation to post war British politics; and (c) an analysis of the particular relations between economic classes, social collectivities and political forces in the period of Margaret Thatcher's government 1979-1981.

This thesis considers the status of consent within both contemporary theories of political obligation, and within the theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. The definitions of consent and obligation offered at the beginning of the thesis seek to capture the paradigm meanings of both terms. It is argued that consent, as defined here, is difficult to locate either in contemporary political society, or in the systems described by Hobbes and Locke. In the latter case, the reasons for reaching this conclusion are not the ones most commonly offered. In assessing the role and status of consent in classic social contract theory, particular attention is given to Hobbes's accounts of human nature and the state of nature, as well as his theory of determinism. Locke's theory of natural law is also examined in terms of its political significance. The final conclusion reached in the thesis is that consent, as properly understood, should be a significant component of any acceptable theory of political obligation. However, this would require a substantial revision of the ordinary understanding of the concept, as well as a clearer understanding of the position of obligations within a general moral hierarchy.

The purpose of this thesis is to interpret Michael Oakeshott as a critic of Enlightenment positions. In so doing, the author's ambition is to go some way to fulfilling the lacuna in Oakeshott studies by concentrating on his notion of philosophy. Having introduced my project of study in the opening chapter, I begin chapter two with an examination of philosophical modernism in order to allude to the Enlightenment positions concerned: foundationalism in philosophy, formalism in ethics and naturalism in history. In the following chapters I turn to cope with Oakeshott's reflection upon philosophical modernity, liberal ethics and positivist historiography respectively. It is my view that Oakeshott's critique of philosophisme and Rationalism expresses a sense of the crisis of philosophical modernity and throughout his intellectual career he has never altered his analysis of these two themes: philosophy as the persistent re-establishment of completeness by transcending abstractness, and the modes of experience as self-consistent worlds of discourse. To apply this philosophy, in his moral and political writings Oakeshott has re-established a balance against the Enlightenment ethical position: "the sovereignty of technique", "demonstrative moral truth", "the politics of faith", or "enterprise association", by revitalising the importance of "traditional knowledge", "conversationally traditional intimation", "the politics of scepticism" or "civil association". Oakeshott is not a doctrinal liberal any more than a dogmatic conservative, but a sceptical philosopher who is the victim of thought. Moreover, Oakeshott's contribution to history not only lies in his effort to transcend the Enlightenment historiographical position by separating the historical from the naturalised conception of History on which the so-called "scientific history" rests, but also in his idealistic solution for the "temporal dilemma in history" and the "epistemic tension in history" that have long bothered philosophers.

This thesis offers a comprehensive examination of the notion of moral stability in Rawls's political philosophy. I argue that the problem of stability is essentially concerned with the motivational priority of a sense of justice. A conception of justice is justified if and only if it can effectively motivate rational agents to act as justice requires. It is a constitutive condition of justifiability rather than a practical matter of feasibility. I vindicate my claim through a philosophical interpretation of Rawls's account of practical reason for action. I then contend that stability plays an essential role in Rawls's two stage justification. At the first stage, taking place in the original position, stability is one of the main grounds for Rawls's principles. Nevertheless, I argue that the motive for contractors to adopt the maximin rule stems from moral considerations rather than an egoistic rational choice. At the second stage, the question of how to reconcile justice and goodness arises. We need to consider whether the regulative desire to act justly is congruent with a person's own good. This concern leads to Rawls's congruence argument through a Kantian interpretation of human nature. I suggest that this interpretation has turned Rawls into a liberal perfectionist within a classical teleological framework - a position inconsistent with Rawls's desire-based conception of prudential rationality. It is this internal inconsistency which makes the congruence argument fundamentally flawed. I then turn to examine political liberalism and point out that the idea of an overlapping consensus fails to justify the priority of political values over non-political ones. Finally, I propose an idea of potential congruence to support justice as fairness as a stable conception of justice. I conclude that this is the right direction to resolve the problem of stability and justification.