The thesis examines the informal learning of global citizenship in the course of social struggle within grassroots movements, through an ethnographic case study of the Save the Narmada Movement (NBA). The movment, comprising village communities in India, campaigned with the support of international non-governmental organisations to prevent the construction of a World Bank (WB) financed dam. The study arises in response to a perceived marginalisation of grassroots resistances, especially in developing contexts, within empirical accounts of global civil society (GCS), which is conceptualised as a space where 'global citizens' seek to resist and transform the exigencies of economic globalisation. Interrogating the validity of this exclusion, a Gramscian framework is adopted to examine whether, and in what ways grassroots actors are global citizens, engaged in the transformative politics of GCS. Analysis of data emerging from NBA suggests that contestation with political structures at the national (Indian government) and global (WB) level is an important source of learning that leads to the construction of a movement's global citizenship. Through a Gramscian dialectical process of strategic action and reflection, the movement developed a critical awareness of the class character of these institutions, leading NBA to connect its local struggle against the dam to wider struggle against `destructive development and globalisation. This process encouraged a revalorisation of grassroots participants' subjective relationships to the nation-state, leading amongst some, to the rejection of national citizenship in favour of global affiliations. Articulation of global citizenship was based on a counter-hegemonic identification with struggles of the oppressed across the world, rather than a depoliticised 'moral universalism'. However, learning to extend global citizenship to challenging oppression embedded within movement communities is constrained in a context where unity against external oppressors is paramount. By examining the learning processes that led NBA to articulate and perform global citizenship in empowering ways, the thesis points to how grassroots movements are constructing GCS, and therefore contests their current marginalisation within GCS perspectives.

A state that violates international law incurs a duty to repair harms caused by its transgression. This will often require pecuniary compensation to be paid to injured parties. To discharge its reparative duty, the state will use public funds or increase taxation. Its reparative burden is, therefore, passed on to its citizens. When, if ever, is this morally justified? In this thesis, I defend an individualist moral responsibility-based account of liability against a number of objections and demonstrate that it can provide intuitively compelling and theoretically defensible answers to the question of whether a particular state’s citizens should pay for the costs of its unjust actions. In defending my account, I will reject an argument which holds that the moral responsibility-based account cannot assign liability for overdetermined harm. The argument runs as follows: no individual is causally responsible for an overdetermined harm; causal responsibility is a necessary condition of moral responsibility; and moral responsibility is a necessary condition of liability. I deny the possibility of overdetermination, and I argue that the appearance of overdetermination simply reflects a lack of sufficiently fine-grained evidence. This presents us with a problem – we do not know who is culpably morally responsible for the harm. If we do not know who is culpably morally responsible for the harm then we do not know who is liable for the harm. I argue, however, that individuals can render themselves liable for a harm by culpably depriving its victim, or someone acting on her behalf, evidence of the identities of the persons liable for the harm. These arguments underpin my defence of the capacity of an individualist moral responsibility-based account of liability to explain when citizens should pay for their state’s unjust actions. I defend my argument against some other important objections, but I also reject an alternative approach to explaining whether citizens should pay for the costs of their state’s unjust actions. I call this the ‘Collectivisation Strategy’. Its proponents believe it capable of avoiding the numerous problems that are said to besiege an individualist moral responsibility-based account of liability. This alternative account conceives of the state as a corporate moral agent, and it holds that the state, qua corporate moral agent, can be liable for unjust harm. The key to its success, however, is explaining when and why the state, so conceived, is justified in imposing shares of its liability-burdens on its citizens. I consider and reject two such justifications. Having rejected these alternative accounts, and by overcoming the arguments made against individualist moral responsibility-based accounts, I demonstrate that my account is intuitively compelling and theoretically defensible, and can tell us whether particular a state’s citizens should pay for the costs of its unjust actions.

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This thesis is concerned to investigate New Zealand secondary school students' views about citizenship and the factors that have formed their views. It is set against a background in which' there is widespread concern about the political apathy of modern youth, not only in New Zealand but in other countries e.g., Britain and France. Methodologically, the study is focussed on two distinct aspects of the concept of representation: representation of political voice and representation of the voice of evidence. It is centred around the human voice in both senses, i.e., the degree to which it is heard to be representing a political point of view, and ways in which evidence provided by the voice itself in its numerous contexts may be understood. To this end, the voice, the voices of those who provide the evidence discussed take a central position throughout. They are available to be heard as well as read about, not just as sound bites but in the continuity of long, sometimes reflective, conversations. The use made of these voices, both in what they say about the degree to which the -speakers have a sense of citizenship, and about the information contained in their manner of saying it, is an attempt to highlight the complementarity of both aspects of the evidence: the substance and the utterance, and the need for each to be considered alongside the other. Six young New Zealanders were interviewed in depth, two of these by students in the sample who were trained as interviewers as well as being interviewees. Methodologically, this apprOach seeks to be innovative in overcoming many of the prOblems that more standard forms of qualitative and quantitative inquiry have encountered. It was found that while these students typically eschewed the formal parliamentary politics of representation, they were concerned with many issues relating to globalization and their local impact. The influences for their views came from the home and school and especially, the nature of authority structures in both.

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This dissertation provides a way for liberal democratic theorists to discuss obligations towards noncitizens within a state’s borders, and argues that, in fact, there are such obligations. Current theories of justice, even those engaging directly with migration across state borders, have been unable successfully to explain a state’s obligations towards non-citizens who are within its territory. This has two problematic ramifications. First, it indicates that there is a problem with theories of justice in their current form. Second, it means that it is difficult to find a liberal vocabulary to discuss obligations towards non-citizens. This dissertation addresses this problem directly, through the lens of the Capability Theory of Rights offered by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. It emphasises the importance of understanding society as it is, and people as they are, as well as the state’s role in societal evolution. This dissertation does not advocate a liberal democratic approach over any other, but is intended to speak to an audience that ascribes to liberal democratic principles. The specific liberal approach it adopts is modest cosmopolitan, starting from a society-of-states empirical world view. This dissertation adopts a normative methodological approach. This can be set against an approach that is legal, social scientific, or political. The core purpose is to establish what should be the obligations of a self-defining liberal democratic state towards non-citizens within its territory, in virtue of people being as they are and the world being as it is.

Orientador: Marcos César alvarez / Banca: Luís Antônio Francisco de souza / Banca: Maria José de Rezende / Resumo: Neste trabalho, realizamos um mapeamento do pensamento social brasileiro tendo em vista a ascensão de um discurso de guerra entre raças ao final do século XIX e começo do século XX. Analisamos um conjunto amplo de discursos – que vão desde José Bonifácio, no começo do século XIX, Nina Rodrigues ao final deste mesmo século, até Oliveira Vianna, na década de 1920 – para traçarmos o campo relacional dos discursos raciais e de guerra das raças, suas condições de possibilidade, para então recompormos algumas questões importantes relevantes às novas condições de cidadania após a abolição do escravismo e também à construção do Estado brasileiro após a proclamação da República. / Abstract: In the present study, it was accomplished a mapping of the brasilian social thought in relation to the development of a war between races discourse from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century. It was analised an extensive collection of discourses -- from José Bonifácio, in the beginning of the 19th century, Nina Rodrigues, in the end of the same century, to Oliveira Vianna, in the 1920 decade -- to outline the relational field of the racial discourses and the war of races ones, their conditions of possibility, and, then, renew some important questions concerned to the new conditions of citizenship after slavery abolishment and also to the construction of the brazillian State after the Republic proclamation.

This thesis is an investigation into the concept of citizenship, or, more precisely, the core concept of citizenship. It attempts to show how certain key debates within citizenship theory can (and should) be framed once the core concept has been clarified. Its central claim is that citizenship is primarily an institutional relationship between an individual and the laws and organs of government to whose authority she is subject. All other 'aspects', 'dimensions', 'senses', or conceptions of citizenship, should be oriented in relationship to this core meaning. Understanding citizenship as primarily an institutional relationship affects how we should approach a number of issues in citizenship theory. The first issue I consider has to do with the limits of both citizenship theory and the extension of citizenship in practice. Specifically, can the conceptual category of citizenship apply to non-human animals, or, indeed, for animals to be citizens in sense that is substantively on par with human citizens? I next consider what the core concept tells us about the moral aspect of citizenship and the relationship between co-citizens. I ask whether one's membership in a morally bounded community could be either necessary or sufficient for a kind of citizenship, and whether citizens owe each other special obligations qua citizens. Finally I ask who might have a moral claim to citizenship in a given state. I consider the possible moral claims a person might have to each of citizenship's two primary elements - what I call democratic membership (i.e. to be included in the demos of a democratically governed polity), and basic membership (i.e. the rights to live and work within the territory of a polity). The first sort of claim brings us into contact with the debate over what is known as the 'democratic boundary problem', while the second leads us to consider the practice of 'birthright ascription'.

This thesis analyses citizens' perceptions of standards in public life. It attempts to understand whether perceptions such as these are important substantively for questions of citizen disaffection, and begins the task of analyzing how citizens come to hold the perceptions they do. The thesis presents a systematic investigation into this topic, placing perceived standards in the context of a discussion about citizen disaffection and the perceived legitimacy of political systems. As they are conceived of in this thesis, 'standards in public life' can usefully be thought of as the 'rules of the game' or the 'spirit of public service'. Standards in public life are less a set of formal, prescriptive rules, more an exhortation to the appropriate exercise of public office. Such a focus upon the 'rules of the game' results in the primary concern of this thesis being about the process of governing, as opposed to the outcomes governors can produce. The thesis investigates perceptions of standards in two parts. Part 1 considers broad questions of the conceptualisation, measurement and structure of citizen beliefs about government in general, and perceptions of standards in particular. The findings of Part 1 therefore provide a base upon which future analyses can be built. Part 2 investigates the causes of perceptions of standards, focusing upon three aspects of political ‘conditions’: partisan co-alignment, the ‘scandal’ concerning Derek Conway’s use of parliamentary expenses to employ his son to do essentially no work, and the MPs’ expenses scandal. The analyses in this thesis are primarily quantitative, and investigate a series of four datasets, which contain data collected in the United Kingdom between 2003 and 2011.

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