Lobbying has been the subject of sustained journalistic and public interest for at least the last 200 years. Much of that discussion has had a clear focus on the function of groups as interest mediators. Less studied are lobbyists as (powerful) individual actors in the political arena, rather than simply as people who populate interest groups. While much is known about lobbying, considerably less is known about lobbyists. This thesis discusses lobbyists as professional political communicators. It does so by considering the author's body of published work in the area. That work makes a coherent and significant contribution to scholarship in respect of three key and interrelated themes: • A focus on lobbyists as individual political actors rather than on the organisations they represent; • The professional reputation of lobbyists; and • Lobbying as a form of political communication, based on influence and persuasion. Independently these three areas constitute representative themes in the existing literature. The distinct contribution the author's published work makes lies in its unique connection made between these areas. It describes the fundamental, circular or reinforcing, interplay between identity, reputation and communication. In so doing, it reveals the lobbyist as a political actor engaged in persuasive activities and situated within the context of an industry which is struggling with its own sense of professionalisation. Among the issues addressed in this thesis, with an overarching comparative focus, are: the impact that a single lobbyist can have on the effectiveness of an organisation, the personal attributes of a successful lobbyist, the career progression of lobbyists, the ways in which lobbying and lobbyists need to develop in the direction of professionalisation, how lobbying and lobbyists are perceived by the public, how they are represented in popular culture, the impact of communication theories on lobbying, and the principal communication techniques used by lobbyists in their efforts to influence policy-makers. The published work upon which this thesis rests is always academic in nature, yet informed by the author's practical experience as a lobbyist. It is concerned with 'academising the profession' (by bringing new intellectual perspectives to lobbying); 'professionalising the academy' (insofar as it deals with a relatively novel subject in the academic sphere); and 'professionalising the profession' (by arguing for the need for lobbyists to act in order to shift public, academic and political perceptions of what they do).

Citizen forecasting is the subject that ties this thesis together. Citizens base their vote choice in part on their forecasts who will win the election. We all should care, therefore, about how accurate the forecasts are and how we may help citizens to form better ones. At first the task of forecasting seems Herculean: for instance, citizens need to overcome bias. measurement problems, and ignorance. But other features simplify the task: the British political system is only slowly changing and the public reflects upon itself by publishing opinion polls. Election fo recasting holds challenges, but citizens can manage them without Herculean effort. Indeed, most citizens correctly forecasted who won in theif constituency in the 2010 British General Election. Groups of citizens are even better at forecasting than individuals, showing a wisdom of crowds ·effect. Aggregating the citizen forecasts for each constituency correctly predicted a hung parliament, with the Conservatives as the largest party. Citizens achieved the accuracy without being unbiased Bayesian learners. Although many researchers already claimed that partisanship biases information processing, none controlled for prior belief certainty. All researchers found that partisan groups differ in their posterior belief, but the finding is not enough to show that partisans are biased. Different posterior beliefs can result from partisans proceSSing information in the same way, but starting with different prior beliefs. It turns out, however, that even after controlling for prior certainty, partisan bias persists. Although citizens are biased, they are efficient information processors. They use Ufast and frugal" heuristics that yield by·and-large accurate forecas ts with very little information. Indeed, a simple path to correct forecasting is to forecast the incumbent party to win again in the constituency, and the party leading in a campaign poll to win the most votes nationally. tdost citizens seem to follow this path.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.