No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

The aim of the present study is to investigate how and why a country facing issues that needed to be tackled nationwide chose to decentralise political power and financial resources when it moved from military rule to redemocratisation. Furthermore, the study examines whether the decision to decentralise taken in Brazil in the period 1981-1991 has changed the allocation of public expenditure at sub-national level, especially to education. By analysing the decision to decentralise and its results at the sub-national level, the study embodies both an upstream and a downstream approach. The upstream approach encompasses the topics related to decentralisation in the Brazilian Constituent National Assembly that sat from 1987 to 1988. Research sources are based on the archives of the Constituent National Assembly and on interviews with key political leaders in Congress and practitioners. The decision to decentralise is analysed in three dimensions: the relationship between political parties and the State; intra- and inter-party competition; and regional cleavages. The downstream approach comprises three case studies: the state of Bahia, its capital, Salvador, and its most industrialised municipality, Camacari. The political analysis is based on (a) interviews with politicians in executive and in legislative positions, and officials and (b) newspaper material as a complementary source. The financial performance is based on the analysis of expenditure extracted from balance sheets. This study fills four gaps in political-science and public-administration works on contemporary Brazil First, it deepens the understanding of how and why Brazil became such a decentralised nation. Second, it links the analysis of political and financial resources. Third, it highlights differences between levels of government in their experiences with decentralisation. Fourth, it investigates the impact of decentralisation on political arrangements and on education expenditure. The results suggest that in Brazil there was a lack of social consensus on what was to be achieved by decentralisation. They suggest that decentralisation fosters democracy but its impacts on policy results have so far been limited. The evidence further implies that decentralisation and democratisation bring about a fragmentation of power without necessarily disintegrating previous political coalitions or changing the way public resources are spent. These findings indicate that various political and economic factors influence the outcomes of decentralisation, thus exposing the limits of decentralisation on policy results.

Can courts really build democracy in a state emerging from undemocratic rule? If so, how they do this, and what are their limits in this regard? This thesis seeks to explore the development since 1945 of a global model of democracy-building for post-authoritarian states, which accords a central position to courts. In essence, constitutional courts and regional human rights courts have come to be viewed as integral to the achievement of, or even constitutive of, a functioning democratic state. The roles courts play in supporting a democratisation process are onerous, and differ starkly from the roles of such courts in long-established democracies of the Global North. Courts in the new democracies of the post-war world have been freighted with weighty expectations to ‘deliver’ on the promises of a new democratic order, while navigating their own place within that developing order–or, in the case of regional human rights courts, inserting themselves into the democratisation process from without. At both the domestic and regional levels, from within and without the state, they are somehow expected to ‘judge’ democratisation. They are required to assess what is needed to support the democratisation process at any given point, especially in light of key deficiencies of the newly democratic order, and to judge when the democratisation context requires a different approach than may be appropriate in a mature democracy, such as the US or Ireland. However, the grand claims made for these courts as democracy-builders in existing scholarship have never been subjected to systematic analysis, nor have the overlapping roles of constitutional courts and regional human rights courts been considered in tandem. This thesis addresses a very significant research gap by drawing together a scattered and fragmented scholarship on the roles of courts in new democracies, integrating discussion of regional human rights courts, providing an innovative conceptual framework for how courts at each level act and interact as democracy-builders, and tracing connections between different normative arguments concerning the roles courts should play. As the first attempt at a wholesale exploration of the effectiveness and viability of the existing global court-centric model for democratisation, this thesis examines what we think courts do as democracy-builders, what they actually do, and what they should do. In doing so, it argues for a significant re-evaluation of how we conceive of, and employ, courts as democracy-builders.

No description available.

The increase in direct personal investment in capital market assets by Australians over the past two decades represents an unprecedented engagement with that sector of Australian economic life. This dissertation critically investigates claims that this engagement heralds a shareholder democracy. Increased economic participation based on private direct ownership of corporate securities could be interpreted as a weak form of democratisation. Using a class-theoretical framework, the dissertation conceptualises the private shareholder phenomenon as a process of embourgeoisement and argues that the development of a macro-level mass consumer financial products market is the result of capitalist class development and expansion. A thesis of strong democratisation proffers the notion that the private shareholder, as an ascendant class of financial actor, engages with real democratic processes in addition to simply owning securities. To test this thesis the dissertation measures the extent to which small shareholders control the objective conditions under which they accumulate greater wealth by seeking evidence of potential or actual engagement with macro-market and meso-corporate level social processes. The dissertation assesses macro-level practice by drawing on the work of Bourdieu and on notions of the social field. It considers the entry of the new class of financial actor to the financial field and analyses their capacity to accumulate and deploy informational capital, and compares their ability to influence a state-sponsored economic reform process (CLERP) with that of other actors. The dissertation analyses longitudinal ownership and shareholder voting data from a set of over 30 major Australian companies. It finds that the new class of economic actor is most prevalent in privatised state-owned enterprises and mutuals. In the context of an ideal Habermasian public sphere, the study considers the potential for small shareholders to participate in meso-level, corporate agenda-setting and deliberation. Using the ideal political space of Arendt, it searches for methods of achieving democratic outcomes. The dissertation finds that while the personal ownership of tradable financial assets may constitute a weak form of economic democratisation, small shareholders?? inability to influence real outcomes, even in companies in which they constitute the majority, places substantial restrictions on the overall strength of the share ownership-as-democracy thesis.

The increase in direct personal investment in capital market assets by Australians over the past two decades represents an unprecedented engagement with that sector of Australian economic life. This dissertation critically investigates claims that this engagement heralds a shareholder democracy. Increased economic participation based on private direct ownership of corporate securities could be interpreted as a weak form of democratisation. Using a class-theoretical framework, the dissertation conceptualises the private shareholder phenomenon as a process of embourgeoisement and argues that the development of a macro-level mass consumer financial products market is the result of capitalist class development and expansion. A thesis of strong democratisation proffers the notion that the private shareholder, as an ascendant class of financial actor, engages with real democratic processes in addition to simply owning securities. To test this thesis the dissertation measures the extent to which small shareholders control the objective conditions under which they accumulate greater wealth by seeking evidence of potential or actual engagement with macro-market and meso-corporate level social processes. The dissertation assesses macro-level practice by drawing on the work of Bourdieu and on notions of the social field. It considers the entry of the new class of financial actor to the financial field and analyses their capacity to accumulate and deploy informational capital, and compares their ability to influence a state-sponsored economic reform process (CLERP) with that of other actors. The dissertation analyses longitudinal ownership and shareholder voting data from a set of over 30 major Australian companies. It finds that the new class of economic actor is most prevalent in privatised state-owned enterprises and mutuals. In the context of an ideal Habermasian public sphere, the study considers the potential for small shareholders to participate in meso-level, corporate agenda-setting and deliberation. Using the ideal political space of Arendt, it searches for methods of achieving democratic outcomes. The dissertation finds that while the personal ownership of tradable financial assets may constitute a weak form of economic democratisation, small shareholders?? inability to influence real outcomes, even in companies in which they constitute the majority, places substantial restrictions on the overall strength of the share ownership-as-democracy thesis.