This thesis examines the processes of the peace negotiations in Cambodia (1987-1993) and El Salvador (1989-1993) in order to address the following question: What does the interplay between the national factions and the external interveners in peace negotiations tell us about their chances of achieving their goals? By using the concept of ‘interplay,’ this study reinterprets the negotiation processes as the negotiating actors’ exchanges of strategic moves. In particular, it explores how the negotiating actors’ attitudes towards the core negotiation issues changed in the two cases and how the changes affected their counterparts’ negotiating strategies. There are two aspects to the findings of this thesis, one descriptive and the other explanatory. First, this study has investigated the characteristics of the negotiating actors’ strategies and the pattern of the interplay between them. As for the interveners’ strategies, this thesis finds that impartial third parties generally employ diplomatic intervention methods, while advocate states enjoy a wider range of options. In addition, national factions’ behaviour is generally affected by three factors: their fundamental goals, the domestic resources under their control, and the incentives or pressure from external interveners. It is also observed that the stronger the intervention becomes, the more that national factions’ provisional strategies are inclined to be receptive towards the intervention. Nevertheless, the national factions rarely fully accepted proposals that they deemed harmful to the achievement of their fundamental goals. Second, based on the descriptive findings, this thesis highlights the importance of mutual understanding between national factions and external interveners. The case studies of Cambodia and El Salvador show that the effectiveness of a particular intervention depends not so much on the type of method employed but on the context in which it is applied. An intervention is more likely to be effective when it is used in a way that national factions can understand and is supported by the consistently strong attention of external interveners. In addition, it is observed that actors’ ethnocentric perceptions on core concepts of conflict and negotiation as well as their lack of an effective communication capability are some of the common causes of the misunderstandings that arise during negotiation processes.

Borderlands are critical security zones but remain poorly understood. In regions plagued by drug violence and conflict, violent groups compete for territorial control, cooperate in illegal cross-border activities, and substitute for the functions of the state in these areas. Despite undermining physical security, fuelling fear, and challenging the state’s sovereignty, the exact modi operandi of these groups are little known. Against this backdrop, this thesis explores how different interactions among violent non-state actors (VNSAs) in the Colombian-Ecuadorian and Colombian-Venezuelan borderlands impact on citizen security. These border areas attract rebels, paramilitaries and criminal organisations alike: they constitute geo-strategic corridors for the global cocaine industry and are sites of supply and operation for the major actors involved in Colombia’s decades-long armed internal conflict. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, this thesis consolidates the literature on conflict, security and organised crime, borders and borderlands, and anthropological approaches to fear and violence. It integrates theories of cooperation among social actors with original empirical research. It is based on a comparative, multi-sited case-study design, using ethnographic methods complemented by quantitative data. The research involved over twelve months of fieldwork with 433 interviews and participant observation on both sides of the crisis-affected Colombia-Ecuador and Colombia-Venezuela borders, and in Bogotá, Caracas and Quito. Developing a typology of VNSA interactions, I argue that these create not only physical violence but also less visible types of insecurity: when VNSAs fight each other, citizens are exposed to violence but follow the rules imposed by the opposing parties. Fragile alliances produce uncertainty among communities and erode the social fabric by fuelling interpersonal mistrust. Where VNSAs provide security and are socially recognised, "shadow citizen security" arises: security based on undemocratic means. I show that the geography of borderlands reinforces the distinct impacts of VNSA arrangements on citizen security yet renders them less visible.

La thèse a pour objectif de mettre en évidence les moyens mis en oeuvre par le système universitaire américain pour conserver une position dominante sur le plan de la recherche et de l’innovation. Elle rend compte des stratégies de recrutement et de formation des universités américaines principalement orientées vers l’international en matière d’excellence. Partant du principe que l’enseignement supérieur se structure sous la forme d’un marché concurrentiel à l’heure de la mondialisation économique, la thèse montre, par le prisme des écoles d’ingénieurs et leurs étudiants au niveau Graduate, la redistribution multipolaire du marché de l’enseignement supérieur en fonction des offres internationales proposées en particulier par les puissances émergentes (BRICS) calquées sur le modèle anglo-saxon. La thèse montre ainsi comment ces étudiants constituent les nouveaux acteurs-ressources "nomades" détenteurs en partie du développement économique des nations par leur capacité d’innovation. Elle souligne dès lors l’imbrication sur un plan régional de ces différents acteurs associés à ce développement économique dans une démonstration empruntant tant aux travaux de la sociologie des organisations de Crozier et Friedberg que du nouvel institutionnalisme défendu par P. Hall et R.Taylor. Pour autant la thèse insiste sur la mainmise de l’étudiant en tant qu’individu dans ces choix de formations qui suivant une démarche rationnelle (Weber) va opter pour la formation la plus intéressante selon les critères qui lui seront propres. Cette thèse apporte un éclairage sur l’importance de ces étudiants par l’innovation technologique qu’ils confèrent à la nation américaine en offrant un avantage stratégique déterminant dans les rapports de forces internationaux. De la même façon, elle démontre l’irréversibilité pour le système de l’enseignement supérieur américain et ses écoles d’ingénieurs de renforcer son recrutement à l’international dans un contexte globalisé. / The thesis aims to highlight the means implemented by the higher education system in America to maintain a dominant position in terms of research and innovation. It reports on strategies for recruiting and training U.S. universities mainly internationally oriented in terms of excellence. Assuming that the higher education structure in the form of a competitive market at a time of economic globalization, the thesis shows, through the prism of engineering schools and their students at Graduate redistribution multipolar market of higher education according to international tenders offered in particular by emerging powers (BRICS) modeled on the Anglo-Saxon model. The thesis shows how well these students are new actors-resources "nomadic" keepers of the economic development of nations by their ability to innovate. It therefore underlines the nesting of a regional plan for the different actors involved in economic development in this demonstration as taking the work of the sociology of organizations Crozier and Friedberg that the new institutionalism defended by P. Hall and R.Taylor. For all thesis emphasizes the stranglehold of the individual student in the choice of training after which a rational (Weber) will opt for the more interesting training according to the criteria that will be clean. This thesis sheds light on the importance of these students through technological innovation they bring to the American nation offering a decisive strategic advantage in the international balance of power. Similarly, it demonstrates the irreversibility of the system of American higher education and engineering schools to strengthen its international recruitment in a globalized context.

This thesis develops a model that can be used to assess the ability of religious institutions to contribute to post-conflict state building. Highlighting the tendency in state building literature to stop short in discussing what seems to be inferred, but unnameable—religion—the research proposes a framework that identifies theoretical mechanisms through which religious institutions can contribute to post-conflict state building. Drawing from the theologies of Roman Catholicism and Sunni Islam the thesis then reflects upon why they would, of their own accord, lend their considerable legitimacy and resources. The thesis diverges from traditional approaches such as rational choice theory that suggest religious institutions act to maximise membership or assets, and instead embraces a teleological view recognizing the importance of belief structures in understanding a religious institution's motivations. It embraces salvation as a hermeneutical key to outline a Roman Catholic theology of state building while drawing upon the concept of justice for Sunni Islam. The thesis concludes by incorporating the particularistic nuances of Bosnia and Herzegovina's unique historically and culturally influenced religious practices, structures and theologies to suggest the ability and willingness of the two religions' institutions to contribute to their country's state building.

This dissertation explores the growing field of study around Maritime Security. While an increasingly common sub-heading in American naval strategy documents, maritime security operations are largely framed around individual threats (i.e. counter-piracy, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics). Here, we endeavor to explore how a seemingly disparate set of transnational issues fit into a more coherent framework to give greater theoretical substance to the notion of Maritime Security as a distinct concept. In particular, we examine, as our research question, whether the Broken Windows theory, a criminological construct of social disorganization, provides the lens through which to theorize maritime security in the littorals. By extrapolating from criminology, this dissertation engages with a small but growing impulse in studies on insurgencies, terrorism, and piracy to look beyond classic theories of security to better understand phenomena of political violence. To evaluate our research question, we begin by identifying two critical components of the Broken Windows theory, multidimensionality and context specificity. Multidimensionality refers to the web of interrelated individuals, organizations, and infrastructure upon which crime operates. Context specificity refers to the powerful influence of an individual or community's environment on behavior. These two themes, as explored in this dissertation, are brought into stark relief through an application of the Broken Windows theory. Leveraging this understanding of the theory, we explore our research question by employing process-tracing and detailed descriptions across three case studies (one primary and two illustrative)—the Caribbean Basin, the Gulf of Guinea, and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In so doing, we demonstrate how applying the lens that Broken Windows provides yields new and interesting perspectives on maritime security. As a consequence, this dissertation offers an example of a theoretical framework that provides greater continuity to the missions or threats frequently binned under the heading of maritime security, but infrequently associated with one another in the literature.

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De nombreuses études concluent à la supériorité des démocraties dans la guerre. A travers notre analyse des relations unissant aujourd’hui les piliers de la trinité clausewitzienne classique – pouvoir politique, peuple et armée – notre recherche s’attache à mettre en évidence l’importance, à cet égard, de la définition du « sens de l’action ». Complexe à conceptualiser, cet objet naît de l’interaction des trois piliers de la trinité qui contribuent à le construire. Cette dynamique prend son origine dans le sens conféré, par le discours politique,à la décision de recourir à la force. Ce sens politique repose sur les intérêts nationaux tels qu’appréhendés par les décideurs, mais également, du fait de la contrainte démocratique, sur les préférences de l’opinion publique telles que perçues par le politique. Le soutien public apparaît essentiel pour alimenter la volonté politique dans le conflit, mais influence aussi le moral des militaires déployés en opérations. Notre étude s’attache donc, en second lieu, à analyser les composantes du sens conféré par les militaires à la mission qu’ils exécutent, afin de déterminer dans quelle mesure un sens politique insuffisamment clair peut influencer le soutien public et, in fine, une éventuelle perte de sens chez les soldats. Cette analyse multiscalaire cherche en définitive à répondre à la question de savoir pourquoi l’on se bat, en approfondissant deux cas d’étude : la participation de l’Armée de terre française à la FIAS, en Afghanistan, et à la FINUL renforcée, au Liban. Elle peut s’inscrire, plus largement, dans le courant d’analyse cherchant à déterminer les facteurs d’efficacité dans la guerre, en esquissant l’idée que les démocraties peuvent, du fait des contraintes qui leur sont propres, présenter une faiblesse à cet égard. / Many studies have determined that democracies perform better in war. Through our analysis of the relationship that links the pillars of today’s clasewitzian trinity – political leaders, people and soldiers – our study seeks to highlight the importance, to this regard, of defining the « meaning of the action ». In spite of a complex conceptualization, this object can be apprehended by analyzing the interactions of the three pillars, within the frame of a military intervention abroad. This interactional dynamic’s origin lies in the meaning given by the political discourse to the decision to use force. This political meaning leans on national interests (as perceived by policymakers), but also on public preferences (as perceived by policymakers), due to democratic constraint. Public support appears essential to underpin the political will during a conflict, but it also affects soldiers’ morale in the field. Secondly, our study thus seeks to analyse the components of the meaning given by soldiers to their mission,in order to determine to what extent an uncleared or blurred political meaning might affect public support and ultimately provoke a loss of meaning among the military. This multiscale approach aims to answer to the ultimate question of knowing why are we fighting, by deepening two case studies : the French Army contribution to ISAF (in Afghanistan) and UNIFIL II (in Lebanon). It can more broadly come within the framework of previous researchs studying strategic and battlefield effectiveness, by underlying that democracies might have a weakness in this regard.

This thesis provides a framework for viewing socio-political contexts and how these relate to interventionist projects. The framework draws on and combines strands from international relations and sociological perspectives of social interaction. The central question becomes how intervention and existing social contexts interact to produce unintended outcomes. It applies the analysis to two separate wider contexts: Afghanistan and Somalia, with a particular focus on the self-declared independent Somaliland as an internally generated and controlled transformational process. Unlike abstract directions of theoretical development the framework seeks to provide a platform that sets aside ideological assumptions and from which interventionist projects can be observed and evaluated based on literature, field observations and interviews. Drawing on such diverse influences as fourth generation peace and conflict studies, Morphogenetics, and social forces theory, the framework explores conditions and interest formations to capture instances of local agency that are part of a continuity of local realities. It views social interaction without imposing Universalist value assumptions, but also without resorting to relativism or raising so many caveats that it becomes impractical. It exposes the agency of local interest formations hidden beneath the discourses of ideologically framed conflicts. These social agents are often dismissed as passive victims to be brought under the influence of for example the state, but are in reality able to subvert, co-opt, constrain or facilitate the forces that are dependent on them for social influence. In the end, it is the modes of mobilisation that emerge as the most crucial factor for understanding the relevant social dynamics.