University-firm collaboration has been regarded as central to the innovation performance of firms and, at aggregate level, of countries. These linkages have been widely promoted as part of innovation policy in many countries. However, there are no conclusive studies of the dynamics of these interactions in developing countries and most of the research on the topic has focused on one side of a two-sided interaction. This gap in our understanding is particularly relevant in the case of developing countries since their innovation systems are 'immature.' This thesis attempts to explain how multi-level factors shape the incentives for agents to engage in collaboration. The analysis reveals conflicting incentives on both sides of university-firm interactions. The productive and institutional environment, as well as the public policy under which academics, universities, and firms operate, create, often unintended, incentives both for and against collaboration. Increasing understanding of these interactions helps to align policy design. By studying university-firm collaboration in Chile, this thesis aims at advancing scholarship in four key ways: (i) by studying university-firm linkages in a developing country that possesses comparative advantages in natural resources; (ii) by incorporating management and innovation theories in the study of innovation incentives, which, until recently, have only been studied using market failure analysis in developing country settings; (iii) by using a novel analytical approach that combines the analysis of the supply and demand sides of these linkages, while also incorporating the multi-level factors influencing them; and (iv) by assessing the impact of university-firm collaboration on the innovation performance of a sample of Chilean firms using a novel dataset specially prepared for this thesis. This quantitative analysis provides valuable insight about the type of firms that benefit from collaboration with universities and about the type of innovations activities that produce these benefits.

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The aim of this project is to find whether the national system of performance measurement in the Russian public sector is affected by deliberate data manipulation. Using mixed methods I demonstrate that locally generated data are more likely to be manipulated than data reported by external agencies. Instead of improving managerial decisions, performance indicators have become a tool of symbolic bureaucratic accountability not linked to real managerial activities. 25 current and former civil servants from three regional governments in Russia were interviewed (including three ministers of economic development); quantitative data were obtained from a publicly available performance dataset covering the period of 2007-2011 (with data for a unified list of over 300 indicators from 83 regional governments). Two strategies of data manipulation were identified: a “prudent bureaucrat” strategy consisted in minimizing long-term risks by reporting “more-normal-than-real” figures; a more ambitions “reckless bureaucrat” strategy aimed at inflating figures to maximise credit. Systematic application of these two strategies has produced a detectable bias in the overall performance data with “prudent bureaucrat” strategy dominating. Performance reporting creates a “bureaucratic panopticon” and resulting behaviour may be understood using Michel Foucault’s notion of normalisation.

L’Accord de Cotonou, signé en juin 2000 entre l’Union européenne et les États d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP), se caractérise par un respect des droits de l’homme, des normes démocratiques et de l’État de droit d’une part, et la quête d’une conformité des normes aux principes de l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC), d’autre part. En effet, la politique de développement mise en place par l’Europe au profit des États ACP a vu le jour avec le Traité de Rome et la création du Fonds européen de développement au profit des ces pays. Pendant longtemps, le partenariat, essentiellement économique, a octroyé d’énormes avantages aux pays ACP en vue d’assurer leur développement. Depuis bientôt deux décennies que les normes politiques ont été insérées dans ce partenariat, force est de constater que quelques pays, dont le Togo, demeurent toujours réticents quant à l’instauration de réelles réformes démocratiques en vue d’assurer une véritable alternance politique. En dépit des sanctions infligées çà et là par l’Union européenne, ces pays trouvent un appui auprès de la Chine qui mène, avec les pays d’Afrique, un partenariat en toute exclusion de la société civile. / Cotonou agreement, signed in June 2000, between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries, is characterized by the respect of Human Rights, Democratic standards and Rule of Law in one side, and the quest for compliance with the standards principles of World trade Organization (WTO) in the other side. Since then the development policy implemented by Europe for ACP Countries was created with the Treaty of Rome which established European Development Funds, in favor of these countries. For many years, this partnership, mainly economic, has given huge benefits to ACP countries to ensure their development. For almost two decades that the political standards rules were introduced into this partnership, no doubt to notice that some countries, including Togo, are still reluctant to introduce real democratic reforms to ensure effective political changes. Despite sanctions here and there from the European Union, these countries find support from China who treats with African countries, a specific partnership excluding any Civil Society.

In an attempt to improve the effectiveness of aid, many of the stakeholders in the international aid regime agreed to commit to five key principles in the Paris Declaration (PD) in 2005. These principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability were aimed at improving the effective delivery and use of aid, although the Declaration has been followed by continuing doubts over aid effectiveness, especially in the context of deficiencies in donor cooperation and coordination and weak recipient ownership. Since the PD, donors have made varying efforts when it comes to implementing the Paris requirements towards greater aid effectiveness. However, after two OECD DAC monitoring surveys, in 2006 and in 2008, donors and recipients found out that the overall result of the progress of the implementation has been slow and that donor behavioural change towards implementing the PD has differed. In the light of this, this research aims to examine how donors have implemented the PD and why there are such differences in donor behaviour based on a comparative study of Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK), South Korea and China in Tanzania. This thesis reveals that there are key differences between advanced donors (Sweden and the UK) and emerging donors (Korea and China), particularly in terms of their levels of behavioural change in implementing the PD. While Sweden and the UK have shown greater progress in implementing many of the protocols of the PD, Korea and China have barely implemented the Paris requirements. The findings of this research highlight that the uneven responses and outcomes of the PD implementation are due to the design of the PD, which was based on the existing aid delivery mechanism of traditional donors at its top level, and the Paris requirements have not considered the bottom level reality of emerging donors who have different aid mechanisms from traditional donors. By examining seven major factors which inform the uneven donor performance (aid amount and number of staff, aid history of donors, political commitments, action plans and country specific strategies, aid management systems, aid modalities, and monitoring and evaluation), this study argues that the PD has been an 'easy option' for traditional donors such as Sweden and the UK, while it requires radical changes for emerging donors such as Korea and China. While this research relies on the public policy implementation theories to explain uneven donor behaviour in the PD implementation process, there has been less focus on the political economy and the self-interests and motivations of donors, which remains a main limitation of the study. Given this, this research has suggested conducting a further study on donor behaviour with a new methodological focus on the political economy and donor self-interests.

The <u>first essay</u> [“Twin Deficits and Free Lunches: Macroeconomic Outcomes In Anticipation of Foreign Aid”] concerns itself with situations in which private agents anticipate a future windfall (free lunch) that will help service the debt resulting from a present fiscal expansion (implemented via a temporary tax cut). Such expectations of a windfall can arise in the context of natural resource discoveries or, more interestingly, due to perceptions by agents in “too important to fail” countries that will be bailed out through higher foreign aid or debt relief. We employ an overlapping generations model featuring credit constraints to study the real effects of such free lunch expectations in a small open economy, drawing contrasts with the standard tax and money finance closure rules. The model is solved analytically and shows that anticipated aid is equivalent to current aid when agents have perfect foresight, so that a temporary tax cut is seen as permanent. Accordingly, agents raise their consumption and indebtedness (at the expense of future generations) by an amount that is an increasing function of their “impatience” (subjective rates of time preference plus probability of death). A worsening of the current account obtains (twin deficits) across a range of plausible closure rules, including those featuring money finance. The introduction of credit constrained households (we study the variant where myopic agents spend their current disposable incomes) does not alter the basic result in the case of full aid finance, but does matter for mixed tax-aid regimes, in more complex settings where agent expectations and donor promises on aid diverge, and when governments face borrowing constraints so that the timing of aid delivery matters. The <u>second essay</u> [“The Role of Domestic Debt in Economic Growth: An Empirical Investigation For Developing Economies”] focuses on the remaining source of government financing, i.e. domestic debt, and the role it can play in mobilizing private savings, facilitating credit intermediation in higher risk settings (i.e. serving a “collateral” function on bank balance sheets), developing financial markets and supporting economic growth in general. To investigate this question empirically, we set up a new domestic debt database covering about 100 developing economies, going back three decades to 1975; explore Granger causality links between domestic debt and key macroeconomic and institutional variables; and estimate the growth impact of domestic debt using panel regressions, allowing for non-linear effects. Domestic debt, as a share of GDP is found to exert a significant positive impact on economic growth, with potential channels including domestic savings mobilization, provision of risk-insurance on banks’ balance sheets; and greater institutional accountability of the state to its citizens. Although this result countervails more established arguments against domestic debt (i.e. that it leads to crowding out and banks to become lazy), there is some evidence that above a ratio of 35 percent of bank deposits, domestic debt does begin to undermine economic growth. The growth payoff also depends on debt quality, with higher payoffs observed for positive interest-rate bearing marketable debt issued to nonbank sectors. The <u>third and final essay</u> [“Why Do Banks in Developing Economies Hold Domestic Government Securities?”] explores demand-side determinants of domestic debt, by focusing on commercial bank holdings of government paper, discriminating carefully between voluntary factors (such as mean-variance portfolio optimization) and statutory ones (cash reserve and capital adequacy requirements). The analysis is made possible by the construction of a dataset on government and private returns (real and nominal) for almost 600 banks from 70 emerging and low-income economies, spanning the (pre-Basel II) period 1995-2005. A battery of structural cross-section regressions indicates that banks’ portfolio decisions are at least as significantly influenced by mean-variance considerations as regulatory factors: the actual portfolio share of government securities (λ) responds intuitively, and sizably, to variations in the moments of the distributions for government and private returns as well as in the minimum-variance portfolio share (λ*). Higher cash reserve requirements tilt portfolios away from government securities toward riskier private lending, while higher capital adequacy requirements work the other way. The association between actual portfolios and the identified determinants is noticeably weaker at lower ends of the λ distribution, suggesting the domination of non-CAPM factors in those contexts.

La thèse vise à examiner les politiques d'aide au développement de l'Union européenne (UE) et leur impact sur les conditions politiques, économiques, sécuritaires et sociales dans le Territoire palestinien occupé (TPO). De plus, elle vise à répondre à la question de savoir si ces politiques ont concrètement contribué à la construction d'une économie palestinienne solide conduisant à l'établissement d'un État palestinien, ou si elles étaient seulement des politiques destinées à protéger un processus de paix, délabré en permanence, et à maintenir le statu quo de l'occupation tout en répondant aux exigences de survie de la population palestinienne. L'étude met en lumière l'évolution de la politique d'aide européenne au peuple palestinien en accordant de l'intérêt à l'évolution de la politique étrangère de l'UE envers le conflit palestino-israélien et aux institutions en charge de la coopération au développement avec les pays tiers au sein de l'Union. La présente recherche a pour objet l'aide accordée par l'UE aux Palestiniens pour la période s'étendant de 1993 à 2014. Elle met en évidence un ensemble de résultats, dont le plus important est que cette aide a joué un rôle éminent afin d'éviter l'effondrement de l'Autorité nationale palestinienne (ANP) et d'aider le peuple palestinien. Elle s'est diversifiée au cours des années, en quantité et en qualité, afin de s'adapter à la situation politique, économique et humanitaire dans le TPO. Elle a contribué aux réformes réussies effectuées par l'ANP dans plusieurs secteurs, et elle a davantage soutenu les plans nationaux palestiniens de développement. Pourtant, cette aide n'a réussi ni à freiner les politiques de dé-développement pratiquées systématiquement par l'occupation, ni à mettre de la pression sur Israël. Cette recherche souligne que cette aide ne réalisera pas ses objectifs, notamment celui de l'établissement d'un État palestinien viable coexistant avec l’État d'Israël en paix et en sécurité, tant que l'UE n'utilisera pas son pouvoir économique et ne transformera pas sa rhétorique en actions concrètes sur le terrain. / The study aims to examine the policies of development aid of the European Union (EU) and their impact on the political, economic, security and social conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT). In addition, it seeks to answer the question whether these policies have helped to build a strong Palestinian economy leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state, or if they were only policies to protect the peace process, permanently dilapidated, and maintain the status quo of the occupation while meeting the basic requirements of survival of the Palestinian population. The study highlights the evolution of the European political support to the Palestinian people by highlighting the evolution of EU foreign policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the institutions responsible for the development cooperation with third countries within the Union. This research relates to the aid granted by the EU to the Palestinians for the period extending from 1993 to 2014. It highlights a set of results, the most important is that this aid has played a prominent role in avoiding the collapse of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and in helping the Palestinian people. It has diversified over the years, both in quantity and quality, to fit the political, economic and humanitarian situation in the OPT. It contributed to the successful reforms carried out by the PNA in several sectors, and has further supported the Palestinian national development plans. However, this aid has not succeeded to curb the de-development policies systematically practiced by the occupation or to put pressure on Israel. This research underlines that this aid will not achieve its objectives, including that of the establishment of a viable Palestinian state coexisting with the State of Israel in peace and security, as long as the EU does not use its economic power and does not turn its rhetoric into concrete action on the ground.