Neutrality has long been seen as impartiality in war (Grotius, 1925), and is codified as such in The Hague and Geneva Conventions. This dissertation empirically investigates the activities of three neutral states in the Second World War and determines, on a purely economic basis, these countries actually employed realist principles to ensure their survival. Neutrals maintain their independence by offering economic concessions to the belligerents to make up for their relative military weakness. Depending on their position, neutral countries can also extract concessions from the belligerents if their situation permits it.   Despite their different starting places, governments and threats against them, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland provided similar types of political and economic concessions to the belligerents. This thesis comparatively investigates neutral trade, labour and capital. Using standardized trade statistics, this study shows that while all three neutrals were dependent on the Germans for most basic goods, they were generally able to benefit from relative gains in prices and excess imports of goods in periods of German weakness. In trade with the Allies, at least two of the three countries permitted the illicit export of items necessary for the Allied war effort, and did so at reduced relative prices.   All three neutrals benefitted from substantial services revenue and positive balance of payments in all of their belligerent relationships. In several cases the neutrals were able to force the belligerents to cover their balance of payments deficits in gold because they needed to maintain access to the neutral markets. The final chapters demonstrate that despite political promises, the Spanish and Swiss governments constructed labour transfer systems to limit the number of workers for Germany.

The conduct of military forces is not limited to their territory. They are typically sent on missions that potentially affect civilians beyond the borders of the sending State. Under the European Convention, the linking factor bringing its protection into play is that of jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR. What is the reach of the European Convention in the context of participation by Contracting Parties in military operations abroad? The interpretation of the concept of jurisdiction has evolved from its territorial beginnings. After a detailed analysis of the case-law on the interpretation of jurisdiction, including the latest landmark cases of Al-Jedda and Al-Skeini, I conclude that the current case-law lacks coherence. The search for a more coherent approach to determining questions of jurisdiction, in situations involving military conduct abroad has steered this thesis into considering the unsatisfactory interplay between humanitarian law and human rights law and the way in which the two systems apply to civilians caught in military operations. An analysis of the case-law under the European Convention in situations where Contracting Parties send troops as part of multi-national forces has indicated the benefits of considering dual or multiple attribution rather than a separation of jurisdiction. I propose a more coherent approach to jurisdiction replacing the present uncertainty in the context of applicability of the European Convention to military operations abroad. I argue, in all situations, for a test requiring a direct and immediate link between the conduct of Contracting Parties and the violation of Convention rights as offering better protection of human rights for individuals trapped in conflicts. In this way the supervisory effect of the European Convention is enhanced.

Journalists reporting from conflict zones are increasingly at risk of injury or death. Not only are they at risk of becoming a casualty in the crossfire, they are now often directly targeted and killed because of their profession. The legal framework protecting journalists in conflict zones consists predominantly of International Humanitarian Law, supplemented by International Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law. The main body of law providing protection to journalists consists of the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols, which are now several decades old. Since their drafting, there have been significant changes in the way we conduct wars, as well as in the way journalists operate and report from conflict zones. This raises the question whether this legal framework is still suitable for the protection of journalists in contemporary conflicts. This thesis confirms that the legal framework contains, at least in theory, a significant number of provisions that continue to provide protection for journalists in conflict zones. What is clear, however, is that there are significant differences in the protection awarded to journalists based on the type of journalist, for example whether they are embedded or function independently in conflict zones, the type of conflict they are covering and even their nationality. The result is a rather complicated legal framework that is not always easy to apply in practice. It has been argued by the International Committee of the Red Cross, a view also reflected in most of the academic literature, that the protection offered by the current legal framework is adequate, but that the enforcement of it is lacking. This is considered the predominant reason why journalists reporting on conflicts currently face such significant risks to their safety. While this is clearly part of the problem, this thesis challenges the notion that the legal framework provides all necessary protection and that only through stronger enforcement can protection be increased. In particular, it suggests that this ignores the effect that clarity and the comprehensiveness of the framework can have on enforcement. Having explored the gaps and limitations in the existing law, this thesis sets out the case for introducing a dedicated convention for the protection of journalists in conflict zones in order to clarify and streamline the current legal framework.

This is a thesis about the applicability of the jus in bello to armed conflicts involving non-state armed groups. The thesis focuses on the thresholds of applicability. These are the definitions of actors and situations that activate the applicability of the jus in bello. The aim is to illuminate and critique the regulatory rationales behind the different definitions of actors and situations in the different thresholds. The evolution of the thresholds is reviewed chronologically. Accordingly, the enquiry ranges from the 19th century doctrines of recognition of belligerency and insurgency, through common article 3 and Additional Protocols I and II, to the law developed by the ICTY and included in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court. While the thresholds constitute the centre of the enquiry, their meaning and function are further elucidated by the analysis of the process of their assessment, as well as the extent of the substantive legal regime they activate. The central question of the thesis is whether there has been a gradual shift from a status-based rationale to one focused on the humanitarian protection of individuals, in the evolution of the thresholds of applicability. A status-based rationale fits with a system of horizontal regulation of state-like collective entities and allows considerations and perceptions of the ascription of status through legal regulation to determine the threshold of applicability. A humanitarian-protection rationale is more related to a system of vertical regulation irrespective of status and links the applicability of the law to the individual and her protection. The argument proposed is that such a gradual shift is indeed visible, if tempered by the continuous role that considerations of status have in conflict situations and the still largely decentralised system of assessment of the applicability of the law.

States may avoid categorising responses to terrorism as armed conflict and yet still use lethal force, administrative detention and other tactics or procedures more usually associated with armed conflict. States are then potentially able to derogate from certain liberty and fair trial norms under the human rights treaties that some suggest are irreducible if international humanitarian law is applicable. States may also interpret the requirement of humane treatment in line with what may appear to be a lower standard of treatment required by certain of the human rights treaties. This thesis examines whether the fundamental rights to liberty, fair trial and humane treatment differ during responses to contemporary terrorism above or below the armed conflict threshold. The thesis concludes that there is little difference between the two regimes of international humanitarian law and human rights law in relation to the irreducible core of these fundamental rights and so it may not be important, in these respects at least, to be clear whether or not an armed conflict exists in legal terms. However, for these fundamental rights, States parties to any of the regional human rights treaties are increasingly unlikely to be able to claim a lack of jurisdiction and so a rights vacuum for those they would call terrorists during extra-territorial operations.

Malicious cyber-attacks, those cyber-attacks which do not rise to the level of force in international law, pose a significant problem to the international community. Attributing responsibility for malicious cyber-attacks is imperative if states are to respond and prevent the attacks from continuing. Unfortunately, due to both technical and legal issues attributing malicious cyber-attacks to the responsible state or non-state actor is difficult if not impossible in the vast majority of attacks. Even if an injured state may recursively trace the malicious cyber-attack to the responsible IP address, this is not enough under the current international customary law to hold a state or non-state actor responsible for the cyber-attack as it is virtually impossible to bridge the air gap between the computer system and end user to demonstrate affirmatively who initiated the attack. Even if a state could demonstrate the identity of the end user that initiated the attack, this is not enough to link the end user to the state for responsibility to lie under existing customary international law. As such this study was conducted to analyze the issue of malicious cyber-attacks as a matter of customary international law to ascertain mechanism to hold states responsible for malicious cyber-attacks which originate from a state’s sovereign territory. Specifically, this study addresses the issue of legal and technical attribution of malicious cyber-attacks for the purposes of holding states responsible for those attacks. This study argues that under existing customary international law attributing malicious cyber-attacks for the purpose of ascertaining state responsibility is difficult if not impossible. As such, this study proposes alternative theories, which already exist within customary international law, for holding states responsible for malicious cyber-attacks which originate from their sovereign territory. This study addresses alternative theories of state responsibility existing in customary international law such as those put forth in Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel and the theory of strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities. In addition, this study addresses the theory of indirect responsibility, the duty to prevent harm, and due diligence in cyber-space. Lastly this study analysis the impact of the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and NATO forces and determines that a burgeoning rule of attribution may be present which would impact the attribution of malicious cyber-attacks to states. This study makes an original and important addition to the corpus of international law by addressing the issues of technical and legal attribution, state responsibility, and the duty to prevent malicious cyber-attacks as a matter of customary international law. This study is needed; malicious cyber-attacks implicate international law, as the majority are interstate in nature. However, international law currently has no paradigm, per se, in place to effectively deal with the issue of malicious cyber-attacks.

It is 150 years since the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), following Henry Dunant’s experiences during the aftermath of the Battle of Solferino. It is 100 years since the commencement of the Great War: if we think about a ‘traditional’ battlefield, what images come to mind? Perhaps one imagines soldiers in uniform, tanks, guns and trenches. Do the emblems of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (IRCRCM) feature in the imagined conflict scenario? Now imagine the conflicts happening today in, for example, Syria, Mali, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Ukraine. In these conflicts, soldiers mingle with civilians in towns, armoured vehicles and open backed trucks transport non- uniformed soldiers between conflict areas and weapons include, amongst others, improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers and sexual violence. Nevertheless the emblems of the IRCRCM continue to emblazon the uniforms of medical personnel and their equipment, vehicles and aid boxes. What consequences do the changes in the nature of armed conflicts have for the ICRC? The human consequences of conflict and the presence of the ICRC has been a constant for 150 years, but the needs of the population and the types of violence continually change. Indeed, since the creation of the ICRC in 1863, the methods, means and actors in conflicts have changed, but so has the practice of the ICRC. This thesis considers the legality of such developments. The ICRC is, perhaps most significantly, the self-entitled, ‘guardian’ of international humanitarian law (IHL) and a neutral and independent entity. This thesis considers the activities currently undertaken by the ICRC in the name of ‘humanitarianism’. It addresses whether a strict interpretation of the Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV 1949, Additional Protocols I and II and Statutes of the ICRC would show that it is, as an organisation, usurping its mandate and principles. It also takes into account the ‘ICRC Study on Customary IHL’. The thesis examines the issue of whether the ICRC is an organisation with International Legal Personality (ILP) and, if so, whether it has legitimately extended its role beyond that provided in the Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV 1949, Additional Protocols I and II and the Statutes of the IRCRCM. More broadly therefore the thesis examines the relationship between the ICRC and international law, including IHL, jus ad bellum and international human rights law (IHRL). One unique contribution made by this thesis is to undertake a substantial analysis of the meaning and implementation of humanity, which is a principle of the IRCRCM. The IRCRCM definition of the principle of humanity is: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, born of a desire to bring assistance without discrimination to the wounded on the battlefield, endeavours, in its international and national capacity, to prevent and alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect human life and health and to ensure respect for the human being. It promotes mutual understanding, friendship, cooperation and lasting peace amongst all people. Chapter five of the thesis shows that emerging concepts in the latter part of the twentieth century, in particular sovereignty as responsibility, human security and the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), are indicative of a development within the international community which identified the plight of individuals within sovereign States as relevant to the international community at large. In particular, the ‘humanity’ and humanitarian needs of people living within states, in particular during and after conflict, became part of international discourse. Humanitarian assistance is no longer restricted to the provision of aid to soldiers. The idea of inhumanity in internal armed conflicts also gained traction on the international stage. It is evident from recent conflicts such as Libya, Syria and Ukraine that international willingness and ability to respond to such situations varies considerably. This thesis, therefore, considers whether the ICRC is able to reach people on the ground in a way that more politicised actors, such as the UN, are not. It considers whether there is a case to be made for a humanitarian approach to protection during, and after, armed conflict? Is the ICRC capable of reaching individuals and communities in a promising and effective way? Has the ICRC had to adapt its humanitarian assistance and protection roles to adequately respond to the changing nature of armed conflicts? These questions permeate the analysis of the mandate of the ICRC and its current work, which is undertaken throughout this thesis. Critically, this thesis dedicates a chapter to analyse what ‘humanity’ means today. In much literature humanity is considered in terms of IHL, which, it is argued, provides a limited definition of such. Likewise, much literature on the ICRC centre’s on its links to IHL. The ICRC often forms a subsection of a chapter on IHL or is viewed through the lens of IHL. This thesis goes further than traditional accounts of the ICRC, as it presents the ICRC as key actor in the long-term protection and assistance of individuals and communities suffering through and trying to recover from armed conflict. It addresses the question of how to interpret ‘humanity’ and whether, perhaps, there is a case to argue that it can and should be interpreted more broadly, given the influx of human focused concepts to emerge since the end of the Second World War. This thesis focuses on sovereignty as responsibility, human security and Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) as key examples of such, as they all relate to humanitarianism. Their specific links are considered in detail in chapter five. Teitel published ‘Humanity’s Law’ in 2011 which reflects on issues similar to those contained in this thesis. However, much of Teitel’s analysis remains grounded in ‘black-letter’ law, whereas this thesis is taking a socio-legal approach and focuses on the law and practice of the ICRC. Humanity’s Law, as a concept, is very close to this Author’s interpretation and understanding of international law and the international legal order, and, as such, it is imperative to refer, throughout the thesis, to ideas put forward in ‘Humanity’s Law’. In terms of existing literature and academic argument on the matter of ‘humanity’, Teitel provides a comprehensive analysis of case law and theory. In addition much literature on the ICRC dedicates a passing comment to the Principles of the IRCRCM, which include ‘humanity’. Sovereignty as responsibility, human security and RtoP are reflective of a shift away from a state-centric model of the international legal order. There is increasing awareness and political will in terms of the plight of vulnerable populations in need. The key for this thesis is whether the ICRC mandate and practice are reflective of the developing notions of humanity, that is, is the ICRC ‘buying in’ to security or interventionist interpretations of humanity? Or, which would be a much more daring conclusion to draw, is the ICRC actually ‘feeding’ the development of ‘humanity’ as a concept which is, in turn, permeating international legal discourse more broadly? The traditional theory of human security, as proposed by the United Nations Development Programme in 1994, considered economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security to be of consequence to the people living in conflict and other insecure environments. These types of security were seldom prioritised in traditional security paradigms, which focused on national security. This thesis considers human security to be of continuing importance to people on the ground during and after armed conflict and other situations of violence. For people trying to rebuild their lives, family life, food, health and community security are as important, if not more important, than the maintenance of territorial borders. In this regard, it considers the work of the Economic Security (EcoSec) Unit, which assesses needs at household level in order to obtain first-hand local information. This thesis required the undertaking of interviews with ICRC delegates at the headquarters in Geneva. The literature in this area is somewhat limited and that which is produced comes predominantly from the ICRC. It was necessary therefore to undertake empirical research to provide an original contribution to research in this field and to comprehensively address the research questions of this thesis. Finally, this thesis uses a case study of the ongoing conflict in the DRC to examine the activities of the ICRC and shows how, and to what extent, the changes within the ICRC practice are impacting people on the ground. The case study was also informed by the interviews.

'International humanitarian law' (IHL) has long differentiated between international and non-international armed conflicts, regulating the latter, at least at the level of treaty law, far less than the former. One of the starkest examples of this is in the case of administrative detention on security grounds or 'internment'. Thus, IHL applicable in international armed conflicts establishes a seemingly robust regime regarding internment. As such, it specifies the limited grounds on which an individual may be interned, the procedural safeguards that must be provided to internees, and the point at which the internee must be released. In the conventional IHL provisions applicable in non-international armed conflicts, on the other hand, no equivalent rules are made explicit. In addition, the application in such situations of international human rights law (IHRL), which also contains procedural rules applicable to detention, is considered by many to be very controversial. This has led to considerable confusion over the current state of the law governing detention in non-international armed conflict, and it is here that some of the most controversial practices and intractable debates within IHL of the last decade have developed. The present thesis seeks to clarify the law here and does so through a comprehensive examination of both IHL and IHRL. It begins with a discussion of the general context in which the thesis falls, i.e. the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts. This is considered from an historical perspective, considering the basis for the distinction as well as its appropriateness in contemporary international law. Having considered this general question, the thesis then moves on to an examination of the current lex lata with regard to internment in non-international armed conflicts, with a comprehensive examination of both IHL and IHRL. Regarding IHL, it is shown that, whilst there remains a dearth of conventional and customary rules here, one can discern a general prohibition of internment that is not necessary as a result of the conflict. The application of the IHRL rules on detention in non-international conflicts and their interaction with relevant rules of IHL are then explored, with substantial reference to the practice of both states and human rights treaty bodies. It is shown that, absent derogation, human rights treaty rules continue fully to regulate detentions by states in relation to non-international armed conflicts, alongside the minimal rules of IHL. However, it is also demonstrated that the current law remains inadequate in this area. First, there is significant disagreement between the human rights treaty bodies on the extent to which derogation from these rules is permitted. Second, persons detained in non-international conflicts by non-state armed groups or by states with no human rights treaty obligations are protected by the far more basic customary rules in this area. The thesis, therefore, concludes with a set of concrete proposals for developing the law here, in a manner that builds upon and clarifies the current obligations of all states and non-state armed groups.

Les enfants constituent un groupe vulnérable de la société et à ce titre ils nécessitent une protection spécifique, en particulier en temps de conflits armés où leurs droits peuvent être violés, qu'ils appartiennent à la population civile ou qu’ils soient impliqués militairement dans des conflits. Cette protection relève d’une problématique récente et qui demeure plus que jamais actuelle. Elle pose la question de savoir quel est le but de la spécificité annoncée dans la mesure où existe déjà une protection générale des civils. Faut-il entendre alors que cette dernière est insuffisante à protéger les enfants dans les situations de guerre ? Également, la protection tant générale que spécifique appliquée aux enfants, varie-t-elle selon que le conflit armé est de type international ou non-international ? L’ensemble de ces questions fera l’objet de la première partie de la thèse, intitulée : « La protection des enfants civils en temps de conflits armés ». La seconde partie de la thèse portant sur « La protection des enfants soldats en temps de conflits armés » se penche sur les conséquences juridiques de la participation des enfants à des hostilités. Et, dans ce cadre, savoir si ces enfants capturés par l’ennemi obtiendront le statut de prisonnier de guerre et s’ils seront poursuivis pénalement en cas de commission de crimes de guerre. L’autre question soulevée dans cette partie est celle de la responsabilité de l’État, du groupe, de l’individu, qui recrute des enfants aux fins de les utiliser dans des conflits armés, en dépit de leur engagement à ne pas le faire. Le cas de la Libye apparaît ici le plus indiqué ; en effet, le pays a traité de ces questions dans sa législation qui présente cependant des failles que nous mettons en exergue, d’autant que dans cet État a éclaté en février 2011 une guerre où sont recrutés et utilisés des enfants. / The protection of children during armed conflict - Comparative study between international law and Libyan lawChildren are a vulnerable group in society and as such they require special protection, especially in times of armed conflict where their rights may be violated, whether they belong to the civilian population or they are militarily involved in armed conflict. This protection is a recent problem and remains more than ever current. It raises the question of what is the purpose of the specificity announced to the extent that there is already a general protection of civilians. Must we then understand that the latter is insufficient to protect children in war situations? Also, does the general as well as the specific protection applied to children vary according to whether the armed conflict is international or non-international? All of these questions will be the subject of the first part of the thesis entitled: « The protection of civilian children in times of armed conflict ».The second part of the thesis on « The protection of child soldiers in times of armed conflict » examines the legal consequences of the participation of children in hostilities. And in this context, whether these children captured by the enemy will get the status of prisoner of war and whether they will be criminally prosecuted in case of commission of war crimes. The other issue raised in this section is the responsibility of the State, the group, the individual, who recruits children for use in armed conflict, despite their commitment not to do so. . The case of Libya appears here the most indicated; indeed, the country has dealt with these issues in its legislation which however presents flaws that we highlight, especially since in that state broke out in February 2011 a war where are recruited and used children.