Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing". Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to. Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights. Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so, further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept. Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg. Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit. Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake, is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte. In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil. Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.

Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing". Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to. Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights. Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so, further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept. Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg. Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit. Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake, is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte. In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil. Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / In hierdie ondersoek is daar navorsing gedoen oor die aard en rol van fisiese beheer in die sakereg met die oog daarop om dit te omskryf en die funksies daarvan te identifiseer. By die verkryging van eiendomsreg word net vereis dat die fisiese beheer wat ten aansien van die saak uitgeoefen word, effektief moet wees. Of 'n saak effektief beheer word al dan nie, word aan die hand van die heersende verkeersopvattings getoets. Hierdie verkeersmaatstawwe wat in die praktyk ten aansien van bepaalde soorte sake uitgekristalliseer het, is buigsaam en veranderlik en dit maak dit moontlik dat die reg by maatskaplike en ekonomiese veranderinge aanpas. Die funksie van fisiese beheer in gevalle van verkryging is altyd publisiteit. In die geval van die beskerming van eiendomsreg word fisiese beheer besonder breed omskryf en daar word slegs verwag dat die persoon van wie die saak teruggeeis word, genoegsame beheer daaroor moet he om dit te kan teruggee. Die funksie van beheer is hier suiwer funksioneel. By die verlies van eiendomsreg speel fisiese beheer nie juis 'n besondere rol nie aangesien die verlies van beheer nie noodwendig op die verlies of beeindiging van eiendomsreg dui nie. Wanneer dit wel ter sprake kom, is die funksie daarvan publisiteit. In die geval van die verkryging van besit en houerskap, dien daarop gelet te word dat die enigste vereiste is dat beheer effektief moet wees en dit word weer eens aan die hand van verkeersmaatstawwe bepaal. Fisiese beheer word strenger omskryf vir verkryging as vir behoud. By die beskerming van besit en houerskap is die enigste vereiste wat gestel word dat beheer vreedsaam en ongestoord moes gewees het. Wanneer beheer oor 'n saak verloor word, gaan dit gewoonlik gepaard met die verlies van besit of houerskap. Die funksie van fisiese beheer is deurgaans publisiteit. Fisiese beheer word redelik streng omskryf vir doeleindes van 'n gewone pand en daar word gewoonlik vereis dat die pandsaak gelewer en gehou moet word vir die vestiging en behoud van 'n pandreg. Die funksies van beheer is hier sekuriteit en publisiteit. / This study examines the nature and role of physical control in the law of property with a view to defining this concept and identifying its functions. The only requirement for the acquisition of ownership is the exercise of effective physical control of the thing in question. Whether or not a thing is physically under control, is determined by the application of legal indicators deriving from use and custom. Such indicators as have cristallised in practice in respect of certain classes of things, are flexible and variable and enable the law to adjust to social and economical changes. The function of physical control in cases of acquisition is always publicity. The definition of physical control in cases of protection of ownership is particularly wide, the only requirement being that the person from whom the thing is reclaimed must have sufficient physical control of it to enable him to return it. The function of control is purely functional. Since loss of control does not necessarily indicate the termination or loss of ownerhip, physical control has no significant part to play in respect of loss, of ownership. Where it does come into play, however, its function will be publicity. In cases of acquisition of possession and holdership it is essential that physical control of the thing is effective and once again this will be determined by application of legal indicators. The definition of physical control is much narrower in respect of acquisition than in respect of retention. The only requisite for the protection of possession and holdership is peaceful and undisturbed physical control. Loss of control of a thing is usually indicative of loss of possession or holdership. Throughout the function of control is publicity. Physical control is quite narrowly defined in cases of ordinary pledge insofar as delivery and retention of the pledge object are usually required for the establishment and continuation of the pledge. In this instance, physical control serves the functions of both publicity and security. / Mercantile Law / LL.D.

Summaries in Afrikaans and English / Text in Afrikaans / In hierdie ondersoek is daar navorsing gedoen oor die aard en rol van fisiese beheer in die sakereg met die oog daarop om dit te omskryf en die funksies daarvan te identifiseer. By die verkryging van eiendomsreg word net vereis dat die fisiese beheer wat ten aansien van die saak uitgeoefen word, effektief moet wees. Of 'n saak effektief beheer word al dan nie, word aan die hand van die heersende verkeersopvattings getoets. Hierdie verkeersmaatstawwe wat in die praktyk ten aansien van bepaalde soorte sake uitgekristalliseer het, is buigsaam en veranderlik en dit maak dit moontlik dat die reg by maatskaplike en ekonomiese veranderinge aanpas. Die funksie van fisiese beheer in gevalle van verkryging is altyd publisiteit. In die geval van die beskerming van eiendomsreg word fisiese beheer besonder breed omskryf en daar word slegs verwag dat die persoon van wie die saak teruggeeis word, genoegsame beheer daaroor moet he om dit te kan teruggee. Die funksie van beheer is hier suiwer funksioneel. By die verlies van eiendomsreg speel fisiese beheer nie juis 'n besondere rol nie aangesien die verlies van beheer nie noodwendig op die verlies of beeindiging van eiendomsreg dui nie. Wanneer dit wel ter sprake kom, is die funksie daarvan publisiteit. In die geval van die verkryging van besit en houerskap, dien daarop gelet te word dat die enigste vereiste is dat beheer effektief moet wees en dit word weer eens aan die hand van verkeersmaatstawwe bepaal. Fisiese beheer word strenger omskryf vir verkryging as vir behoud. By die beskerming van besit en houerskap is die enigste vereiste wat gestel word dat beheer vreedsaam en ongestoord moes gewees het. Wanneer beheer oor 'n saak verloor word, gaan dit gewoonlik gepaard met die verlies van besit of houerskap. Die funksie van fisiese beheer is deurgaans publisiteit. Fisiese beheer word redelik streng omskryf vir doeleindes van 'n gewone pand en daar word gewoonlik vereis dat die pandsaak gelewer en gehou moet word vir die vestiging en behoud van 'n pandreg. Die funksies van beheer is hier sekuriteit en publisiteit. / This study examines the nature and role of physical control in the law of property with a view to defining this concept and identifying its functions. The only requirement for the acquisition of ownership is the exercise of effective physical control of the thing in question. Whether or not a thing is physically under control, is determined by the application of legal indicators deriving from use and custom. Such indicators as have cristallised in practice in respect of certain classes of things, are flexible and variable and enable the law to adjust to social and economical changes. The function of physical control in cases of acquisition is always publicity. The definition of physical control in cases of protection of ownership is particularly wide, the only requirement being that the person from whom the thing is reclaimed must have sufficient physical control of it to enable him to return it. The function of control is purely functional. Since loss of control does not necessarily indicate the termination or loss of ownerhip, physical control has no significant part to play in respect of loss, of ownership. Where it does come into play, however, its function will be publicity. In cases of acquisition of possession and holdership it is essential that physical control of the thing is effective and once again this will be determined by application of legal indicators. The definition of physical control is much narrower in respect of acquisition than in respect of retention. The only requisite for the protection of possession and holdership is peaceful and undisturbed physical control. Loss of control of a thing is usually indicative of loss of possession or holdership. Throughout the function of control is publicity. Physical control is quite narrowly defined in cases of ordinary pledge insofar as delivery and retention of the pledge object are usually required for the establishment and continuation of the pledge. In this instance, physical control serves the functions of both publicity and security. / Mercantile Law / LL.D.