Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing". Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to. Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights. Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so, further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept. Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg. Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit. Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake, is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte. In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil. Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.

Thesis (LLM (Mercantile Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis discusses the meaning of public purpose and public interest in s 25 of the Final Constitution. The main question that is asked is: how does ‘public purpose’ differ from ‘public interest’, and what impact did the Final Constitution have on the interpretation and application of the public purpose requirement in expropriation law in South Africa? This question is investigated by looking at how the courts have dealt with the public purpose requirement, both before and during the first years of the constitutional era in South African law, and also with reference to foreign law. The thesis shows that the position has not changed that much yet because the interpretation of this requirement has not received much attention in constitutional case law. The main focus is to show that the reason for the interpretation problems surrounding this requirement is the apparent conflict between the formulation of the public purpose requirement in the Final Constitution and in the current Expropriation Act of 1975. It is pointed out that the efforts that were made to resolve the problem failed because the Expropriation Bill 2008 was withdrawn. Consequently, it is still unclear how the public purpose requirement has been changed by s 25(2) of the Constitution, which authorises expropriation for a public purpose or in the public interest. This apparent lack of clarity is discussed and analysed with specific reference to the different types of third party transfers that are possible in expropriation law. Comparative case law from Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the European Convention on Human Rights is considered to show how other jurisdictions deal with the public purpose requirement in their own constitutions or expropriation legislation, with particular emphasis on how they solve problems surrounding third party transfers. In the final chapter it is proposed that the Expropriation Bill should be reintroduced to bring the formulation of the public purpose requirement in the Act in line with s 25(2) and that expropriation for transfer to third parties could be in order if it serves a legitimate public purpose or the public interest (e g because the third party provides a public utility or for land reform), but that expropriation for economic development should be reviewed strictly to ensure that it serves a more direct and clear public interest than just stimulating the economy or creating jobs. / AFRIKAANS OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis bespreek die betekenis van openbare doel en openbare belang in a 25 van die Finale Grondwet. Die belangrikste vraag is: hoe verskil ‘openbare doel’ van ‘openbare belang’, en watter impak het die Finale Grondwet op die interpretasie en toepassing van die openbare doel-vereiste in die Suid-Afrikaanse onteieningsreg gehad? Die vraag word ondersoek met verwysing na die howe se hantering van die openbare doel-vereiste voor en gedurende die eerste jare van die nuwe grondwetlike bedeling, asook met verwysing na buitelandse reg. Die tesis toon aan dat die posisie nog min verander het omdat die interpretasie van die vereiste in die grondwetlike regspraak nog nie veel aandag gekry het nie. Daar word aangetoon dat interpretasieprobleme rondom hierdie vereiste ontstaan as gevolg van die oënskynlike teenstrydigheid tussen die formulering van die openbare doel-vereiste in die Finale Grondwet en in die huidige Onteieningswet van 1975. Daar word geargumenteer dat pogings om die probleem op te los gefaal het omdat die Onteieningswetsontwerp 2008 teruggetrek is. Dit is daarom steeds onduidelik hoe die openbare doel-vereiste deur a 25(2) van die Grondwet, wat onteiening vir ‘n openbare doel of in die openbare belang toelaat, verander is. Hierdie oënskynlike gebrek aan sekerheid word bespreek met verwysing na die verskillende gevalle waarin eiendom onteien en dan aan derde partye oorgedra word. Regsvergelykende regspraak van Australië, Duitsland, die Verenigde Koninkryk, die Verenigde State van Amerika en die Europese Konvensie op Mensregte word oorweeg om te wys hoe ander regstelsels die openbare doel-vereiste in hulle grondwette of onteieningswetgewing interpreteer, spesifiek ten aansien van die oordrag van eiendom aan derde partye. In die laaste hoofstuk word aan die hand gedoen dat die Onteieningswetsontwerp weer ter tafel geneem moet word om die bewoording van die openbare doel-vereiste in die Onteieningswet in ooreenstemming met a 25(2) te bring. Daar word ook aan die hand gedoen dat onteiening vir oordrag aan derde partye in orde kan wees as dit ‘n geldige openbare doel of die openbare belang dien (bv omdat die derde party ‘n openbare diens lewer of in belang van grondhervorming), maar dat onteiening vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling streng hersien moet word om te verseker dat dit ‘n meer direkte en duidelike openbare belang dien as bloot om die ekonomie te stimuleer of om werk te skep.

LL.M. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

The intention of this dissertation is not to embark on a discussion on the desirability of a property clause, nor to undertake a full analysis of the property and environmental clauses as they appear in both the interim and working draft constitutions. Instead it is my intention to analyze the inherent conflict that exists between property rights, specifically ownership, and environmental conservation. This will be assessed against the backdrop of the common law, case law and in the light of both the interim and working draft constitutions. Due to the fact that the terms "deprived" and "expropriate", as used in both constitutions, broadly correspond to the concepts of police powers and eminent domain, and since measures taken in the name of environmental conservation are invariably carried out under the auspices of the States police power, it is necessary to :- (a) assess the "deprivation"-"expropriation" conflict and emphasise the ambiguity that can arise in interpreting and differentiating between the two terms; (b) draw a distinction between police power deprivations and expropriatory deprivations. Foreign jurisdictions have experienced grave problems in drawing this distinction, which has been further exacerbated by the concept of inverse condemnation. U.S takings jurisprudence is analyzed to elicit the resultant chaos which will emerge if the courts do not come up with an adequate solution. A possible solution is offered which will provide the courts with an analytical framework within which to work; and (c) assess, although to a lesser extent, the courts ability to review Parliamentary enactments and administrative action. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1996.

Text in Afrikaans / In this thesis, the place and role of incorporeal things in the new South African law of things are examined. In the Roman law and Germanic customary law not only physical but also incorporeal objects, including rights, were regarded as things. In the early South African law of property (the period until 1950) a wide interpretation was given to the concept "thing". Consequently, things were said to denote either corporeal or incorporeal objects, as was the position in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. The recognition of incorporeal things suffered a setback during the fifties with the reception of the theories of the Pandectists in the South African law of things. The reception of the Pandectists theories can in all probability be attributed to writers such as WA Joubert and CG Van der Merwe. These writers gives preference to a narrow thing concept which only includes corporeal things and can be related to a certain interpretation of the doctrine of private law (subjective) rights which they adhere to. Incorporeal things are merely considered as exceptions. However, this narrow interpretation of things, are not generally accepted as correct. Several academics and the South African legal practice acknowledge a wider and more pragmatic concept of things which includes incorporeal things. Even before South Africa's new constitutional dispensation, pressure were exercised to extend the private law concept of things, despite the resistance of Joubert and Van der Merwe against the acknowledgement of incorporeal things. Creative legislation were introduced in 1971 which extended the concept of things by creating new land use rights. Within the context of the protection of land rights, a functional division of ownership is required in order to overcome the conflict between individual rights and public interests. The fragmentation of land rights provide the greatest possible number of people with the widest possible chance of access to land, and where necessary ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide suitable security of tenure. Needs and problems regarding land reform were also addressed through legislation by recognizing different rights in land. By doing so, further pressure was placed on the narrow thing concept. Against this background, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996 started a new era for the South African private law. It is within this context that the relationship between private and public law comes to the fore. The Constitution offers the possibility of a wide interpretation of the public law concept of things. Our courts has already confirmed that the constitutional meaning of property is wider than the private law concept of property and that constitutional property is not limited to corporeal things. The application of the new constitutional dispensation on specific areas such as new property, labour related rights and intellectual property must be considered in light of the fact that the thing concept differs in the private law and public law. These constitutional developments can only sometimes be seen as an extension of the narrow thing concept. The implication is that incorporeal objects and rights can therefore be accommodated either within the existing private law paradigm, or within the wider constitutional paradigm. It is also argued that in certain circumstances ad hoc legislation should be introduced to provide the required security and protection. An analysis of the literature indicates that this is the preferable approach, rather than the dogmatic view that incorporeal things, in the form of other rights, are not considered as things. The new public law thing concept will have no influence on the further development of the private law in certain cases, but in combination with the existing theoretical and practical pressures to adopt a wider thing concept, the narrow private law approach could be given the final death-blow. / In hierdie verhandeling word die plek en rol van onstoflike sake binne die nuwe Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg ondersoek. In die Romeinse reg en Germaanse gemenereg is nie net stoflike nie maar ook onstoflike objekte, insluitende regte, as sake beskou. In die vroee Suid-Afrikaanse eiendomsreg (die tydperk tot 1950) is daar 'n wye interpretasie aan die begrip "saak" geheg. Daar is gevolglik verklaar dat sowel stoflike as onstoflike objekte sake is, soortgelyk aan die posisie in die Romeinse en Romeinse-Hollandse reg. Die erkenning van onstoflike sake het 'n terugslag beleef gedurende die vyftiger jare met die resepsie van die Pandektiste se teoriee in die Suid-Afrikaanse sakereg. Die resepsie van die Pandektisme kan waarskynlik toegeskryf word aan skrywers soos WA Joubert en CG Van der Merwe. Hierdie skrywers verkies 'n enger omskrywing van die saakbegrip wat slegs stoflike sake insluit, in navolging van 'n bepaalde interpretasie van die leerstuk van subjektiewe regte. Onstoflike sake word bloot as uitsonderings verklaar. Hierdie eng interpretasie wat aan die saakbegrip geheg word, word egter nie algemeen as korrek aanvaar nie. Verskeie akademici en die Suid-Afrikaanse regspraktyk erken 'n wyer en meer pragmatiese saakbegrip wat onstoflike sake insluit. Desondanks Joubert en Van der Merwe se weerstand teen die erkenning van onstoflike sake, is daar reeds voor Suid-Afrika se nuwe konstitusionele bedeling druk uitgeoefen om die privaatregtelike saakbegrip uit te brei. Kreatiewe wetgewing het in 1971 die lig gesien wat die privaatregtelik saakbegrip uitgebrei het deur die skepping van nuwe grondgebruiksregte. In die konteks van die beskerming van grondregte word 'n funksionele verdeling van eiendomsreg vereis ten einde die konflik tussen individuele regte en die openbare belang te oorkom. Die fragmentasie van grondregte bied aan die grootste moontlike aantal mense die wydste moontlike geleentheid om toegang tot grand te verkry. Behoeftes en probleme ten aansien van grondhervorming is oak by wyse van wetgewing aangespreek deur die erkenning van verskillende regte in grand. Sodoende is verdere druk op die eng saakbegrip geplaas. Teen hierdie agtergrond het die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 108 van 1996 'n nuwe era in die Suid-Afrikaanse privaatregtelike sakereg ingelui. Binne hierdie konteks staan die verhouding tussen die privaat- en publiekregtelike saakbegrip op die voorgrond. Die Grondwet skep die moontlikheid om 'n wyer interpretasie aan die publiekregtelike saakbegrip te heg. Ons howe het reeds bevestig dat die konstitusionele betekenis van eiendom wyer is as die privaatregtelike eiendomskonsep en dat eiendom as 'n konstitusionele reg nie beperk word tot stoflike sake nie. Die nuwe konstitusionele bedeling se toepassing op spesifieke velde soos new property, arbeidsverwante regte en intellektuele goedereregte moet beoordeel word met inagneming van die feit dat die saakbegrip in die privaat- en publiekreg van mekaar verskil. Hierdie konstitusionele ontwikkelings kan soms as uitbreidings van die eng saakbegrip gesien word en soms nie. Die implikasie hiervan is dat onstoflike sake en regte of binne die bestaande privaatregparadigma of binne 'n wyer konstitusionele paradigma verklaar kan word. Daarword ook geargumenteer dat ad hoc wetgewing in sekere gevalle uitgevaardig moet word ten einde die nodige sekerheid en beskerming te verleen. 'n Analise van die literatuur dui daarop dat hierdie 'n lofwaardige benadering is, wat verkies moet word bo die dogmatiese siening dat onstoflike sake, in die gedaante van ander regte, nie as sake beskou kan word nie. In sommige gevalle sal die nuwe publiekregtelike saakbegrip geen invloed op die verdere ontwikkeling van die privaatreg uitoefen nie, maar in kombinasie met die reeds bestaande teoretiese en praktiese druk om 'n wyer saakbegrip te aanvaar kan dit die eng privaatregtelike benadering 'n finale nekslag toedien. / Private Law / LL.D.

Thesis (MTech (Public Management))--Peninsula Technikon, Cape Town, 2002 / Restitution is a constitutionally mandated programme aimed at redressing the injustices of the apartheid era. Land rights are being addressed via a legal administrative process in order to make some form of reparation. The mission of the Commission on the Restitution on Land Rights is to have persons or communities, in the Western Cape province, who were dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices, restored to such property or receive just and equitable redress. The restitution process is the first programme in South Africa that aims to restore people to the land from where they were dispossessed. The processes and procedures involved are very complex, which could result in slow delivery. The research attempts to determine the impact of monetary compensation as a form of land restitution on the current life-styles of Paarl residents. The research will focus on financially settled claims. The reason for selecting Paarl as a case study was because of the demographics and diversity of the region. This study also includes the history of forced removals in South Africa as well as the local international restitution processes. The study has a descriptive approach. Primary data will be collected by means of questionnaires based on the living standard measurement. The questionnaires will focus on the life-styles of people prior to dispossession and their life-styles after receiving their restitution awards. This study may provide a positive or a negative critique on the restitution process. The study attempted to determine whether restitution provides a better quality of life to the disadvantaged, displaced people of our country and provides an indicator for future similar endeavours.

Being a Dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Magister Technologae Public Management to the Department of Public Management and Law in the Faculty of Business at the Peninsula Technikon, 2002 / Restitution is a constitutionally mandated programme aimed at redressing the injustices of the apartheid era. Land rights are being addressed via a legal administrative process in order to make some form of reparation. The mission of the Commission on the Restitution on Land Rights is to have persons or communities, in the Western Cape province, who were dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices, restored to such property or receive just and equitable redress. The restitution process is the first programme in South Africa that aims to restore people to the land from where they were dispossessed. The processes and procedures involved are very complex, which could result in slow delivery. The research attempts to determine the impact of monetary compensation as a form of land restitution on the current life-styles of Paarl residents. The research will focus on financially settled claims. The reason for selecting Paarl as a case study was because of the demographics and diversity of the region. This study also includes the history of forced removals in South Africa as well as the local international restititution processes. The study has a descriptive approach. Primary data will be collected by means of questionnaires based on the living standard measurement. The questionnaires will focus on the life-styles of people prior to dispossession and their life-styles after receiving their restitution awards. This study may provide a positive or a negative critique on the restitution process. The study attempted to determine whether restitution provides a better quality of life to the disadvantaged, displaced people of our country and provides an indicator for future similar endeavours.

In 1994, South Africa’s political dispensation changed when the African National Congress (ANC) came into power. For most people, that meant that their aspirations and wishes would be fulfilled. The main objective of the new government was to redress past imbalances. The land question was one item on their agenda. In South Africa, land ownership has long been a source of conflict. The South African history of dispossession and forced removals and racially–skewed distribution of land resources has left Africans with a complex and difficult legacy (Christopher,1987).The issue of land had been an emotional issue affecting many people in South Africa. The struggle for land and access to land in South African history gave rise to many conflicts and loss of lives. The restitution of land rights in South Africa has been a highly contentious and emotive issue. The pain, anger and frustration of those affected by the implementation of racially based discriminatory measures of the past, cannot be denied. Confronting and redressing the anguish of the past has proven to be central to the process of reconciliation within a transformed political dispensation in South Africa (South African White Paper on Land, 1991a). The Constitution of South Africa and The Restitution of Land Rights Act (Act No. 22 of 1994) have firmly established the rights to claim restitution in accordance with the provision of justice and equity for all South Africans. During such a long process, it has been noticed in the suburb of Fairview, Port Elizabeth that some claimants ultimately received their land and compensation, some died before they received absolutely nothing and some old, poor and illiterate claimants are still struggling to claim their land or compensation. Fairview was formerly known as Baakens River Farm in 1810. It was situated far from the city centre and formed part of the Walmer Municipality. Initially, it was owned by John James Besny. In 1826 the farmer was bought by John Parkin and he later sold half 2 of it to Robert Newcombe before 1849. Robbert Newcombe named his half of the farm Fairview (Harradene, 2000). In 1933, Fairview became part of the Walmer Municipality. In 1967 Walmer became part of the Port Elizabeth Municipality. Fairview developed as a township of low density and became increasingly heterogeneous in nature. Davies (1971:10) claimed that the largest concentration of properties were owned and occupied by Coloured people, followed by Chinese, Blacks and Indians. The majority of the residents were Coloured. According to Sampson (1994), the plot sizes in Fairview were relatively large, either 0,8 ha or 0,2ha. Sampson also claimed that no business sites were distinguished, but businesses were established by the Chinese on residential plots. During the apartheid era, Fairview was one of the lands declared as a “Controlled Area”. The Group Areas Act also affected Fairview, even though the removal of the people in Fairview was not as pressing as it was to other suburbs due to its location at a relative distance from the city (Davies, 1970). As a result an increase in the Coloured population in Fairview was noticed between 1960 and 1970 as people faced eviction from central city areas such as South End. The people moved to Fairview with the hope that the area would be proclaimed a Coloured area. Unfortunately for those who ran to Fairview, people in Fairview were also removed from 1970s to other areas like New Brighton Location and other areas in Korsten. The last removal of people in Fairview took place in 1984 (Eastern Province Herald, 26 October 1996). After 1994, the introduction of the Restitution of Land Rights Act made provision for the establishment of a Commission on the Restitution of Land Rights and a Land Claims Court to adjudicate all claims lodged with the Commission as from 1 May 1998 (Land Info., 1996). Disputes with land owners over prices, validity of the claims and resistance to give away land, led to referral of some claims to the Land Claims Court. Although some research has been undertaken on Fairview, there is a vacuum of research into the problems faced by claimants in this area. The problems faced by claimants meant that some died while they were still busy with the process and some are still struggling to make a claim, and recently some were successful. 3 The focus of this study is to examine the process of the Fairview land claim, and as a recommendation, I wish to come up with suggestions for making the process easier for claimants.

This thesis argues that 1994 did not mark a point of absolute discontinuity in the history of South Africa. More specifically, it asserts that 1994 did not signal the end of segregationism; instead of democracy leading to national integration, the Bantustans are still governed and managed differently from the rest of the country. Consequently, it is no surprise that they remain mired in pervasive, debilitating poverty fifteen years after 1994. In insisting that contemporary South Africa is old (rather than new), the thesis seeks to make a contribution to political struggles that aim to bring to an end the segregationist past-in-the-present. The thesis is arranged in seven chapters. The first chapter considers the crisis that has engulfed South Africa historiography since 1994. It traces the roots of the crisis back to some of the fundamentals of the discipline of history, such as empiricism, neutrality and historicism. It suggests that the way to end the crisis, to re-assert the relevance of history, is for historians to re-invoke the practice of producing histories of the present, in an interested, deliberate manner. Chapter 2 narrows down the focus of the thesis to (past and present) property. It suggests that instead of understanding the constitutional protection of property rights and installation of a restitution process as the product of a compromise between adversarial negotiators, these outcomes are more correctly understood as emanating from consensus. The third chapter outlines the implementation of the restitution programme from 1994 to 2008. The productive value of restitution over this period is found not in what it has delivered to the claimants (supposedly the beneficiaries of the programme), but rather in its discursive effects related to citizenship in the new South Africa. Chapter 4 considers the exclusion of dispossession that was implemented in the Bantustans from the restitution programme. It argues that this decision was not an oversight on the part of the post-1994 government. Instead it was consistent with all other key policy decisions taken in the recent period. The Bantustans have been treated differently from the rest of South Africa; they have been deliberately under-developed, fabricated as welfare zones, and subjected to arbitrary customary rule. Whereas Chapters 2 to 4 look at the production of historical truth on the side of domination, Chapter 6 and 7 consider production on the side of resistance. Specifically, they describe and analyse the attempts of an NGO to establish the truths of betterment as dispossession, and post-1994 prejudice against the victims of betterment dispossession. They serve as case studies of third party-led processes that seek to produce truth-effects from within a prevailing truth regime. The final chapter attempts to bring many of the threads that weave through the thesis together, by means of a critical consideration of human rights discourse. The chapter calls on intellectuals to establish truths in relation to the history of ongoing human wrongs in South Africa (as opposed to the rainbow narrative of human rights) Finally, the thesis includes a postscript, comprising technical summaries of each of the chapters.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Women’s rights to property have still not been recognised in many countries as a basic individual right. Furthermore, women have often been excluded in the policies that govern land reform, that is, the economic restructuring programmes and land distribution policies. It is important to understand how women's rights in and access to land are being addressed, and the ways in which institutional reforms have benefited or disadvantaged women, given the importance of women as agricultural producers in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as the commitment to gender equality adopted by many governments. The determination of the criteria used to target land beneficiaries for land reform in South Africa is largely unclear and undocumented. Furthermore, there is a limited focus in existing literature on the actual impact of land reform on its beneficiaries. Land reform in South Africa is only benefiting a small proportion of the population. The findings of this research also indicate that there is a conscious attempt by the state to address racial injustices of Apartheid, with the majority of recipients of land in South Africa being African/black, and Coloureds following closely. Furthermore, the beneficiaries of land appear to be largely uneducated and unmarried. The research indicates that women in South Africa have equal, if not more opportunity than men to gain access to land through land reform. However, it does appear that males are heading most of the households with access to land through land reform and women in male-headed households have more access to land through land reform than those in female-headed households. This suggests that unmarried women are still at a disadvantage for accessing land through land reform, which further validates the findings of existing literature that customary practices may still be prevalent in South Africa and women’s primary access to land is through marriage. The findings of the research also indicate that generally people with access to land through land reform are more likely to have better household welfare than those with no access to land through land reform. Therefore, with only 2.5 per cent of the population accessing land, there is a significant limitation on the number of households whose welfare can be improved by land reform. The results also indicate that males without access to land have better household welfare than females without access to land therefore implying that women are more vulnerable without land access and they are more likely to face poverty when they are not afforded the opportunity to access land through land reform. Furthermore, it appears that females with access to land have better household welfare than males with access to land, which implies that females are an essential contributor to household welfare, more so than their male counter parts. Similar to existing literature, these findings further validate the need for the state to address gender inequality in land reform and ensure that women are included in the process. Nevertheless, with the majority of the land beneficiaries in this research being female, household welfare in South Africa is expected to improve in the future due to land reform.