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This thesis explores the concepts of ‘crime’, justice and punishment through the narratives of male ex‐prisoners. I adopt a critical criminological perspective and seek to humanise those who have been made monstrous by their status as ex‐prisoners by allowing their stories to be heard. I provide a unique examination of ex‐prisoners’ identities and argue that if we allow those who have experienced prison to tell their stories, new theories and counter discourses about prisons and justice can develop. By hearing these stories we are forced to confront the ex‐prisoner ‘other’, and must explain our own fears, disgust, pity, vitriol, but also fascination with those who have been punished. In hearing the stories of the ex‐prisoner ‘other’, we must reflect on what demands for ever harsher penalties, greater restrictions on liberty, disenfranchisement, and the denial of full human rights does: to those whom we focus these pains upon, and on us, as a society, who believe pain is the equivalent of justice. The methodology of the thesis involved life story research with 15 male ex‐prisoners. Utilising intertextuality, myth and mythology, the arc of the ex‐prisoners’ life stories is followed in analysing: life before prison, imprisonment, and life after prison. In doing this, consideration is given to the outlaw identities of the men when they were actively involved in offending, the prison myths that shaped their experience of incarceration, and the mutable identities that they adopt on release. The stories recounted here offer new ways of understanding ‘crime’, justice and imprisonment. They also, I argue, have the power to problematize existing discourses about prisons and punishment, and to open up new possibilities for social justice.

The moral justification of punishment is the fundamental concern of this thesis. It is argued that a moral response to crime has to be a civilised response; therefore, the notion of "civility" is defined and discussed. Punishment is then defended in such a way that it accords with being a civilised response to crime. It is argued that in order to be such a response, and thereby qualify as a moral response, punishment must have a certain structure, i.e. it must fulfil seven necessary conditions, which, it is argued, together constitute the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. In arguing for each of the necessary conditions, different onedimensional theories of punishment are dealt with (retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, a paternalistic theory of punishment, and restitutionalism}, indicating that each fulfils some of the criteria for morally justified punishment. None of the onedimensional theories fulfils all the necessary conditions, however, and hence none on its own fulfils the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. This is not to argue that a straightforward theory could never on its own fulfil the conditions for morally justified punishment, but I have not been able to conceive how this could be done. The theory I here present is therefore a hybrid approach, incorporating elements of all the above-mentioned theories into a unitary theory. In doing so, it fulfils all the necessary conditions for being a civilised response to crime, thereby fulfilling the sufficient condition too, and hence providing a morally defensible account of punishment. Finally, the question of how this theory can be put into practice is addressed. Because the objective of punishment ought to be a civilised response, thereby benefiting both society as a whole and those being punished and rehabilitated, the thesis may be seen as a progressive synthesis of the various approaches examined. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)

The moral justification of punishment is the fundamental concern of this thesis. It is argued that a moral response to crime has to be a civilised response; therefore, the notion of "civility" is defined and discussed. Punishment is then defended in such a way that it accords with being a civilised response to crime. It is argued that in order to be such a response, and thereby qualify as a moral response, punishment must have a certain structure, i.e. it must fulfil seven necessary conditions, which, it is argued, together constitute the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. In arguing for each of the necessary conditions, different onedimensional theories of punishment are dealt with (retributivism, utilitarianism, deterrence theory, rehabilitationism, a paternalistic theory of punishment, and restitutionalism}, indicating that each fulfils some of the criteria for morally justified punishment. None of the onedimensional theories fulfils all the necessary conditions, however, and hence none on its own fulfils the sufficient condition for morally justified punishment. This is not to argue that a straightforward theory could never on its own fulfil the conditions for morally justified punishment, but I have not been able to conceive how this could be done. The theory I here present is therefore a hybrid approach, incorporating elements of all the above-mentioned theories into a unitary theory. In doing so, it fulfils all the necessary conditions for being a civilised response to crime, thereby fulfilling the sufficient condition too, and hence providing a morally defensible account of punishment. Finally, the question of how this theory can be put into practice is addressed. Because the objective of punishment ought to be a civilised response, thereby benefiting both society as a whole and those being punished and rehabilitated, the thesis may be seen as a progressive synthesis of the various approaches examined. / Philosophy, Practical and Systematic Theology / D. Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)