This thesis examines the social, political and legal basis for the establishment of a national regime for the oversight of risks posed by gene technology in Australia. It provides an overview of the public debate about gene technology and considers how that debate served to motivate and shift the focus of regulatory reform which led to the Gene Technology Act 2000 (Cth) (GTA). The debate about gene technology belies a much deeper social preoccupation with novel risk generally - something described by risk theorists as the 'risk society'. This risk society has placed pressure on legislatures to manage the perceived risks posed by novel technologies or to use novel technologies to manage man-made or natural risks. Yet the traditionally prescriptive and cumbersome process of regulatory reform is ill-suited to the pace and transient nature of scientific innovation. Consequently, legislatures have developed a new legislative form, risk governance, designed to provide a more flexible scientifically based response to novel technologies. This form of legislation is exemplified by the GTA. Yet risk governance has proved to create problems of its own. Maintaining regulatory flexibility necessitates that rule making is virtually, if not officially, undertaken outside of the parliamentary process. Furthermore, because risk governance adopts a scientifically based assessment and management process (risk analysis) it must co-opt technical specialists (the subjects of regulation) into the decision making process. These factors have contributed to risk governance being perceived as anti-democratic in some quarters. Such perceptions are agitated by a growing distrust of technocrat's ability to serve the public interest in the risk society. Lack of trust was a major theme throughout the Australian gene technology debate. The response to public distrust in technocratic oversight of novel technology has been the inception of risk communication, a process that encourages public involvement in risk analysis. Unfortunately, best practice risk communication has tended to be promulgated in policy but avoided in practice - something revealed with the commercialisation of gene technology. This has resulted in increased pressure to put promise into practice by institutionalising participatory risk communication principles within risk governance. I have referred to this more democratic regulatory form as 'deliberative risk governance'. The GTA was enacted with the promise that it would involve the public in all aspects of regulating risks posed by gene technology. I consider how we arrived at such a system, if it matters and whether the promise of deliberative risk governance is real, efficacious and genuine within this act.

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This thesis examines four aspects of the contempt power in New Zealand. It does not, therefore, purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of contempt in all its protean forms. Rather, its aims are to assess what the law is, and why, and to consider whether it aptly describes the values of the society it purports to protect. The law of contempt has suffered from an excess of dichotomies and classifications which nowhere guarantee its clarity. The most enduring classification is that which distinguishes between criminal and civil contempts, largely on the basis of whether the sanctions which follow are punitive or coercive. Three types of criminal contempt are discussed. Contempt in the face of the court concerns the jurisdiction to punish summarily contumelious behaviour in court. It is argued that, since the summary procedure permits the imposition of sanctions without the usual trial safeguards, the contempt power ought to be limited to the removal of the contemnor from the court. Any more extensive contempt power arguably infringes the freedoms protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The law of sub judice contempt seeks to strike a balance between the competing values of freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. Judicial insistence on the existence of a real risk as a matter of practical reality before the actus reus of this form of contempt is met has effectively restrained criticisms of the rule. Nevertheless, since it can penalise non-negligent practices, it is suggested that sub judice contempt should be treated as a crime of strict liability. The third form of criminal contempt, scandalising a court or judge, is said to be necessary to ensure confidence in the administration of justice. However, there is little evidence that the public perception of the judiciary would suffer through debate over the abilities of its judges. This arm of contempt ought not to be perceived as a form of judicial protectionism. For that reason, and because it arguably infringes the Bill of Rights Act 1990, it is urged that contempt through scandalising a court or judge should be abolished. The law of civil contempt is dealt with through a discussion of breaches of injunctions and undertakings. Since the sanctions which follow may serve both punitive and coercive ends the distinction between this category and the other three is regarded as incomplete. It is contended, however, that there are many similarities between criminal and civil contempts which merit their treatment as a genus. Whenever punitive sanctions are imposed (whether for a criminal or civil contempt) normal trial safeguards ought to exist. On the other hand, if enforcement of a court order is sought, such protection is inappropriate. A procedural approach to the different types of sanctions ought to rid contempt law of perplexing categorisations which fail to address the essential characteristics of the contempt power.

This is a collection of essays about the restraint of trade doctrine as laid down in the courts of the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth. Generally, I will not give an account of the restraint of trade doctrine in the United States of America, for even although each individual state (apart from the civil jurisdictions California and Louisiana) and the federation itself, has a common law system, for reasons peculiar to those jurisdictions, the restraint of trade case law there has become so vast and so confused as to be unsuitable for my purposes. More importantly, however, the common law restraint of trade doctrine in the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth has been laid down by courts without any significant consideration of the state of the law in the United States. Davies v Davies (1887) 36 Ch D 359, 370 by contrast, the period during which the Privy Council operated as a supra national court of final appeal has resulted in considerable harmony in the doctrine within the British Commonwealth. Even now the House of Lords is influential in Australia and Canada and the influence is increasingly reciprocal. By way of an exception I will discuss the purposes of the anti-trust legislation in the United States. This is necessary because I intend to show that the common law restraint of trade doctrine was not able to be, and was never intended to be, a means of regulating the economy in contradistinction to the United States anti-trust legislation and related legislation in the British Commonwealth. This account is not merely a description of the law relating to the restraint of trade doctrine although I do purport to describe the law. There are other accounts of the restraint of trade doctrine which do that well. Accounts of the restraint of trade doctrine include: Matthews & Adler, The Law Relating to Covenants in Restraints of Trade (London, 2nd ed 1907); Sanderson, Restraint of Trade in English law (London, 1926); Heydon, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine (London, 1971); Trebilcock, The Common Law of Restraint of Trade; A Legal and Economic Analysis (Toronto, 1986); Dean, The Law of Trade Secrets (Sydney, 1990); Mehigan & Griffiths, Restraint of Trade and Business Secrets: Law & Practice (London, 2nd ed 1991); Holdsworth, History of English Law IV (3rd ed, 1945) 343-54, 373-9; VIII (2nd ed, 1937) 56-42. There are other, less detailed accounts in contract law textbooks. The purpose of this dissertation is to describe aspects of the doctrine as it developed between the medieval period and the twentieth century and then to use that account as a basis for an analysis of how the law has taken a number of paths during the twentieth century which cannot be justified by the rules and their justifications which existed in the law prior to that time. Such a development has had important consequences for the restraint of trade doctrine and even the law in general, most of which have been detrimental. I do not intend to give a continuous historical narrative covering the whole of the doctrine. The history has been described before. For example, I do not intend to give a discrete account of the process by which the absolute rule against general restraints of trade gave way to the rule of reason, although I do mention this process where relevant for other purposes. The history, so far as it is relevant, is integrated into each chapter. I will argue that historically the restraint of trade doctrine was a rule or complex of rules, of a certain form and content. The form and content of the rule are important because they bear on the meaning of the class term "restraint of trade" which is an element of the rule. The meaning of that term began to change around the year 1890. Beginning first with certain classes of trade combination, courts began to classify as restraints of trade covenants which did not in fact restrain trade. Then the courts similarly treated the exclusive dealing contract and certain forms of property transaction. Another trend in the law which added to the confusion about the meaning of restraint of trade was the failure by the courts to make definitive findings one way or another as to whether a particular covenant was in restraint of trade. The courts were then faced with a dilemma. The law required a court to refuse to enforce a covenant in restraint of trade unless the covenantee could justify the restraint by presenting evidence to the court from which the courts could assess whether or not that particular restraint was within the reason for the restraint of trade doctrine or not. Such considerations were entirely inapt in the case of covenants which, in accordance with the traditional view, did not restrain trade. Yet if the courts did not validate these contracts, catastrophic consequences would have followed for the parties to such contracts and, indeed, to contract as an institution. To solve the dilemma the courts began to interpret the famous statement of the restraint of trade doctrine by Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co [1894] AC 535, 565 (HL) literally, rather than contextually. Ultimately this has resulted in the obscuring of the rule underlying the restraint of trade doctrine itself. There were many minor confusions along the way. It is important that the doctrine is coherent and its use consistent with its justifications because it is still a fruitful cause of legal change. In the last year the force of the rule has caused a radical restructuring of Association Football in Europe Bosman’s case. The rule has even penetrated the collective consciousness of the community at large. The broad thrust of the development and the detail will be outlined in the next thirteen chapters.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine and evaluate the present common law relating to trade unions in New Zealand. It is proposed that this examination and evaluation should not be limited to the “black-letter” law, but should take place in the wider social context of how trade union affairs, and industrial relations, are in fact conducted in this country. Where the common law is weighed in this balance and found wanting, it is intended that the possibility of statutory reform be considered.

In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development published its long awaited report: "Our Common Future". The report contained a detailed discussion of global environment and development problems and a set of recommendations which the Commission suggested could alleviate many of those problems. At the core of the Commission's recommendation was the 'sustainable development' concept which the Commission strongly suggested countries should adopt as the principal vehicle for overcoming many of the global environmental and social ills. But, what is sustainable development? What are its core values? How can sustainable development be utilized to arrest and resolve global societal problems? Does sustainable development have a universal application? Under what conditions can sustainable development be successfully implemented? These are some of the key issues that are addressed in this research paper. In this paper I look at the origin and definition of the sustainable development concept and identify the relevant principles of the concept. I also identify the tools that are necessary for the implementation of the concept. The underpinning of my argument is that sustainable development can be successfully implemented by countries particularly developing countries because the concept has strong roots in traditional cultures which are dominant in developing countries. I explore this position and the various issues that have been identified above by adopting Papua New Guinea (PNG) a developing country as a case study.

Pollution from vessels cannot be controlled effectively without the involvement of flag States. They have the primary responsibility for ensuring that the vessels which fly their flags comply with all applicable international rules and standards relating to vessel source pollution. Compliance with such rules and standards involves additional operating costs for ship-owners. Thus, in the highly competitive international maritime transport industry, there are many incentives for flag States not to prejudice their pursuit of comparative advantage by ensuring that their flag vessels comply with the applicable rules and standards. Enforcing their flag vessels to comply is not a rational choice. Accordingly, flag States must be given reasons to ensure that their flag vessels do comply with pollution control rules and standards if the problem of vessel source pollution is to be resolved. Neither of the two international Conventions which regulate the control of vessel source pollution, namely MARPOL and UNCLOS III, gives flag States reasons to ensure the compliant operation of their flag vessels. For that reason, neither Convention can claim to be an effective means for controlling pollution from vessels. There is, however, emerging evidence of flag State commitment to the control of vessel source pollution in response to the application of regional Port State Control measures. From the perspective of flag States, one aspect of the application of the concept of Port State Control is of concern - that is the legal basis of the control measures which are being taken against their flag vessels for violations of MARPOL's rules and standards.