The Constitution of Fiji though similar to many others adopted within the Commonwealth since the end of the Second World War departs in many respects from the Constitution of the United Kingdom and that of New Zealand. The Constitution of the United Kingdom is wholly unwritten and that of New Zealand is only partly written as contained in the Constitution Act of 1852. Fiji not only has a written Constitution; the Constitution also incorporates the rules or principles which are accepted as constitutional conventions in the United Kingdom and New Zealand. In this thesis attention has been given to the position of the Governor-General as the representative of the Queen and the powers conferred upon him. The fact that he is a local appointee makes his position even more delicate. The problem is accentuated in that the exercise of some of his powers are made nonjusticiable by the Constitution. It is also suggested in this work that the fact that the Constitution of Fiji has an entirely different basis from that of the United Kingdom or New Zealand renders many of the principles adopted in those countries inapplicable. The notion of parliamentary sovereignty propounded by Dicey and others does not apply. The Constitution, not Parliament, is supreme. Judicial review of legislation is inevitable and the courts are intended as guardians of the Constitution. There are other important differences many of which are the result of the political decisions made on behalf of the three main races in Fiji before the Constitution was drafted. The separate Fijian administration and the powers of the Council of Chiefs are illustrations of these provisions. The fact the indigenous Fijians enjoy a privileged position through the separate Fijian Administration and the Council of Chiefs is discussed. The system of representation in the House of Representatives with a combination of the communal and multiracial electorates provides an unusual, perhaps questionable, experiment towards a solution of the tensions and problems associated with a heterogeneous society. Likewise the fundamental rights provisions have special significance in a multi-racial society like that of Fiji. As a background to the above matters a comprehensive survey of the constitutional history of the country is attempted. The role of the judiciary has been given significant emphasis throughout the thesis as it is felt that the judiciary is linchpin of the Constitution of Fiji. Concluding observations have been offered on ways of making the spirit of the Constitution, as enshrined in the preamble to the Constitution, a reality; and to engender a national outlook amongst the people of all ethnic groups.

Equality is a prominent value in modern moral, legal and political philosophy. There is, however, much controversy over the meaning of the concept and its moral implications. In this thesis I argue that the recent scepticism expressed by some writers about the prospects of reaching any agreement about what equality means is not well founded. The idea is not an empty one. The difficulty in pinning down its exact meaning and implications for our social ethics is caused by its abstractness, not its vacuity. The moral significance of equality can be expressed in the idea of basic equality – the requirement that persons are to be treated as equals and accorded equal concern and respect. That idea is morally justifiable and plays an important role in modern moral theory. If we accept that human beings are equal in important respects and that a commitment to basic equality as a moral ideal makes sense because of our shared human condition, then it follows that respect for that value is implicit in each instance of our moral decision making. The abstractness of basic equality means that it cannot serve as a straightforward rule which can be easily applied to disputes about who should or should not receive equal treatment. There is no list of prohibited grounds of differentiation that applies in all circumstances. Thoughtful moral judgments about the denial of basic equality typically demand sophisticated assessments of whether the interests of all affected parties have been taken into account and different sorts of denial of basic equality will require consideration of different factors. Attempts have been made in recent equality law jurisprudence to find a less abstract concept of equality that can inform the interpretation of the law. These are unsuccessful because basic equality cannot be reduced to some simpler, rule like, standard. These understandable attempts to make this area of law more manageable are not good explanations of what is morally important about the idea of equality. Clarity about the meaning and purpose of contemporary discrimination law is not likely to be achieved by further attempts to say what this law is really about. The law is difficult to apply because it is in the same broad terms as the idea of basic equality. The central moral quandaries of recent jurisprudential thought about basic equality concern the appropriateness of different treatment on grounds which can be used to discriminate against people. The difficulties that courts have with these issues are not remarkable because the moral issues are intractable. Issues such as indirect discrimination or the fairness of affirmative action policies require in depth consideration of the interests and concerns of all affected parties and will not be resolved by the application of any simple algorithm based on a less abstract definition of equality. These issues are difficult to resolve, not because we do not know what equality is but because weighing the competing concerns of affected parties while paying attention to other important values is a complex and often difficult task.

This thesis examines four aspects of the contempt power in New Zealand. It does not, therefore, purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of contempt in all its protean forms. Rather, its aims are to assess what the law is, and why, and to consider whether it aptly describes the values of the society it purports to protect. The law of contempt has suffered from an excess of dichotomies and classifications which nowhere guarantee its clarity. The most enduring classification is that which distinguishes between criminal and civil contempts, largely on the basis of whether the sanctions which follow are punitive or coercive. Three types of criminal contempt are discussed. Contempt in the face of the court concerns the jurisdiction to punish summarily contumelious behaviour in court. It is argued that, since the summary procedure permits the imposition of sanctions without the usual trial safeguards, the contempt power ought to be limited to the removal of the contemnor from the court. Any more extensive contempt power arguably infringes the freedoms protected by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The law of sub judice contempt seeks to strike a balance between the competing values of freedom of expression and the right to a fair trial. Judicial insistence on the existence of a real risk as a matter of practical reality before the actus reus of this form of contempt is met has effectively restrained criticisms of the rule. Nevertheless, since it can penalise non-negligent practices, it is suggested that sub judice contempt should be treated as a crime of strict liability. The third form of criminal contempt, scandalising a court or judge, is said to be necessary to ensure confidence in the administration of justice. However, there is little evidence that the public perception of the judiciary would suffer through debate over the abilities of its judges. This arm of contempt ought not to be perceived as a form of judicial protectionism. For that reason, and because it arguably infringes the Bill of Rights Act 1990, it is urged that contempt through scandalising a court or judge should be abolished. The law of civil contempt is dealt with through a discussion of breaches of injunctions and undertakings. Since the sanctions which follow may serve both punitive and coercive ends the distinction between this category and the other three is regarded as incomplete. It is contended, however, that there are many similarities between criminal and civil contempts which merit their treatment as a genus. Whenever punitive sanctions are imposed (whether for a criminal or civil contempt) normal trial safeguards ought to exist. On the other hand, if enforcement of a court order is sought, such protection is inappropriate. A procedural approach to the different types of sanctions ought to rid contempt law of perplexing categorisations which fail to address the essential characteristics of the contempt power.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine and evaluate the present common law relating to trade unions in New Zealand. It is proposed that this examination and evaluation should not be limited to the “black-letter” law, but should take place in the wider social context of how trade union affairs, and industrial relations, are in fact conducted in this country. Where the common law is weighed in this balance and found wanting, it is intended that the possibility of statutory reform be considered.

Pollution from vessels cannot be controlled effectively without the involvement of flag States. They have the primary responsibility for ensuring that the vessels which fly their flags comply with all applicable international rules and standards relating to vessel source pollution. Compliance with such rules and standards involves additional operating costs for ship-owners. Thus, in the highly competitive international maritime transport industry, there are many incentives for flag States not to prejudice their pursuit of comparative advantage by ensuring that their flag vessels comply with the applicable rules and standards. Enforcing their flag vessels to comply is not a rational choice. Accordingly, flag States must be given reasons to ensure that their flag vessels do comply with pollution control rules and standards if the problem of vessel source pollution is to be resolved. Neither of the two international Conventions which regulate the control of vessel source pollution, namely MARPOL and UNCLOS III, gives flag States reasons to ensure the compliant operation of their flag vessels. For that reason, neither Convention can claim to be an effective means for controlling pollution from vessels. There is, however, emerging evidence of flag State commitment to the control of vessel source pollution in response to the application of regional Port State Control measures. From the perspective of flag States, one aspect of the application of the concept of Port State Control is of concern - that is the legal basis of the control measures which are being taken against their flag vessels for violations of MARPOL's rules and standards.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.

In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.