From 1840 to the present, the Treaty of Waitangi has been a subject of some significance in New Zealand – a distinctive but subtle thread running through the fabric of the country’s history and shaping attitudes to race relations. A conviction strongly held by New Zealanders is that the treaty has made the country different from other nations, that it initiated an experiment in race relationships that has secured reasonable accord over the years. Only as the climate of public opinion has shifted slightly in the last twenty years and as Maori protest about failure to obtain treaty rights has become more strident have these convictions been challenged.

From 1840 to the present, the Treaty of Waitangi has been a subject of some significance in New Zealand – a distinctive but subtle thread running through the fabric of the country’s history and shaping attitudes to race relations. A conviction strongly held by New Zealanders is that the treaty has made the country different from other nations, that it initiated an experiment in race relationships that has secured reasonable accord over the years. Only as the climate of public opinion has shifted slightly in the last twenty years and as Maori protest about failure to obtain treaty rights has become more strident have these convictions been challenged.

The major problems associated with trade secret law in New Zealand are that it is confused in definition and in jurisdiction. This confusion contributes to the failure of trade secret law in some instances, particularly to protect information created in the emerging biotechnology and computer software industries. This has contributed to alternative forms of protection, notably through copyright for computer programs. From a review of the current law, categories of trade secrets are identified, including sub-patentable and patentable trade secrets. The jurisdictional dispute may be resolved if it is recognised that trade secrets represent a form of property right. To this end, the legal and economic approaches to property rights are synthesised. This synthesis is then extended to create a legal-economic model of the justifications for, and the problems with, the protection of these rights: the intellectual property rights continuum. From this model, it is concluded that some legal protection of trade secrets is justified, provided that equally harmful effects are not created. In particular, sub-patentable trade secrets may warrant greater protection, and patentable trade secrets may be over-protected. One proposal is to punish industrial espionage, although some harmful effects may result. Utility models and laws that protect trade secrets in general are considered and rejected as solutions. Instead, patents of improvement (PI) are proposed which would protect trade secrets that represent an advance on an existing patent. PI would represent a lower standard of inventiveness that is adopted from American biotechnology patent disputes, and so protect sub-patentable trade secrets. The other, higher threshold from the existing English patent law would remain as the patent standard. If a PI were granted to a patent owner, then s/he could practise price discrimination, but if granted to a rival, then competition could result. Either outcome could protect trade secrets, yet mitigate the harmful effects of legal protection. If these proposals were adopted, more information could be produced as well as utilised. Moreover, the growth of the biotechnology and computer software industries in New Zealand could be furthered.

From 1840 to the present, the Treaty of Waitangi has been a subject of some significance in New Zealand – a distinctive but subtle thread running through the fabric of the country’s history and shaping attitudes to race relations. A conviction strongly held by New Zealanders is that the treaty has made the country different from other nations, that it initiated an experiment in race relationships that has secured reasonable accord over the years. Only as the climate of public opinion has shifted slightly in the last twenty years and as Maori protest about failure to obtain treaty rights has become more strident have these convictions been challenged.

From 1840 to the present, the Treaty of Waitangi has been a subject of some significance in New Zealand – a distinctive but subtle thread running through the fabric of the country’s history and shaping attitudes to race relations. A conviction strongly held by New Zealanders is that the treaty has made the country different from other nations, that it initiated an experiment in race relationships that has secured reasonable accord over the years. Only as the climate of public opinion has shifted slightly in the last twenty years and as Maori protest about failure to obtain treaty rights has become more strident have these convictions been challenged.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.

For a variety of historical, cultural and political reasons, the Islamic headscarf has become an increasingly controversial matter in Europe. This is particularly the case in France, where the Parliament passed, in March 2004, a piece of legislation that prohibits students from wearing the Muslim veil—together with any other ‘conspicuous’ religious sign—in the classroom. Although Statute 228/2004 proved highly controversial and attracted unprecedented media attention, it was overwhelmingly supported by French MPs as a response to popular opposition towards religious insignia at school and was heralded as a ‘liberating’ piece of legislation that faithfully reasserted the beloved French principle of laïcité. Overseas, the new law was less favourably perceived and was often accused of being discriminatory and of violating the students’ freedom of religious expression. This thesis compares the French and American attitudes towards religious symbolism in general and the Islamic veil in particular. As in other matters, at first sight these two countries seem to adopt a very different—if not opposite—approach to religion and the Muslim veil, and so much so that their positions are often described as ‘irreconcilable’. This thesis will argue that this is hardly the case. Indeed, it will show that, at least before the passage of Statute 228-2004, the French and American legal systems adopted a substantially similar approach that appeared respectful of a veiled student’s right to wear religious insignia. This, the work will also suggest, is not surprising, for contrary to popular belief, the American conception of secularism is in many respects stricter than the French idea of laïcité, with the result that French ‘exceptionalism’ on matters of religion is hardly a convincing ground for justifying the new piece of legislation. The fundamental value of a Franco-American comparison, this work will suggest, ultimately lies with the fact that such a comparison demolishes a good portion of the popular myths surrounding the affaire des foulards: that the French legal system is fiercely secular; that the American one is strongly ‘religious’; and that France was, in 2004, confronted with a veritable ‘veil emergency’ that rendered the passage of the new statute all but inevitable.