In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.

In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

During the 1970s and early 1980s the historic contradiction between Maori and the colonial state publicly resurfaced, with high-profile Maori demands for the recognition of Maori sovereignty. By 1984 those demands became broader-based. They focused on the Crown's affirmation in the Treaty of Waitangi of continued Maori control over economic resources, independent political authority, and the protection of the Maori way of life. In the face of these pressures, the Labour Party, and later the fourth Labour Government, committed itself to a policy of recognising the Treaty of Waitangi. At the same time, New Zealand's under-developed capitalist economy was in crisis. Advocates of market liberalism within the Fourth Labour Government secured a power base from which they launched the New Zealand version of their paradigm, known as Rogernomics. The two policies were logically irreconcilable, and embodied the deeper, real contradiction of the colonial project itself. Once that logical contradiction became apparent, and the electoral implications became too costly, the Treaty policy gave way. The primary focus of this thesis is the role played by colonial law, legal ideology, and the legal intellectuals in mediating those contradictions during the 1980s. They helped to secure a passive revolution, whereby Maori demands were defused, and Maori resistance was subsumed within the political and judicial forums of the colonial state. This development is analysed within the framework of the dual state, whereby metropolitan and colonial social formations co-exist within the one national boundary, both dominated by the capitalist mode of production. In this thesis, that duality comprises Pakeha within New Zealand, and Maori within Aotearoa. The specifically legal dynamics are situated within the complex interactions of the economic, political, juridical, and ideological levels of that dual state during the 1980s. The thesis concludes that the colonial state did secure a passive revolution over Maori between 1984 and 1990. But this was, at best, a temporary reprieve. By the end of the Fourth Labour Government, in October 1990, many Maori remained committed to the anti-colonial struggle. It appeared that the fundamental contradictions of colonial capitalism, and the crisis of constitutional legitimacy for the colonial state, had not been resolved. They had merely been deferred.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

Whole document restricted, see Access Instructions file below for details of how to access the print copy. / This thesis examines two important common law defences to the defamation action: fair comment, now known as honest opinion in New Zealand, and qualified privilege. It does not purport to be an exhaustive study of the law of defamation. The thesis traces the development of the two defences over the last two centuries, and the discernable shift in the balance the law of defamation achieves between freedom of expression and reputation towards freedom of expression and away from the protection of private reputation as New Zealand became a mature democracy. The fair comment defences applies to matters of defamatory communications of opinion. The change of nomenclature to honest opinion more accurately reflects the inherent nature of the defence. From the inception of the defence if the subject matter of a communication was in the form of opinion, honestly held, it could be widely disseminated, provided the topic was of public interest. The defence began with literary criticisms, but then expanded to encompass comment on public figures, particularly political figures insofar as the comment concerned their public life. It is argued that the suggestion which has recently been made by the courts that the subject matter of the opinion need no longer be on a matter of public interest is both misguided and wrong. The qualified privilege defence, based on reciprocity of duty/interest in the occasion of communication, concerns the publication of false and defamatory matters of fact. For this reason the courts were traditionally reluctant to permit the defence when the communication received wide publication. Towards the end of the 20th century, however, this changed with the greater recognition accorded freedom expression in a mature democracy. Courts in England, Australia and New Zealand acknowledged that all members of the public had an interest in political discussion, particularly as it related to political figures, and that the media had a corresponding duty or interest in disseminating such information. The courts recognised that this had the potential to leave those who sought public office with little recourse when their reputation was attack in the media. Each jurisdiction adopted a different solution to this problem. I argue that the New Zealand Court of Appeal's solution has left the law in an unsatisfactory state and requires statutory intervention by the legislature.

In the past ten years, the world has witnessed a transformation in the relationship between governments and the supply of money. A number of countries, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the 11 European countries participating in EMU, have made their national central banks 'independent'. Inflation is at a post World War II low, and there a general recognition that inflation cannot, in the long term, create employment or boost economic growth. The economic consensus is that the best monetary policy is the pursuit of price stability. However, these changes to monetary regimes have been a pragmatic response to the problem of high inflation. There has been little recognition of the constitutional implications of the supply of money. I argue that this pragmatic approach is constitutionally dangerous. Upon examining the history of money, it is clear there are fundamental property rights associated with the issue of money. There is a strong need for monetary arrangements to be identified as constitutional issues, and for constitutional rules to be developed and applied in relation to the issue of money. This thesis analyses the appropriate relationship between governments and money from a constitutional perspective. Chapters II-VI examine the following issues: • the constitutional principles which should guide the behaviour of any government in relation to money; • the historical development of money and its theoretical qualities; • the difference between 'commodity' and 'fiat' money and the constitutional implications of their respective monopoly supply by governments; and • the constitutionally ideal monetary regime. Chapters VII, VII and IX then examine the existing monetary regimes in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and in the European Union, and I compare these regimes to the constitutionally ideal monetary order identified in Chapter VI. The penultimate chapter examines electronic payment systems over the Internet, and assesses the possible impact these will have on governments' monetary monopolies in the future. The fundamental conclusion of the thesis is that adherence to constitutional principles demands that money be supplied on a private competitive basis. Notwithstanding that many central banks are now 'independent', the way money is supplied today - by governments possessing monetary monopolies - is contrary to the principles of constitutionalism.

From 1840 to the present, the Treaty of Waitangi has been a subject of some significance in New Zealand – a distinctive but subtle thread running through the fabric of the country’s history and shaping attitudes to race relations. A conviction strongly held by New Zealanders is that the treaty has made the country different from other nations, that it initiated an experiment in race relationships that has secured reasonable accord over the years. Only as the climate of public opinion has shifted slightly in the last twenty years and as Maori protest about failure to obtain treaty rights has become more strident have these convictions been challenged.