No description available.

This study examines the value of literary interpretation. A case is argued on the basis of the possibility of literary works being understood as 'about' diverse 'themes'. The process of understanding literature, it is argued, inevitably involves the concerns and the personal and historical situatedness of the interpreter. In the performance history of Shakespeare's The Tempest we see clearly how the thematic focus and the representation of the elements of the work changes, sometimes radically, over time. An interpretation of The Tempest with an emphasis on today's concerns is the basis for a discussion which shows the interdependence of the questions of why literary works have survived as valued objects of attention over time, and how literature can matter to the reader. Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics shows, in its emphasis on the historical situatedness of understanding, how the reader'S situation and concerns feeds into the process of making sense of literary works and thereby makes literary interpretation interact with the life of the interpreter. 'Themes', or what the work is seen to 'be about', is central to the process of literary interpretation. This, in particular, is where literature has its openness to accommodate application to diverse concerns and situations. To remedy the deficiency of Gadamer's hermeneutics on this point, the role of themes in literary interpretation is first illustrated by an interpretation of Conrad's Heart of Darkness and then analyzed. The study argues that while different literary interpreters may have different purposes, for their procedures to constitute interpretations three criteria need to be observed. In having to reach an equilibrium between the requirements of faithfulness to the literary work on the one hand, and the understanding of it through one's own situation and concerns on the other, the process of literary interpretation makes a valuable contribution to understanding.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

The thesis begins by examining the philosophical underpinnings of Foucault's 'constitutionalist' methodology. It argues that the archaeological method of The Order of Things derives principally neither from phenomenology nor structuralism, but from a philosophical and scholarly tradition (that of Kant, Cassirer, Duhem, Koyré) in which mathematics, the scientific revolution of Galileo et al, and an a priori conceptualism are paramount. It suggests that the rigid gathering of conceptual energies into the notion of episteme finds an echo in the subsequent genealogical work on prisons. The thesis challenges the widely-held view that Foucault is a Nietzschean thinker, maintaining that his overstatement of the constitutionalist powers of 'discipline' is conditioned as much by a strong Cartesianism as by his residual structuralism. The thesis shows how the Classical theme of order informs Foucault's attempt to develop a modern theory of the constitution of the subject in discourse. It postulates that the much-traduced first volume on sexuality, which introduces time into his theory and embraces many of the truisms of twentieth-century theoretical science, exhibits a less rigid understanding of constitutionalist powers. The penultimate chapter addresses, in the context of accusations of Eurocentrism levelled at Foucault's work, some of the shortcomings of theoretico-political work which fails to think through the 'deconstitution' of power, the play between order and disorder. Finally, a profound continuity is posited between the archaeological method of The Order of Things and his treatment of sexuality. Rejecting the suggestion of an epistemological break, the thesis discovers the strategic invocation, in the final two volumes, of a very traditional understanding of reason. Diverging from those critics who only hear in Foucault the insistent theme of specificity and the persistent denunciation of reason and (technological) rationality, the thesis maintains that his writings effect a constant appeal to logos as order and reason.

I formulate what I believe to be a correct account of the normativity of rationality. I identify two opposing doctrines which I call instrumentalism and rationalism. Instrumentalism says there are no obligations to be rational intrinsic to rationality, but that being rational is instrumental to doing what ought to be done. Rationalism says there are intrinsically rational obligations. I give arguments for instrumentalism and show how a bifurcation in normativity undermines characteristic Aristotelian and Kantian arguments in support of rationalism. I concede that the confrontation between instrumentalism and rationalism cannot be settled in the thesis, since it depends in part on a fundamental dispute about the nature of rationality. However, the doctrine of instrumentalism gives a particularly clear picture of how obligation and rationality are related, and I believe I have shown instrumentalism to be a doctrine which must be taken seriously. Consequently, I believe my thesis to be a contribution to the Humean view of the relation of obligation and reason.

This thesis traces the evolution of the concept of African philosophy through three phases: the cultural essentialism of Léopold Senghor, founder of Négritude, the universalist critical reaction of Paulin Hountondji and the professional philosophers, and the sophisticated particularism of Valentin Mudimbé. The three stages are contextualized with discussion of the socio-political positioning of each writer, his motives, and his particular understanding of what is at stake in the definition of African philosophy. The initial need to bring about a revalorization of African culture and a recognition of African philosophical capabilities is met by a flamboyant and highly vocal cultural movement, Négritude, which is, however, intrinsically limited in scope and lifespan, and sets up a number of persistent, dogmatic suppositions about the ‘essentially African reason’. A demonstration of the Western origins of this essentialism debunks but does not dispel its influence, since it is firmly anchored to the themes of authenticity, colonial influence, and postcolonial independence. This leads to a dilemma where any move to separate African philosophy from the notion of a distinctly African reason is perceived as a Eurocentric attempt at acculturation, or a capitulation to the false universalism of ‘Enlightenment philosophy’, and on the other hand, the view that African thought is essentially different from European thought is also criticized as deriving from the Western colonial discourse. There is no definitive answer to this problem, and even the search for such an answer is itself part of the problem, a further twist in the ruse that Mudimbé believes is inherent to the colonial discourse. The practical solution Mudimbé proposes is to introduce an écart between African scientific practice and the West, to create a new space within which Africans might investigate the field of their experience in an Afrocentric way which will preserve their cultural specificity.

No description available.

My thesis is original in placing together Wittgenstein's ideas of how language works, and arguments for the philosophical significance of the embodied and relational figure of the mother. I both use and resist a Wittgensteinian therapy to overcome the problem of the forgetting of the mother in philosophy. I begin with the problem of essentialism, important to Wittgenstein and to feminist philosophy. My reading of Wittgenstein finds an ignored lacuna between language and (female) experience. I add in to the debate the type specimen approach from botany. Adopting this approach enables me to avoid a classification which requires a true inner essence to mothering, and provides a way for me to denote the significant place of the language games of mothering in language games about women. I argue for a different symbol of the mother. I agree with Wittgenstein's account of language, but add to it. I show the importance of Wittgenstein's insight that although meaning is not fixed independently of use, use does not fix meaning in that I create new meanings for the figure of the mother. I argue, through an exploration of Wittgenstein's concept of `übersichtlichen Darstellung ; that Wittgenstein can help us to see the phenomena of our life differently, in a way that makes space for understanding female difference. His concept of a form of life provides such openings. As the Wittgensteinian agent seems distinctly un-female, I bring in the philosophy of Kierkegaard in my argument for a different relational self as mother. I argue for a Kierkegaardian flexible maternal self with mobile edges. I insert the language games of the mother into Kierkegaard's writing on women. My aim is a more adequate representation of a (true) reality. I use the work of John Wisdom to make a bridge between Wittgenstein and the narrative form, which I use throughout. Wisdom's strategy is to engage in unconventional reflection in looking for new ways of telling philosophical stories, and in finding new patterns of meaning in the familiar. I claim that the narrative form enables me to express the shifting essence of the mother and the diversity of mothers; and to acknowledge the silences which are part of the mother's story. My aim in this thesis is creative. I use Wittgenstein to create a new kind of relation to philosophy. I do not offer a correct reading of Wittgenstein or Kierkegaard. Instead, aided by the insights provided by feminist philosophy, I write in the language games of the mother to their ideas. Thus, I bring into existence through utterance a different, feminist philosophical symbol of the mother.