<p>The efficacy and accuracy of information is very important for making decision in stock markets. In this paper, we study on the effect of information diffusion in Chinese stock market before and after the owership release in February 19, 2001, by testing the stationary of A share premium and cointegration between A and B share prices. The panel unit root tests we propose on A share premium are Augmented Dickey-Fullar (ADF) tests for individual firm and Fisher tests for the panel, based on combining pvalues from each individual cross-section. The panel cointegration tests on A and B shares we use is Johansen’s likelihood ratio tests for individual firm and likelihoodbased panel cointegraion tests for panel, based on combining the test statistics. The results show that before the opening of B share markets to domestic investors, A share premiums have a unit root and there is no cointegration relationship between A and B share markets. On the contrary, after ownership release, A share premium is stationary and there is cointegration relationship between A and B share markets.</p>

The efficacy and accuracy of information is very important for making decision in stock markets. In this paper, we study on the effect of information diffusion in Chinese stock market before and after the owership release in February 19, 2001, by testing the stationary of A share premium and cointegration between A and B share prices. The panel unit root tests we propose on A share premium are Augmented Dickey-Fullar (ADF) tests for individual firm and Fisher tests for the panel, based on combining pvalues from each individual cross-section. The panel cointegration tests on A and B shares we use is Johansen’s likelihood ratio tests for individual firm and likelihoodbased panel cointegraion tests for panel, based on combining the test statistics. The results show that before the opening of B share markets to domestic investors, A share premiums have a unit root and there is no cointegration relationship between A and B share markets. On the contrary, after ownership release, A share premium is stationary and there is cointegration relationship between A and B share markets.

The ownership structure in Sweden is characterized by a few controlling owners who often base their ownership of a lower capital investment than in many other countries. The separation of ownership and control is determined by control-boosting mechanisms and is a constantly debated topic. These mechanisms are used to control companies without having to bear the bulk of the capital, and the criticism centers around concerns that companies with control-boosting mechanisms are not managed as well as companies without them. The purpose of the study was to examine the use of control enhancing mechanisms and its effect on the market value of Swedish companies on Nasdaq Stockholm. The study adopted a quantitative form with hypotheses testing. The data collection has been made through annual reports of the sample and then statistically tested in SPSS through multiple regression. The use of vote-strong shares was shown to have a strong positive effect on the value of a company. Minor effects proven came from the difference between the largest owner's voting share and capital contribution, and of the percentage of the total votes held by the largest owner. These two, however, counteracted each other in approximately equal amounts. Not offering their vote-strong shares to on the public exchange is suggested to be strongly negative, but this could not be ascertained. Type of ownership and age were both insignificant in their ability to explain company value.

<p>Background: The origin of this study was the negotiations around a EU takeover directive, aimed at making the market for corporate control more open. One of the proposals was to neutralise shares carrying multiple rights in takeover situations when a potential acquirer obtains 75% of the total share capital. For many Swedish ownership groups, this would mean that the system of unequal voting rights, constituting an important defense to their control, would decrease in effectiveness. In the middle of writing this thesis, an EU agreement was finally reached, making the proposal voluntary to adopt. The imminent threat posed to the Swedish system faded, but has though not disappeared since the present rules anew will be brought under inspection in five years. </p><p>Purpose: To give examples on potential tactics to adopt if unequal voting rights would risk to become neutralised in takeover situations, these tactics dependent on two different scenarios: (1) Present Swedish ownership structure is considered advantageous for the country and thus to be remained or (2) A more open market for takeovers is desired. Course of action: Interviews have been conducted with parties within Swedish trade and industry, partly in order to assess the value and necessity of the content of this thesis. </p><p>Conclusion: The threat of an abolition of the unequal voting rights is not perceived as imminent by parties within Swedish trade and industry and few alternative resistance strategies are suggested. If current Swedish ownership structure is to be remained, the author proposes competition-reducing defenses, if a more open market for takeovers is aimed for, auction-inducing resistance strategies. The choice of how to proceed should depend on how afraid the Swedish Government and Swedish companies are of a change in present ownership structure.</p>

Background: The origin of this study was the negotiations around a EU takeover directive, aimed at making the market for corporate control more open. One of the proposals was to neutralise shares carrying multiple rights in takeover situations when a potential acquirer obtains 75% of the total share capital. For many Swedish ownership groups, this would mean that the system of unequal voting rights, constituting an important defense to their control, would decrease in effectiveness. In the middle of writing this thesis, an EU agreement was finally reached, making the proposal voluntary to adopt. The imminent threat posed to the Swedish system faded, but has though not disappeared since the present rules anew will be brought under inspection in five years. Purpose: To give examples on potential tactics to adopt if unequal voting rights would risk to become neutralised in takeover situations, these tactics dependent on two different scenarios: (1) Present Swedish ownership structure is considered advantageous for the country and thus to be remained or (2) A more open market for takeovers is desired. Course of action: Interviews have been conducted with parties within Swedish trade and industry, partly in order to assess the value and necessity of the content of this thesis. Conclusion: The threat of an abolition of the unequal voting rights is not perceived as imminent by parties within Swedish trade and industry and few alternative resistance strategies are suggested. If current Swedish ownership structure is to be remained, the author proposes competition-reducing defenses, if a more open market for takeovers is aimed for, auction-inducing resistance strategies. The choice of how to proceed should depend on how afraid the Swedish Government and Swedish companies are of a change in present ownership structure.