Contemporary peace operations are deployed to increasingly complex, high-risk environments where localised armed groups, often those that can influence the trajectory of the conflict are not at the table, at the same time militaries are mandated to facilitate social, economic and political transformative processes in recovered areas. By the opening of the twenty-first century, the distinction between peacebuilding and military interventions converged both in policy and practice and increasing pressure are placed on the troop-contributing countries to adapt to the dynamics of ‘multidimensional peace operations. Drawing upon the intersection between the academic bodies of peacekeeping and counter-insurgency, this research argues that there is a growing amount of empirically grounded literature that seeks to critically assess missions’ peacebuilding capability, and more specifically its impact on local settings. Yet, most studies tend to be framed in relation to conflict abatement along reductionist approaches to development rather than analysing how and in what ways such missions aid in providing a stable polity, thus suggesting a need of further investigation about the phenomena. In contribution to the community of practice(s), this research draws upon the latest theoretical trend of peacebuilding, abiding to a system perspective of the 5 Capabilities Framework (5Cs). This, in order to attain an increased understanding of military actors’ involvement and ability to undertake early peacebuilding tasks, by studying the case of the Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) under the auspices of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the Jubbaland region. Moreover, the research was operationalised through an on-ground collection of data in Kenya and Somalia, using unstructured and semi-structured interviews and draws upon a purposive sampling method to gather perspectives from a variety of actors involved in peace operation affairs. The study finds that the AMISOM KDF has played a key role in shaping the organisation’s peacebuilding policy, with a diverse portfolio engagement of both top-down and bottom-up character. Working predominantly through informal structures, much of their engagement is not aligned with the AMISOM civilian headquarters, in response to an environment with many challenges, resulting in a patchwork of practices with sectoral difference. Analytically, the 5Cs framework posit that an organisation must strike a balance between all capabilities in order to produce social value, something that the Kenyan contingents have struggled to achieve. While this unpacks a view of moderate, to low capacity for peacebuilding, it also generates an overall critique to the framework as it promotes a scenario which seems impossible to realise. Despite its ‘system-wide’ contribution, questions remain regarding the value of the framework in analysing local peacebuilding engagement in peace operations.

Contemporary peace operations are deployed to increasingly complex, high-risk environments where localised armed groups, often those that can influence the trajectory of the conflict are not at the table, at the same time militaries are mandated to facilitate social, economic and political transformative processes in recovered areas. By the opening of the twenty-first century, the distinction between peacebuilding and military interventions converged both in policy and practice and increasing pressure are placed on the troop contributing countries to adapt to the dynamics of ‘multidimensional peace operations’. Drawing upon the intersection between the academic bodies of peacekeeping and counter-insurgency, this research argues that there is a growing amount of empirically grounded literature that seeks to critically assess missions’ peacebuilding capability, and more specifically its impact on local settings. Yet, most studies tend to be framed in relation to conflict abatement along reductionist approaches to development rather than analysing how and in what ways such missions aid in providing a stable polity, thus suggesting a need of further investigation about the phenomena. In contribution to the community of practice(s), this research draws upon the latest theoretical trend of peacebuilding, abiding to a system perspective of the 5 Capabilities Framework (5Cs). This, in order to attain an increased understanding of military actors’ involvement and ability to undertake early peacebuilding tasks, by studying the case of the Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) under the auspices of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in the Jubbaland region. Moreover, the research was operationalised through an on-ground collection of data in Kenya and Somalia, using unstructured and semi-structured interviews and draws upon a purposive sampling method to gather perspectives from a variety of actors involved in peace operation affairs. The study finds that the AMISOM KDF have played a key role in shaping the organisation’s peacebuilding policy, with a diverse portfolio engagement of both top-down and bottom-up character. Working predominantly through informal structures, much of their engagement is not aligned with the AMISOM civilian headquarters, in response to an environment with many challenges, resulting in a patchwork of practices with sectoral difference. Analytically, the 5Cs framework posit that an organisation must strike a balance between all capabilities in order to produce social value, something that the Kenyan contingents have struggled to achieve. While this unpacks a view of moderate, to low capacity for peacebuilding, it also generates an overall critique to the framework as it promotes a scenario which seems impossible to realise. Despite its ‘system-wide’ contribution, questions remain regarding the value of the framework in analysing local peacebuilding engagement in peace operations.

State failure impacts international relations through the spill-over effects it has beyond the failed state. The international response to state failure: The case of Somalia attempts to answer the research question "Is the international response to the failed Somalia more concerned with security (i.e. the fight against terrorism and piracy) than with nation building/democratization or humanitarian aid (refugees, poverty)? This question is answered through descriptive-analytical research approach using the Neo-Realist theory within a globalised world. Concepts of legitimacy, authority and sovereignty in relation to the international response are explored where response takes the form of Intervention and humanitarian intervention that could be informed by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) or go as far as nation building. Various annually published indices that examine and rank failed states are analysed which collectively and independently indicate that Somalia has been the number one failed state since 2008. Historically, the international response to Somalia prior to state collapse in 1991 forms the foundation to the response as well as accounting for the importance of complex internal clan politics. The background to how the international response has been, plays a key role in understanding where the international response‘s motives are positioned on scale of humanitarian versus security motives for intervention. The regional dynamics are explained through the Regional Security Complex (RSC). The security power political motives are seen through Anti-terror motives in a post 9/11 world and the various international responses to the different forms of attempts of interim governments and their opposition movements. Most notably, Al Shabaab, who formally merged with Al Qaeda in 2012, has been a focus point for the international response. The African Union (AU) mission in Somalia AMISOM is analysed from its humble beginnings to a force to be reckoned with. Due to the failure in Somalia for over 20 years, 14 per cent of its population form part of the influential Diaspora group. State building has emerged as one of the major international responses to state failure with the motive of avoiding nationwide humanitarian crisis. Yet the inaction of the past decade has lead to large spread famine in 2011. The security motive of regional and international players has overshadowed a pure humanitarian response in the past but the immensity of the crisis in 2011 has lead to a global humanitarian response. A new window of opportunity has presented itself with the appointment of the new president of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) in September 2012. The international response to state failure has placed security first and has acted accordingly to limit the international economic and security effects of piracy, terrorism and refugee flows. Nation building has come second although, there have been attempts at achieving a uniform response to the failure in Somalia, neo realist real politik reigns. The ideal of a golden mean, where a balance is achieved between security and humanitarian motives, could only be achieved if Somalia starts addressing its internal issues that have caused and resulted from the failure, which is far from straightforward. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Political Sciences / unrestricted