published_or_final_version / abstract / Mathematics / Master / Master of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering / Master / Master of Philosophy

Investigate the use of partial relations for multicriteria reverse auctions. At first, a theoretical framework is introduced. Then, an extension of traditional multicriteria tools is considered. This is referred to as the Butterfly model. Finally, the concept of Bidding Niches partitions is formalized and tested.

The goal of this dissertation is to understand the market-based mechanisms that enable shippers to allocate lanes in an efficient way for truckload (TL) transportation procurement despite the self-interest of carriers. To understand the market-based mechanisms, we focus on proposing some novel models and mechanisms to enhance the use of combinatorial auction for TL transportation procurement. In this dissertation, our approach to gaining the understanding consists of three parts: 1. We develop a carrier optimal bid generation model for carriers (bidders) to discover the best sets of lanes to bid for at a given round. The optimal bid generation model simultaneously generates alternative tours and selects the most profitable package bid for the carrier under a myopic strategy, which has never been considered before. The simultaneous tour generation and selection significantly lessen the computational complexities of a carrier's optimization problem since it is unnecessary for the carrier to calculate the values for all possible packages. 2. We present an iterative combinatorial auction design that integrates the optimization problems for both the shipper and the bidders where the approximate dual prices derived from the result of a winner determination solution are used by the bidders in identifying profitable lanes. The auctions also allow the bidders to submit exclusive-OR (XOR) bids and are able to deal with some common business considerations. The extension of the concept of active bids enables this mechanism to effectively mitigate the exposure problem, the threshold problem, and the free-riding problem. Furthermore, both the shippers and the carriers are better off compared to multi-round auctions that do not integrate the shippers' and carriers' optimizations. 3. We extend a deterministic winner determination model to a two-stage stochastic winner determination model for TL transportation procurement under shipment volume uncertainty. We demonstrate that the value of the stochastic solution is always at least as good as one obtained by a deterministic model based on using expected shipment volumes. The sWDP model is to the best of our knowledge the first winner determination formulation of any kind that explicitly incorporates demand uncertainty.

Telecommunication sector is one of the most developing in last 20 years. The speed of the progress in inventing new technologies has to be balanced by proper radio spectrum management since radio spectrum is a scarce resource. The methods of assignment used in past such as beauty contests or lotteries are no longer those that rule the sector. To keep pace with new technologies, spectrum auctions were presented as a new method that ensures the best results for state. Since the companies are competing for the licenses, final price is getting higher and thereby higher revenues go to the state treasury. In this thesis the behavior of final price in the spectrum auctions was examined. In the end of the work, recommendations to NRAs were presented to conclude the results of the empirical examination. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

M.Sc. / This dissertation investigates how auctioneer agents can maximise the revenue of an auction. Auctions are an effective solution to agent negotiation because of their simplicity. They are therefore the most widely used approach to agent negotiation. A review of auction theory proves that auction revenue is influenced by factors such as the auction format and the auction parameters. The optimal auction format and parameters are dependent on the bidders and the auction environment. A study of internet auctions confirms the findings of auction theory regarding the importance of the format as well as the parameters in an auction. There has been significant research on the strategies bidding agents can adopt in order to maximise their utility. There is little research, however, on the strategies auctioneer agents can adopt to maximise auction revenue. In this study, a survey is done of the related auctioneer agents in research that maximise auction revenue. The shortcomings of these are identified. The aim of this research is to develop an adaptive auctioneer agent that can maximise the revenue of an auction. The proposed solution is the revenue maximising adaptive auctioneer (RMAA) agent. The RMAA agent consists of three components: the auction manager, the auction format selector (AFS) and the auction parameter selector (APS). The AFS employs a customised zeroth-level classifier system to select the auction format based on the auction environment. The APS employs reinforcement learning combined with a local hill climbing algorithm to learn what the most profitable values are for auction parameters, such as the reserve price and the bid increment. The auction manager automates the auction and coordinates the AFS and APS. It implements the four traditional auction formats, namely the English auction, the Dutch auction, the Vickrey auction and the first-price sealed-bid auction. Experiments conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the RMAA agent prove that this agent can consistently generate more revenue than a non-adaptive auctioneer agent. The contribution of this research is an auctioneer agent that adapts both the auction format and the auction parameters according to the environment in order to maximise the auction revenue.

Auctions are a key economic mechanism for establishing the value of goods that have an uncertain price. In recent years, as a consequence of the ubiquitous emergence of technology, auctions can reach consumers, and as a result drive market prices, on a global scale. Collection of private information such as past trades exposes more information than desired by market participants. The leaked information can be statistically analyzed to provide auctioneers, or competitors, an advantage on future transactions. The need to preserve privacy has become a critical concern to reach an accepted level of fairness, and to provide market participants an environment in which they can bid a true valuation. This research is about possible mechanisms to carry out sealed-bid auctions in a distributed setting, and provides the reader with the challenges that currently persevere in the field. The first chapter offers an introduction to different kinds of auction, and to describe sealed-bid auction. The next chapter surveys the literature, and provides necessary theoretical background. Moving on to chapter 3, instead of solely focusing on theoretical aspects of sealed-bid auctions, this chapter dives into implementation details, and demonstrates through communication and computational analysis how different settings affect performance. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.S.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2018. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

We study sealed-bid first-price auction for one commodity. While traditional model (Vickrey, 1961) consists of only one stage of bidding, we introduce a new model by adding a new stage of application before the stage of final bidding. In the application stage, each bidder submits a tentative sealed bid, and it is then announced who is the tentative winner. Then in the bidding stage, each bidder gives his final (sealed) bid, and the final winner receives the commodity by paying his final bid. / To analyze the model, we use the equilibrium concepts of Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (WPBE). The role of the tentative bid can be regarded as a pre-play communication between the bidders. We obtain three main results: / 1) Our Theorem 1 shows that every equilibrium in the traditional one-stage model can be realized as a WPBE in our two-stage model, and the tentative bids of bidders are independent of their private values. / 2) Our Theorem 2 shows that if one requires the tentative bids of bidders to be strictly increasing with their private values, then no symmetric WPBE exists. / 3) Our Theorem 3 shows that if each bidder uses a weakly increasing step function as the tentative bidding strategy, then no symmetric WPBE exists. / Our work suggests that if each bidder is free to change his final bid from the tentative bid, then introducing the application system does not affect the outcome of the auction. / 本文章主要論及首價密封投標拍賣。傳統的拍賣只有一個階段﹐而在這篇文章我們會在傳統拍賣前加一個「申請階段」。在「申請階段」中﹐每名投標者需要遞交一個意向價格﹐拍賣者再根據意向價格宣佈那位投標者成為申請人。之後的拍賣中﹐每名投標者會遞交一個最終價格﹐最高價者會成功投得該項商品。 我們會使用「弱完美貝葉斯均衡」(WPBE)的概念去分析本文中的模型。我們得到以下的三個主要結果: / 1)在定理一中﹐我們發現所有傳統單一階段拍賣中的均衡點, 在我們新申請拍賣的模型中﹐都會是弱完美貝葉斯均衡(WPBE)﹐而且投標者的意向價格會和他們對商品的自身價值沒有關係。 / 2)在定理二中﹐如果投標者的意向價格函數和對商品的自身價值是嚴格遞升﹐那麼對稱性弱完美貝葉斯均衡不會存在。 / 3)在定理三中﹐如果申請階段的策略是遞升階梯函數﹐那麼對稱性弱完美貝葉斯均衡不會存在。 / 我們的研究指出, 當投標者可以不受意向價格規範而自己更改最終價格﹐那麼加入「申請階段」也不會改變拍賣的結果。 / Ho, Man Kit. / Thesis M.Phil. Chinese University of Hong Kong 2014. / Includes bibliographical references (leave 41). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Title from PDF title page (viewed on 18, October, 2016). / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only.

by Chi-Wai Lee. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 112-117). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iii / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Background and Motivations --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Problem Definition --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- Contributions --- p.5 / Chapter 1.4 --- Thesis Organization --- p.7 / Chapter 2 --- Literature Review --- p.8 / Chapter 2.1 --- Electronic Commerce --- p.8 / Chapter 2.2 --- Agents for Electronic Commerce --- p.9 / Chapter 2.3 --- Online Auctions --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Business Models --- p.12 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Auction Formats --- p.13 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Time Duration of Auctions --- p.14 / Chapter 2.3.4 --- Minimum Bids and Reserve Prices --- p.15 / Chapter 2.3.5 --- Auction Properties and Bidder Behaviours --- p.15 / Chapter 2.3.6 --- "Comparison of English, Dutch and Double auction" --- p.16 / Chapter 2.4 --- Agents Developing Tools and Tool-kits --- p.17 / Chapter 2.5 --- Limitations of Agent Tool-kits --- p.18 / Chapter 2.6 --- Markov Processes for Stochastic Modeling --- p.20 / Chapter 2.6.1 --- Continuous Time Markov Chain --- p.21 / Chapter 2.6.2 --- Poisson Arrival Model --- p.22 / Chapter 2.6.3 --- Example: discrete time Markov chain with stationary probabilities --- p.22 / Chapter 3 --- Markov Chain Model --- p.25 / Chapter 3.1 --- Markov Chain for English Auction --- p.25 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Variables --- p.27 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- Auction Assumptions --- p.27 / Chapter 3.1.3 --- Bidder Assumptions --- p.29 / Chapter 3.1.4 --- Propositions of the Markov Model --- p.31 / Chapter 3.1.5 --- Tractability --- p.35 / Chapter 3.2 --- Markov Chain for Dutch Auction --- p.38 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Variables --- p.39 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Model Assumptions --- p.39 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Propositions of the Markov Model --- p.42 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Tractability --- p.43 / Chapter 3.3 --- Progression of the Price Vector for English and Dutch Auction --- p.43 / Chapter 3.4 --- Markov Chain for Double auction --- p.45 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Variables --- p.47 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Model Assumptions --- p.47 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Propositions of the Markov Model --- p.49 / Chapter 3.4.4 --- Tractability --- p.53 / Chapter 3.5 --- Progression of the Price Vector for Double Auction --- p.53 / Chapter 3.6 --- Summary --- p.54 / Chapter 4 --- System Design --- p.57 / Chapter 4.1 --- System Features --- p.58 / Chapter 4.2 --- System Architecture --- p.59 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- System Workflow --- p.60 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Communication Layer --- p.61 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Agent Logic Layer --- p.62 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Database Abstraction Layer --- p.62 / Chapter 4.3 --- Roles of the Agents --- p.62 / Chapter 4.4 --- Implementation Details --- p.65 / Chapter 4.4.1 --- Choosing a Scripting Language --- p.65 / Chapter 4.4.2 --- Choosing a Database --- p.68 / Chapter 4.4.3 --- Server-Side Java with Jakarta-tomcat --- p.69 / Chapter 4.4.4 --- Agent API --- p.70 / Chapter 4.4.5 --- Class java.agent.Agent --- p.72 / Chapter 4.5 --- Summary --- p.73 / Chapter 5 --- Experimental Results --- p.75 / Chapter 5.1 --- Simulation Environment --- p.75 / Chapter 5.2 --- Experiment One: A small English auction --- p.76 / Chapter 5.3 --- Experiment Two: A large English auction --- p.80 / Chapter 5.4 --- Experiment Three: A small Dutch auction --- p.82 / Chapter 5.5 --- Experiment Four: A large Dutch auction --- p.83 / Chapter 5.6 --- Experiment Five: Partial knowledge on other BAs --- p.84 / Chapter 5.7 --- Experiment Six: Partial knowledge on closing time --- p.86 / Chapter 5.8 --- Experiment Seven: A small Double auction --- p.87 / Chapter 5.9 --- Comparisons and Discussions --- p.89 / Chapter 5.10 --- Summary --- p.90 / Chapter 6 --- Conclusion --- p.91 / Chapter A --- Markov Chain for English Auction --- p.93 / Chapter A.1 --- Graphs of F and F* Functions --- p.93 / Chapter A.2 --- Solution of a Small Example --- p.96 / Chapter A.2.1 --- Computation of Transition Probabilities --- p.97 / Chapter A.2.2 --- Progression of the Price Vector --- p.97 / Chapter B --- Markov Chain for Double Auction --- p.101 / Chapter B.1 --- Graphs of Fb(vbi) and Fs(vsi) Functions --- p.101 / Chapter B.2 --- Solution of a Small Example --- p.102 / Chapter B.2.1 --- Computation of Transition Probabilities --- p.102 / Chapter C --- Implementation Details --- p.105 / Chapter C.1 --- Tables Design in MySQL --- p.105 / Chapter C.2 --- Sample Apache Configuration File --- p.109 / Bibliography --- p.112

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Florida, 2001. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains x, 61 p.; also contains graphics. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-60).