Announcements of acquisitions of publicly traded companies are usually accompanied by their share price booming by tens of percent. The underlying reason is that the acquirer of the company gains a controlling stake, due to which he can help the company pivot in the desired direction or benefit from synergy effects. A minority investor, by definition, is not capable of doing this, thus he is willing to pay a lower price for the shares than the acquirer of the controlling stake. The thesis analyzes whether a minority shareholder can profit from the acquisition premium by purchasing shares of companies which he believes will be later acquired. The paper consists of two parts - theoretical and analytic. The theoretical part discusses the significance of the acquisition premium and its value, with regard to the type of investor and his motivations for the acquisition. The theoretical part yields into the analytic part, where acquisition waves are tested. It also includes an analysis of individual acquisitions and their underlying reasons, which are grouped into categories in order to find patterns of aquired companies.

Notre thèse s'intéresse aux conflits d'agence entre les actionnaires de contrôle et les actionnaires minoritaires pouvant surgir suite à une décision de fusion ou d'acquisition. Plus précisément, nous tentons, à travers trois essais, d'identifier les cas où, les actionnaires de contrôle utilisent des opérations de fusions-acquisitions comme un outil de transfert de richesses des actionnaires minoritaires vers leurs propres comptes. Dans le premier essai, nous présentons une analyse théorique de ce comportement opportuniste avec deux cas portant sur des faits réels. En utilisant la méthodologie des études d'événement, nous montrons dans le deuxième essai que ce comportement peut se révéler important dans des cas spécifiques liés au degré de l'enracinement de l'actionnaire de contrôle. Dans le troisième essai, nous montrons que la prime d'acquisition peut refléter ce comportement dans les cas de fusions-acquisitions à caractère public / Our dissertation focuses on agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders that may arise following a merger-acquisition decision. Through three essays, we aim to identify cases in which the controlling shareholders use mergers and acquisitions as a tool to transfer wealth from minority shareholders to their own accounts. The first essay provides a theoretical analysis of this opportunistic behavior and examines two real cases. Using event study methodology, the second essay shows that the opportunistic behavior may be important in specific cases linked to the level of shareholder's entrenchment. Finally, the third essay shows that the acquisition premium may reflect this behavior even in cases of public transactions

本研究以2002年至2013年台灣主併公司為上市公司的併購案件為樣本，探討專家意見評價結果和品質對主併公司短期股價影響。本研究結果有兩項發現： 1. 於意見書揭露日時，若專家意見書評估價格高於雙方約定交易價格愈多時，即評價溢酬愈大，主併公司會有負向的累積異常報酬率。 2. 於意見書揭露日時，若併購溢酬越大、或是併購溢酬大與評價品質高，主併公司會有負向的累積異常報酬率。 故本研究認為，台灣獨立專家制度相較歐美國家仍不成熟，相關配套措施及規範未規畫周詳，對於獨立專家的獨立性、專業性之確保，以及出具意見時評價方法的選擇標準、意見書應記載事項等規範過少，使得專家意見書於揭露時評價結果易受到市場及投資人懷疑。另外評價品質與主併公司異常報酬的關聯性在少數的樣本下無法表現出顯著性，市場及投資人較傾向以併購溢酬做為交易出價是否過高之依據。 / This study analyses the relation between target firm appraisal outcome and quality disclosed in the fairness opinions and acquiring firm performances by using the samples of Taiwanese listed company in M&A transaction between 2002 and 2013. We find that the stock price reactions to the public disclosure of fairness opinions are negatively related to the difference between target firms valuations contained in the fairness opinion and the merger offer price. In addition, the greater the acquisition premium for or acquisition or high acquisition premium with high appraisal quality would result in negative stock price reactions as well. Under these conditions, this study suggests that Taiwan's independent expert system in Taiwan still appeared to be immature, including that related supplementary measures are not careful planned, the independence of the independent expert, the professionalism of independent expert, and the criteria of valuation methods are not carefully regulated by the government. Therefore, the outcome and the quality of the fairness opinion may not to be trusted by the market and investors. Also, the association between appraisal quality and abnormal unable to be significant could result from the lack of number of samples.