Leonard B. Meyer proposed unique metaphysical constructs of the aesthetic experience in music in his 1956 book Emotion and Meaning in Music. These constructs posited a causal nexus for affective response to music based upon the absolute-expressionist viewpoint that structural variations in a work of music give rise to human affect. The primary hierarchical constituents of Meyer’s theory include his inhibition thesis, deviation thesis, and violation of the Gestalt principles of continuity, closure, and shape. The study of Madsen, Brittin, and Capparella-Sheldon (1993) was part of a series of studies that examined the aesthetic experience in music according to continuously measured affective response. Participants recorded affective response via Continuous Response Digital Interface (CRDI) while listening to Act I of Giacomo Puccini’s La Bohéme. The purpose of this study was to analyze the Puccini according to the constructs of Meyer, and then compare those results to the “aesthetic footprint” generated by the empirical study. Results indicated a correlation between affective response and delays or violations of continuity, closure, and shape. A case is presented for the validity of Meyer’s constructs. Additionally, future research and applications to teaching expressivity are discussed. / A Dissertation submitted to the College of Music in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester 2018. / April 19, 2018. / Affective response, Entropy, Expressivity, Gestalt, Leonard Meyer, Tension / Includes bibliographical references. / Clifford Madsen, Professor Directing Dissertation; Bruce Holzman, University Representative; Katarzyna Bugaj, Committee Member; John Geringer, Committee Member; William Fredrickson, Committee Member.

Thesis advisor: James Najarian / This investigation outlines and applies what I have termed Aesthetic Phenomenology – a method of interdisciplinary criticism founded on the intersections of Martin Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and Wolfgang Iser’s literary anthropology. This study traces the articulation of Dasein’s fundamental ontological structures outlined in Heidegger’s philosophy. A concern with Dasein and the issue of its Being, specifically in relation to the aesthetic, are prominently foregrounded in many works of eighteenth-century and Romantic period English literature. Hence conceptions and investigations of the imagination become central during this period. Yet the idea of the imagination itself as a faculty is amended and supplemented when it is brought into play with what Iser terms “the imaginary,” which is conceived as the domain of possible worlds and modes of Being. In the first chapter, “Aesthetic Phenomenology: A Critical Encounter,” I outline how a phenomenologically grounded aesthetic must account for the interplay of the domains of the artist, artwork, and recipient in what I call an “aesthetic equation.” The second chapter, “Between Fundamental Ontology and the Imaginary: A Genealogy of Aesthetic Phenomenology,” traces the principle landmarks defining the topography of our investigation. “The Aesthetics of Insein” deals with how Being is projected and articulated in regards to Heidegger’s conceptions of “understanding,” “interpretation,” and “worlding,” as well as his distinction between the “real” and “reality.” “The Aesthetics of Attunement” is concerned with the opposition between everyday and authentic Being and the quality of aesthetic experience as both Erlebnis and Erfahrung. The aesthetic functions as an analogue to Heidegger’s conception of “conscience” as a “call” which leads to Being becoming “resolute” and taking up the path to its “authentic,” ownmost self and returning to its “there.” In “The Undiscovered Country and the Mortal Bourne: There Be Monsters,” I delve into the potentially negative side of the imaginary and discuss the implications of, and dangers inherent in, the transgressive qualities of the aesthetic. The writings of Samuel Johnson are explicitly guided by the ontological and moral issue of the choice of life. The first part of the chapter measures Johnson’s “ontological surveys,” which address Dasein’s range of possible attunements, specifically as conducted in the poems “London” (1738), “The Vanity of Human Wishes” (1749), and “On the Death of Doctor Robert Levet” (1782). In “The Temporality of Idleness: Aesthetic Ramblers, Adventurers, and Idlers and the Issue of Authenticity,” I consider both the negative and positive aspects of idleness as attunement, which recurs in Johnson’s periodical essays. The next section, “The Domain of the Aesthetic in Johnson’s Criticism,” posits that for Johnson the aesthetic provides a realm wherein a range of possible projections of Being are disclosed. The final section, “The Devouring Imaginary and the Struggle of Resolution,” investigates the obverse side of Johnson’s relationship to the imagination and the imaginary. As the leading philosopher of the imagination in England during this period, Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s poetry and prose is directly engaged with the issue of Dasein’s ontological projection and the disclosure of horizons of Being. “The Imagination vs. the Imaginary,” deals first with what I term the “voluntary imagination” as it is revealed in Coleridge’s so-called “conversation poems” as a form of Erlebnis. The obverse side of the voluntary imagination is the “compulsory imaginary,” which in a form of experience conceived as Erfahrung, the contours and consequences of which are drawn out through a readings of “Fears in Solitude” (1798), The Rime of the Ancient Mariner (1798 / 1834), and “Kubla Khan” (1797-1799?). The awareness of the failure of the imagination to order experience and life becomes evident in Coleridge’s “Black Period” poems: Dejection: An Ode (1802), Constancy to an Ideal Object (1804-7), Ne Plus Ultra (1811), and Limbo (1811). Here the imagination as creator and site of joy is replaced by the abyss of the imaginary. Coleridge’s imaginative failure eventuates his pursuit of what I call the “Philosophic Imaginary” – a process initiated in the Biographia Literaria (1817). The Coleridge section concludes with a consideration of the philosophic imaginary’s legacy as revealed in essays about Coleridge by Algernon Charles Swinburne, Walter Pater, and Arthur Symons. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: English.

<p> The goal of this dissertation is to write the theory of organic architecture which Wright himself did not write. This is done through a comparison with GWF Hegel&rsquo;s philosophy of art to help position Wright&rsquo;s theory of organic architecture and clarify his architectural aesthetic. Contemporary theories of organicism do not address the aesthetic basis of organic architecture as theorized and practiced by Wright, and the focus of this dissertation will be to fill part of this gap. Wright&rsquo;s organic theory was rooted in nineteenth-century Idealist philosophy where the aim of art is not the imitation of nature but the creation of beautiful objects which invite contemplation and express freedom. Wright perceived this quality in Japanese art and wove it into his organic theory. </p><p> This project is organized into three main categories from which Wright&rsquo;s own works and writings of organic architecture are framed, two of which are affinities of his views and one which, by its contrast, provides additional definition. The second chapter, Foundation, lays the philosophical or metaphysical foundation and is a comparison of Hegel&rsquo;s philosophy of art, including his Romantic stage of architecture, with Wright&rsquo;s own theory. The third chapter, Formalism, relates the affinity between Japanese art and Wright&rsquo;s own designs. Three case studies are here included, showing their correlation. The fourth chapter, Filter, contrasts early twentieth-century Modernist architecture with Wright&rsquo;s own organicism. This provides a greater definition to Wright&rsquo;s organicism as it takes clues from Wright&rsquo;s own sense of discrimination between the contemporary modernism he saw and his own architecture. These three chapters lead to the proposal of a model theory of organic architecture in chapter five which is a structured theory of organic architecture with both historical and contemporary merit. This serves to provide a greater understanding of Wright&rsquo;s form of the organic as an aesthetically based system, both in historic context, and as relevant for contemporary discourse. </p><p>

文潔華. / 稿本(電腦打印本) / Thesis (Ph. D.)--香港中文大學, 1990. / Gao ben (dian nao da yin ben) / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 548-552. / Wen Jiehua. / Thesis (Ph. D.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1990. / 前言： --- p.一 / Chapter 第一章 --- 儒家藝術理論中的「自然人化」觀 --- p.1 / Chapter A. --- 儒學論藝術價值之根源-仁 --- p.1 / Chapter 1. --- 先秦孔孟哲學之中心一「攝禮歸仁」 --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- 儒家論仁、性與天道 --- p.8 / Chapter 3. --- 儒家的人心觀-論心之無對、虛靈、主宰與涵蓋性 --- p.20 / Chapter 4. --- 儒家的自然宇宙 觀 --- p.28 / Chapter 5. --- 儒學論人與自然的關糸 --- p.33 / Chapter 6. --- 儒家之「智的直覺」」 --- p.37 / Chapter B. --- 禮樂傳統-儒家道德哲學於藝術理論上的引申 --- p.44 / Chapter 1. --- 禮樂傳統的基礎-孔門仁學論藝術與人性自覺 --- p.49 / Chapter 2. --- 禮樂傳統的理論根源一「中和觀念」 --- p.69 / Chapter C. --- 禮樂傳统中的「自然人化」觀 --- p.69 / Chapter 1. --- 從形上形下兩層看禮樂傳統中的「自然人化」說 --- p.70 / Chapter 2. --- 禮樂傳統中「人自然化」與「自然人化」的循環 --- p.74 / Chapter 第二章 --- 道家藝術精神論人與自然 --- p.80 / Chapter A. --- 道家論藝術價值的根源-「道」 --- p.80 / 引言：老莊之道的主觀及客觀性原則 --- p.89 / Chapter 1. --- 老子之道一 --- p.82 / Chapter 2. --- 莊子之「道」 --- p.85 / Chapter 3. --- 道家論人與自然 --- p.115 / Chapter 4. --- 道家的「智的直覺」 --- p.119 / Chapter B. --- 道家之道於蓊術理論上的引申 --- p.124 / 引言：道家之道與藝術精神 --- p.124 / Chapter 1. --- 老子論美 --- p.127 / Chapter 2. --- 莊子的藝術精神 --- p.134 / Chapter 3. --- 道家美學範疇 --- p.145 / Chapter C. --- 道家藝術精神中的「人自然化」及「自然人化」觀 --- p.159 / Chapter 1. --- 從形上形下兩層看道家藝術精神中的「人自然化」觀 --- p.161 / Chapter 2. --- 道家藝術精神中「人自然化」與「自然人化」的循環 --- p.165 / Chapter 第三章 --- 儒道互補 --- p.170 / 引言 --- p.170 / 《易》與先秦儒家 --- p.175 / Chapter 1. --- 《易》與儒 --- p.176 / Chapter 2. --- 《易》中的「天人相應」說 --- p.178 / Chapter 3. --- 「易體」與儒道之「内心之學」 --- p.181 / Chapter 第四章 --- 馬克思美學中的「自然人化」觀： --- p.188 / Chapter A´Ø --- 馬克思主義論人與自然 --- p.188 / Chapter 1. --- 馬克思辯證唯物主義與唯物史觀的理論淵源 --- p.189 / Chapter 2. --- 辯證唯物主義與唯物史觀内容大要 --- p.203 / Chapter 3. --- 辯證唯物主義的認識論 --- p.223 / Chapter 4. --- 辯證唯物史觀論人 --- p.231 / Chapter 5. --- 辯證唯物史觀論自然 --- p.243 / Chapter 6. --- 辯證唯物史觀論人與自然 --- p.245 / Chapter B. --- 馬克思主義於藝術理論上的引申 --- p.250 / 引言 --- p.251 / Chapter 1. --- 馬克思主義文藝發展的辯證觀點 --- p.256 / Chapter 2. --- 馬克思主義的審美觀 --- p.266 / Chapter 3. --- 馬克思美學中的「自然人化」觀 --- p.272 / Chapter C. --- 馬克思論美的規律中的「人自然化」與「自然人化」 --- p.287 / Chapter 第五章 --- 當代中國採納馬克思美學的發展與内容 --- p.295 / Chapter A. --- 馬克思主義在當代中國的傳播 --- p.295 / Chapter 1. --- 馬克思主義哲學在毛澤東以前的中國 --- p.295 / Chapter 2. --- 毛澤東對馬克思主義的採納與發展 --- p.297 / Chapter 3. --- 毛澤東以後 --- p.300 / Chapter B. --- 馬克思美學在當代中國的傳播 --- p.301 / Chapter 1. --- 馬克思美學在毛澤東以前的中國傳播的發展與重點 --- p.301 / Chapter 2. --- 毛澤東的文藝思想與影響 --- p.303 / Chapter 第六章 --- 當代中國馬克思美學關於自然人化問題的論爭 --- p.316 / 引言：《巴黎手稿》與中國當代美學硏究 --- p.316 / Chapter 1. --- 《手稿》的理論背景 --- p.316 / Chapter 2. --- 《手稿》中的人本主義與人性問題 / Chapter A´Ø --- 中國當代美學對《巴黎手稿》的不同態度及理解 --- p.321 / Chapter 1. --- 怎樣評價《手稿》 --- p.322 / Chapter 2. --- 《手稿》中的人本主義與人性問題 --- p.327 / Chapter 3. --- 關於自然人化的爭論 --- p.343 / Chapter 4. --- 關於「美的規律」的爭論 --- p.359 / Chapter B. --- 自然人化觀與當代中國馬克思美學主流 --- p.364 / Chapter 1. --- 高爾太與絶對主觀論 --- p.365 / Chapter 2. --- 蔡儀的《新美學》與絶對客觀論 --- p.368 / Chapter 3. --- 朱光潛美學與主客觀統一說 --- p.370 / Chapter 4. --- 李澤厚美學與客觀社會說 --- p.375 / Chapter 第七章 --- 儒道藝術精神與當代中國馬克思美學自然人化說比較 --- p.391 / 引言： --- p.391 / Chapter A. --- 儒道傳統與當代中國馬克思主義論主體與客體 --- p.392 / Chapter B. --- 儒道存有論與人類學本體論 --- p.399 / Chapter C. --- 藝術理論中「自然人化」說型態比較 --- p.405 / Chapter D. --- 儒道傳統與當代中國馬克思美學自然人化說中的人觀 --- p.410 / Chapter E. --- 關於美的規律 --- p.421 / Chapter F. --- 其他 --- p.426 / Chapter 第八章 --- 中國傳統美學現代化的可能與方向 --- p.435 / 引言 --- p.435 / Chapter A. --- 儒道傳统的轉化 --- p.438 / Chapter 1. --- 儒道傳统的睿識 --- p.439 / Chapter 2. --- 對儒道傳統的反省 --- p.443 / Chapter 3. --- 儒道傳统轉化之可能 --- p.444 / Chapter B. --- 發展馬克思主義 --- p.448 / Chapter 1. --- 儒學傳统對辯證唯物主義的檢討 --- p.448 / Chapter 2. --- 馬克思思想發展的可能 --- p.452 / Chapter 3. --- 中國特色的馬克思主義 --- p.456 / Chapter C. --- 現代化的主要涵義 --- p.464 / Chapter 1. --- 人的現代化 --- p.464 / Chapter 2. --- 新的人文主義 --- p.466 / Chapter D. --- 中國傳統美學現代化的可能 --- p.471 / Chapter 1. --- 審美主體的現代化 --- p.471 / Chapter 2. --- 美學體系的現代化 --- p.475 / Chapter 3. --- 藝術表現的現代化一境界與典型 --- p.480 / 後語： --- p.483 / 附錄： / Chapter I --- 儒家禮樂傳統的範例：「樂教」的内容 --- p.491 / Chapter II --- 道家藝術精神的影響 --- p.502 / Chapter III --- 「儒道互補」之藝術典型 --- p.512 / Chapter IV --- 馬克思恩格斯論文藝的現實主義 --- p.521 / 註釋 --- p.422 / 參考書目: --- p.548

程展緯. / 論文 (藝术碩士)--香港中文大學, 1998. / 參考文獻 (leaves 22-23). / 附中英文摘要. / Cheng Zhanwei. / Lun wen (yi shu shuo shi)-- Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1998. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 22-23). / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / Chapter (一） --- 前言´ؤ´ؤ從物理性的分析開始 --- p.1 / Chapter (二） --- 繪畫中幻象界與物象界的對立關 係 --- p.3 / Chapter (三） --- 游離的概念 --- p.8 / Chapter (四） --- 參照模型槪念看繪畫的游 離 --- p.9 / Chapter (五） --- 參照視錯覺雕塑看繪畫的游離 性 --- p.15 / Chapter (六） --- 總結 --- p.19 / Chapter (七） --- 註釋 --- p.20 / Chapter (八） --- 參考書目 --- p.22

In 1946, Monroe C. Beardsley and W. K. Wimsatt published an article, “The Intentional Fallacy,” which objected to the critical practice of treating claims about an artist as claims about her work. Thus was inaugurated what today is known as the intentionalism debate. I begin by offering a certain conception of the debate—not quite a novel conception, for it corresponds more or less to what Beardsley and Wimsatt took themselves to be doing, but one which, in recent decades, has increasingly been supplanted by something very different. I argue for the priority of this original conception, which is concerned primarily with the language and norms of criticism, over the more recent conceptions which focus on analyses of meaning. I then propose a view which defends the artist’s relevance against the objections of Beardsley and Wimsatt, so understood. The interest of my view lies in its circumvention of what many have (incorrectly) thought essential to the position to which Beardsley and Wimsatt were objecting.

<p> This dissertation heeds archetypal psychologist James Hillman&rsquo;s call for depth psychology to &ldquo;also be a depth aesthetics&rdquo; by considering Dionysos as an archetype of aesthetic experience. We respond affectively to the sensations of our interpenetrating everyday world of bodies, including our imaginal and ideational perceptions. Dionysos has been studied as an archetype of intoxication, indestructible life, madness, nature, bodily excitement, eroticism, festive inclusivity, theater, and liberation. This study reevaluates these qualities and more to discover how Dionysos and multiple figures of his <i>thiasos</i> create an archetypal background for the phenomenon of aesthetic experience. While Psyche serves Aphrodite, Dionysos serves psyche and may be considered a more comprehensive archetypal figuration for aesthetic experience than the goddess of Beauty. </p><p> Notoriously epiphanic Dionysos traverses all realms, but is most beloved of the earthly between&mdash;his ecstasy turned on, sustained by, and expressed via the aesthetic dimension. For Nietzsche, the profound surfaces of this embodied life are divine, a belief echoed in the work of Hillman, David L. Miller, and the philosophies of Phenomenology, Alfred North Whitehead, and the contemporary Speculative Realists, among others. In varying ways, all suggest the aesthetic dimension <i>is</i> the causal dimension&mdash;the inspired starting condition of reverie and cognition. This study suggests reading the aesthetics of daily life as &ldquo;concrete poetry,&rdquo; a term repurposed here as a metaphor for the concentrated instant in which an entire mythos is given in the very medium of an image. The &ldquo;archetypal&rdquo; is thus not defined herein as a first principle, in the universal or originary sense, but, more simply, as any particular event that deeply and experientially impresses upon us, creating an insta-mimesis of reactivity and recreation. Detailed evidence for this study&rsquo;s broad thesis is given historically, conceptually (through philosophy, art theory, and depth psychology), mythopoeic- and mythologically, and with support from the aesthetic realm of the arts, including, in its conclusion, examples from twentieth-century artists, most primarily the Dadaists, Marcel Duchamp, and Dennis Hopper. </p><p>

This thesis reads radical indeterminacy into the reflective judgements of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgement through points of connection between Kant's aesthetics and the philosophies and writing of Theodor Adorno and Maurice Blanchot. These re-situate the 'ends' of Kantian aesthetics in the historical situation of the 1960s and 1970s. In turn, this historicising of Kantian aesthetics reinterprets its original content. Such double reading - from Kant forwards, and back to Kant - is configured through what I call 'reversal': the indeterminacy of aesthetic reflection calls for a reverse 'reading' of itself which is not self-defeatingly determined by the aesthetic. Kant thus gives us the vocabulary for re-reading his aesthetics of reflection, and from this other indeterminacies of reflection, despite his attempt to organise and explain reflective relations through consistently with philosophical form through judgement. To read Kant outside his or any philosophy's economy, the task demanded by Adorno's theory and Blanchot's writing, asks for poetic readers and writers such as their near-contemporary, Paul Celan. They understand Celan's poetry as making legible how Kant's aesthetic might be thought reflectively, thus showing that the indeterminacy Kant attributes to reflection can be aesthetically experienced without being effaced by the philosophical judgement implying that indeterminacy. This turn back, the turn of verse, forms the hinge between Adorno's and Blanchot's dialectical and political thinking, allowing the common sense, the un-institutionalised 'we' Kant thinks ratifies aesthetic judgement, to remain negative or 'unavowable'. Aesthetics still structures the reading of poetry, but such poetry makes the indeterminate implications of Kantian aesthetics legible. 'Disconnection' becomes the organising principle for reflection and politics, implied by but now freed from aesthetic judgement, made visible by a poetry of 'reversal'. We conclude by finding the development of these ideas in two major elegists of Celan, Geoffrey Hill and Jeremy Prynne.

Thesis (M. Arch.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture, 1980. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND ROTCH. / Includes bibliographical references. / In the first section, taste, along with parallel phenomena linked to form and symbolism in general, is discussed in relation to the fundamental device of the reason-feeling dichotomy . The dichotomy's internal possibilities of significance and basic ways in which these have at times affected aesthetics are traced. Examples are used which range from ancient Greek philosophy, via the 18th century, to Wittgenstein. The latter's gradual evolution from a position of unyielding separation of rational, valid knowledge from fantasy and the 'unspeakable', towards an increasingly unified view of language and conceptualization as phenomena rooted in wide social contexts, serves as the point leading into, as well as the basic-idea underlying, the second section. Accordingly, issues relevant to a 'game' notion of taste are brought forth, such as the continuity (as opposed to any clearcut and schematical division) of experience and of the processes of perception and conception; the idea of utility, convention as an indispensable means of obtaining knowability, conmunicability, and persistence of our mental constructions, either scientific, or aesthetic, or religious, etc.; prejudice, appearing as an ineluctable factor underlying our arguments; or, the phenomenon of aesthetic polarities, being the result of fundamental traits (or 'rules') of the 'game'. Juxtaposed to these issues is the theme of the autonomy of art and taste, chiefly as it was propounded by Kant. Genuine autonomy is disputed in the ends of the second and in the beginnings of the third section and it is by way of this disputation that the game notion is resumed. This time, in a more extended sense, i.e. as centering upon the search for order in the conceptions of nature. The implication of this for a commentary on the phenomenon of taste is that, whatever the techniques appropriated and the results sought, what ever the specific biases of art, form-giving, and form-appreciating at different times, a possibility of unification may be presented. That possibility results from considering the general ground of perception and conceptualization, i.e. the tendency to effect an ordering of experience whatsoever. However, by unification, nothing of the sort of a smoothly functioning though artificial and forced generalization is meant. On the contrary , what is implied is an attempt to visualize, in the sphere of formal systems, what Michel Foucault calls a "discursive unity." That is, a discourse unified not by virtue of any consistency or continuity 'reigning over it, but rather by virtue of clashes, contradictions , discontinuities, which may nevertheless have a common focus. In terms of form, conceptions of orderable nature are taken to formulate such a common locus of diverse formal systems, and the hypothesis is brought forth of a possibility of "discursive" unification of formal and aesthetic in compatibilities, on the grounds of subtle threads that link them with integral epistemologies or world-views. / by Panos Kokkoris. / M.Arch.

In a democracy, every individual is thought to have the potential to achieve what Matthew Arnold considers the supreme characteristic of intellectual freedom, "the intellectual maturity of man himself; the tendency to observe facts with a critical spirit; to search for their law, not to wander among them at random; to judge by the rule of reason, not by the impulse of prejudice or caprice" (The Complete Prose Works of Matthew Arnold, Vol. 1, p. 21). But Arnold finds a critical opposition between man's instinctive efforts to develop "fully and freely" and the economic forces of the industrial culture of modern democracies, consumed with work and wealth accumulation. He maintains that in the aesthetic experience of literature we behold the being we are capable of. First in his poetry, and later in his critical prose, Arnold confronts the malaise of modernity and the spiritual fragmentation at the heart of contemporary literature. The hope for his project for education is that it can free us to find new critical consciousness and recover the moral authority of aesthetic judgment. In this study I try to explicate Arnold's conviction that collapsing the duality of literature and science expands our knowledge of the world and that cultivating humanity through the experience of ideas in literature affirms the integrity of the individual and reconciles his or her relation to nature and the human community. The aim of this work is twofold. First it recasts Arnold's uncertain legacy among philosophers of education in the perspective of philosophy as a way of life. I hope it also invites further inquiry into his synthesis of intellect and imagination in the aesthetic phenomenon and its capacity to critique conditions of existence.