This research seeks to examine the effects of the establishment of regional trade agreements (RTAs) among developing nations on trade, welfare and production activities. The focus here is on the new East African Community (EAC) formed between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and established in 1999. The formation of the new EAC raises the important question of whether this regionally based trading agreement is of economic merit to its members. This study begins by reviewing trends in regional trade flows and the extent to which regional integration has affected trade patterns and productive activities. Using a gravity model augmented with several sets of dummy variables, I estimate the effect of the EAC-RTA on trade and welfare on members and non-members. The results show that intra-bloc trade is on average 18 times higher than what would be expected in the absence of the agreement. However, this trend does not seem to be influenced by the official lowering of trade barriers with the formation of the EAC. Model results also show a decline in bloc exports to the rest of the world suggesting that the bloc has trade diverting tendencies. Since static gains from the EAC-RTA are quite low, possibly dynamic gains from regional integration lend more support to the economic merit of the EAC.

This research seeks to examine the effects of the establishment of regional trade agreements (RTAs) among developing nations on trade, welfare and production activities. The focus here is on the new East African Community (EAC) formed between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and established in 1999. The formation of the new EAC raises the important question of whether this regionally based trading agreement is of economic merit to its members. This study begins by reviewing trends in regional trade flows and the extent to which regional integration has affected trade patterns and productive activities. Using a gravity model augmented with several sets of dummy variables, I estimate the effect of the EAC-RTA on trade and welfare on members and non-members. The results show that intra-bloc trade is on average 18 times higher than what would be expected in the absence of the agreement. However, this trend does not seem to be influenced by the official lowering of trade barriers with the formation of the EAC. Model results also show a decline in bloc exports to the rest of the world suggesting that the bloc has trade diverting tendencies. Since static gains from the EAC-RTA are quite low, possibly dynamic gains from regional integration lend more support to the economic merit of the EAC.

The dissertation assesses the suitability of countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa region for a monetary union. Using VAR techniques the symmetry of the underlying structural shocks is analyzed. The results indicate that supply and demand shocks are generally asymmetric, which does not lend strong support for forming a region-wide currency union at the moment. Although economic shocks are not highly correlated across the entire region, we tentatively identify three sub-regional clusters of countries that may benefit from a currency union. We find some tentative evidence that some, though not all, sub-regions may benefit from a link to the Euro. However, the speed and magnitude of adjustment to shocks is similar across the countries. Therefore, further integration of the economies might lead to more favorable conditions for a monetary union. Using a Barro-Gordon type model, it is shown that forming a monetary union yields net benefits if output shocks are similar across member countries and if one or more countries in the union can serve as anchors. In addition it is shown that the opportunistic objectives of one country’s policymakers are kept in check at the union level by other members with disparate objectives. Hence monetary union can improve the monetary policy for its members if the pressures on the individual central banks are dissimilar. Calibrating the model to evaluate the proposed monetary union in the East African Community, it is found that central bank uncertainty would be a significant aspect in the net welfare effect of monetary union. An examination of the EAC countries also shows a fair degree of linkages. Intra-regional trade is substantial. The benefits from reduced transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty would be substantial and growing. Though symmetry of shocks is still low, implementation of a protocol on factor mobility under discussion would help improve labor mobility. However though some progress has been made there is still need for more convergence before monetary union could be implemented.

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Este trabalho procura responder por que as políticas externas de Uganda, Tanzânia e Quênia convergiram ao final da década de 1990 culminando na refundação da Comunidade da África Oriental (CAO). Leva-se em consideração o quadro de análise em dois níveis: a política interna e o sistema internacional. O trabalho guia-se por duas hipóteses. A primeira é que dificuldades econômicas domésticas, experimentadas na década de 1990 — marcada pela adoção do Consenso de Washington —, deram impulso a forças políticas que favoreciam parcerias regionais. Já a segunda é que a CAO seria um fator conducente à constituição de um paradigma relacional no leste africano, permitindo a resolução pacífica de controvérsias entre os Estados membros e a coordenação de ações militares em seu entorno. Para averiguar as hipóteses, analisam-se os processos políticos internos dos três países em busca das causas da aproximação, isto é, mudanças de governo, governante e de arcabouço institucional. Traça-se também a evolução da políticas externas de Quênia, Tanzânia e Uganda, relacionando-as com o panorama internacional da época e com as dinâmicas políticas domésticas. Ademais, exploram-se os limites da convergência política através do estudo de alguns casos específicos: projetos de integração infraestrutural na CAO, a guerra civil da Somália e as guerras na República Democrática do Congo. Verifica-se que na Tanzânia a transição presidencial foi determinante para a mudança na política externa. Em Uganda, a superação da instabilidade interna (insurgências) permitiu o maior engajamento regional. Em contraste, a política externa queniana mostrou-se mais reativa ao contexto externo: a perda de valor estratégico do país para os Estados Unidos com o fim da Guerra Fria obrigou-o a buscar aliados regionais para evitar isolamento. Já os estudos de caso mostram que a convergência política encontra muitos desafios, pois, embora haja uma relação especial entre Dodoma, Kampala e Nairóbi, eles disputam entre si para tornar-se polo regional de poder. Ainda assim, mesmo quando estão indiretamente em guerra um contra o outro, como na República Democrática do Congo, a integração consegue avançar paulatinamente. / This work aims to answer why did the foreign policies of Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya converge by the end of the 1990s culminating in the re-foundation of the East African Community (EAC). It takes into consideration the two-level analytical framework: internal politics and the international system. Two hypothesis guide the investigation. The first is that domestic economic difficulties, experience in the 1990s — marked by the adoption of the Washington Consensus —, have given impulse to political forces favorable to regional partnerships. The second considers that the EAC is a factor conducive to the constitution of a relational paradigm in East Africa, allowing for the peaceful resolution of controversies among member-states and military action coordination in their surroundings. To test the hypotheses, the internal political processes of the three countries are analyzed in search for the causes of the convergence, that is, changes in government, ruler and institutional framework. The evolution of Kenya's, Tanzania's and Uganda's foreign policies is traced, relating them with the international scene of the period and with domestic political dynamics. Furthermore, the limits of the political convergence are explored through the study of some specific cases: infrastructure integration projects in EAC, Somalia's civil war and the wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The work finds that in Tanzania the presidential transition was determinative to the foreign policy shift. In Uganda, the overcoming of internal instability (insurgencies) allowed a greater regional engagement. Conversely, the Kenyan foreign policy has shown to be more reactive to the external context: the country's loss of strategic value to the United States with the end of the Cold War pushed it to seek regional allies to avoid isolation. The case studies have shown that the political convergence meets many challenges, because, although there is a special relationship between Dodoma, Kampala and Nairobi, they dispute to become a regional pole of power. Nevertheless, even when they are indirectly at war with one another, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the integration manages to advance step by step.

Este trabalho procura responder por que as políticas externas de Uganda, Tanzânia e Quênia convergiram ao final da década de 1990 culminando na refundação da Comunidade da África Oriental (CAO). Leva-se em consideração o quadro de análise em dois níveis: a política interna e o sistema internacional. O trabalho guia-se por duas hipóteses. A primeira é que dificuldades econômicas domésticas, experimentadas na década de 1990 — marcada pela adoção do Consenso de Washington —, deram impulso a forças políticas que favoreciam parcerias regionais. Já a segunda é que a CAO seria um fator conducente à constituição de um paradigma relacional no leste africano, permitindo a resolução pacífica de controvérsias entre os Estados membros e a coordenação de ações militares em seu entorno. Para averiguar as hipóteses, analisam-se os processos políticos internos dos três países em busca das causas da aproximação, isto é, mudanças de governo, governante e de arcabouço institucional. Traça-se também a evolução da políticas externas de Quênia, Tanzânia e Uganda, relacionando-as com o panorama internacional da época e com as dinâmicas políticas domésticas. Ademais, exploram-se os limites da convergência política através do estudo de alguns casos específicos: projetos de integração infraestrutural na CAO, a guerra civil da Somália e as guerras na República Democrática do Congo. Verifica-se que na Tanzânia a transição presidencial foi determinante para a mudança na política externa. Em Uganda, a superação da instabilidade interna (insurgências) permitiu o maior engajamento regional. Em contraste, a política externa queniana mostrou-se mais reativa ao contexto externo: a perda de valor estratégico do país para os Estados Unidos com o fim da Guerra Fria obrigou-o a buscar aliados regionais para evitar isolamento. Já os estudos de caso mostram que a convergência política encontra muitos desafios, pois, embora haja uma relação especial entre Dodoma, Kampala e Nairóbi, eles disputam entre si para tornar-se polo regional de poder. Ainda assim, mesmo quando estão indiretamente em guerra um contra o outro, como na República Democrática do Congo, a integração consegue avançar paulatinamente. / This work aims to answer why did the foreign policies of Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya converge by the end of the 1990s culminating in the re-foundation of the East African Community (EAC). It takes into consideration the two-level analytical framework: internal politics and the international system. Two hypothesis guide the investigation. The first is that domestic economic difficulties, experience in the 1990s — marked by the adoption of the Washington Consensus —, have given impulse to political forces favorable to regional partnerships. The second considers that the EAC is a factor conducive to the constitution of a relational paradigm in East Africa, allowing for the peaceful resolution of controversies among member-states and military action coordination in their surroundings. To test the hypotheses, the internal political processes of the three countries are analyzed in search for the causes of the convergence, that is, changes in government, ruler and institutional framework. The evolution of Kenya's, Tanzania's and Uganda's foreign policies is traced, relating them with the international scene of the period and with domestic political dynamics. Furthermore, the limits of the political convergence are explored through the study of some specific cases: infrastructure integration projects in EAC, Somalia's civil war and the wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The work finds that in Tanzania the presidential transition was determinative to the foreign policy shift. In Uganda, the overcoming of internal instability (insurgencies) allowed a greater regional engagement. Conversely, the Kenyan foreign policy has shown to be more reactive to the external context: the country's loss of strategic value to the United States with the end of the Cold War pushed it to seek regional allies to avoid isolation. The case studies have shown that the political convergence meets many challenges, because, although there is a special relationship between Dodoma, Kampala and Nairobi, they dispute to become a regional pole of power. Nevertheless, even when they are indirectly at war with one another, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the integration manages to advance step by step.

Este trabalho procura responder por que as políticas externas de Uganda, Tanzânia e Quênia convergiram ao final da década de 1990 culminando na refundação da Comunidade da África Oriental (CAO). Leva-se em consideração o quadro de análise em dois níveis: a política interna e o sistema internacional. O trabalho guia-se por duas hipóteses. A primeira é que dificuldades econômicas domésticas, experimentadas na década de 1990 — marcada pela adoção do Consenso de Washington —, deram impulso a forças políticas que favoreciam parcerias regionais. Já a segunda é que a CAO seria um fator conducente à constituição de um paradigma relacional no leste africano, permitindo a resolução pacífica de controvérsias entre os Estados membros e a coordenação de ações militares em seu entorno. Para averiguar as hipóteses, analisam-se os processos políticos internos dos três países em busca das causas da aproximação, isto é, mudanças de governo, governante e de arcabouço institucional. Traça-se também a evolução da políticas externas de Quênia, Tanzânia e Uganda, relacionando-as com o panorama internacional da época e com as dinâmicas políticas domésticas. Ademais, exploram-se os limites da convergência política através do estudo de alguns casos específicos: projetos de integração infraestrutural na CAO, a guerra civil da Somália e as guerras na República Democrática do Congo. Verifica-se que na Tanzânia a transição presidencial foi determinante para a mudança na política externa. Em Uganda, a superação da instabilidade interna (insurgências) permitiu o maior engajamento regional. Em contraste, a política externa queniana mostrou-se mais reativa ao contexto externo: a perda de valor estratégico do país para os Estados Unidos com o fim da Guerra Fria obrigou-o a buscar aliados regionais para evitar isolamento. Já os estudos de caso mostram que a convergência política encontra muitos desafios, pois, embora haja uma relação especial entre Dodoma, Kampala e Nairóbi, eles disputam entre si para tornar-se polo regional de poder. Ainda assim, mesmo quando estão indiretamente em guerra um contra o outro, como na República Democrática do Congo, a integração consegue avançar paulatinamente. / This work aims to answer why did the foreign policies of Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya converge by the end of the 1990s culminating in the re-foundation of the East African Community (EAC). It takes into consideration the two-level analytical framework: internal politics and the international system. Two hypothesis guide the investigation. The first is that domestic economic difficulties, experience in the 1990s — marked by the adoption of the Washington Consensus —, have given impulse to political forces favorable to regional partnerships. The second considers that the EAC is a factor conducive to the constitution of a relational paradigm in East Africa, allowing for the peaceful resolution of controversies among member-states and military action coordination in their surroundings. To test the hypotheses, the internal political processes of the three countries are analyzed in search for the causes of the convergence, that is, changes in government, ruler and institutional framework. The evolution of Kenya's, Tanzania's and Uganda's foreign policies is traced, relating them with the international scene of the period and with domestic political dynamics. Furthermore, the limits of the political convergence are explored through the study of some specific cases: infrastructure integration projects in EAC, Somalia's civil war and the wars in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The work finds that in Tanzania the presidential transition was determinative to the foreign policy shift. In Uganda, the overcoming of internal instability (insurgencies) allowed a greater regional engagement. Conversely, the Kenyan foreign policy has shown to be more reactive to the external context: the country's loss of strategic value to the United States with the end of the Cold War pushed it to seek regional allies to avoid isolation. The case studies have shown that the political convergence meets many challenges, because, although there is a special relationship between Dodoma, Kampala and Nairobi, they dispute to become a regional pole of power. Nevertheless, even when they are indirectly at war with one another, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the integration manages to advance step by step.

Business relationships have been studied as a driver for firm competitiveness through relationship marketing, but not as a strategic advantage when entering an economy. Prior research has identified several dimensions of market entry drivers from host country, home-location, sector-related as well as firm-level perspectives. This research study takes a managerial perspective and argues that relationships and their benefits are pivotal during market entry strategy formulation. It asserts that firms should alter their market entry strategies, specifically for emerging economies, taking into consideration the net gains of a client. This study used a mixed method design involving exploratory research and explanatory research. Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted to make sense of the use of relationship benefits when entering the African market. An online self-administrative questionnaire was also used to gather further insights of attributes that individuals use when entering the East African Community (EAC) market. The findings revealed that institutions do stipulate the rules of the game in an emerging market. Although the research results were not conclusive regarding a wholly owned subsidiary being favoured for entry into an emerging market with stronger institutions, it was conclusive in indicating that firms still favour joint ventures into the EAC. Relationship building is time consuming and many who are given the opportunity to interact with clients still do not grasp the merits of building these relationships. This could be the reason why in general individuals still rely on social benefits like friendships; interactions beyond business relationships; sharing of information and knowledge with the client as opposed to psychological benefits. / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / zkgibs2014 / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

Magister Legum - LLM