The dissertation assesses the suitability of countries in the Eastern and Southern Africa region for a monetary union. Using VAR techniques the symmetry of the underlying structural shocks is analyzed. The results indicate that supply and demand shocks are generally asymmetric, which does not lend strong support for forming a region-wide currency union at the moment. Although economic shocks are not highly correlated across the entire region, we tentatively identify three sub-regional clusters of countries that may benefit from a currency union. We find some tentative evidence that some, though not all, sub-regions may benefit from a link to the Euro. However, the speed and magnitude of adjustment to shocks is similar across the countries. Therefore, further integration of the economies might lead to more favorable conditions for a monetary union. Using a Barro-Gordon type model, it is shown that forming a monetary union yields net benefits if output shocks are similar across member countries and if one or more countries in the union can serve as anchors. In addition it is shown that the opportunistic objectives of one country’s policymakers are kept in check at the union level by other members with disparate objectives. Hence monetary union can improve the monetary policy for its members if the pressures on the individual central banks are dissimilar. Calibrating the model to evaluate the proposed monetary union in the East African Community, it is found that central bank uncertainty would be a significant aspect in the net welfare effect of monetary union. An examination of the EAC countries also shows a fair degree of linkages. Intra-regional trade is substantial. The benefits from reduced transaction costs and exchange rate uncertainty would be substantial and growing. Though symmetry of shocks is still low, implementation of a protocol on factor mobility under discussion would help improve labor mobility. However though some progress has been made there is still need for more convergence before monetary union could be implemented.

A rebours du schéma élaboré dans le cadre du Traité d’Abuja signé le 3 juin 1991 par les Etats membres de L’Organisation de l’unité Africaine (OUA), la divergence actuelle des systèmes régionaux africains constitue une dénaturation de l’approche convenue. Ce texte prévoit en effet dans son article 6, la création des Communautés économiques régionales (CER) comme une modalité de l’intégration continentale. A ce titre, huit CER sont aujourd’hui reconnues par l’Union Africaine : la Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) ; la Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) ; la Communauté de l’Afrique de l’Est (CAE) ; la Southern Africa Development Community (SADC); l’Autorité Intergouvernementale pour le Développement (IGAD); le Marché Commun de l’Afrique Australe et Orientale (COMESA); l’Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA); et la Communauté des Etats Sahélo-Sahariens (CEN-SAD). L’établissement de la Communauté économique africaine instituée par le Traité, reste subordonné à la réussite de ces systèmes communautaires régionaux. Toutefois, la multiplication d’autres organisations communautaires sous-régionales - en plus de celles reconnues - d’une part, et la mise en œuvre de programmes et activités similaires dans le domaine économique d’autre part, tendent à compromettre la réalisation du projet africain. Cette situation fait échec au concept de départ qui établit le principe d’une exclusivité régionale à la faveur de la CER reconnue. A cause de chevauchements des objectifs poursuivis, il s’ensuit entre les organisations régionales, des rapports de rivalité plutôt que de complémentarité, aboutissant à la coexistence des systèmes d’intégration concurrents. Les rapports entre les CER et l’Organisation continentale rendent également visibles les insuffisances liées à la coordination du processus projeté. L’Union Africaine ne disposant pas du tout ou pas suffisamment des moyens juridiques lui permettant une intrusion dans la mise en œuvre des programmes communautaires régionaux, l’application des dispositions du Traité d’Abuja par les CER, ne semble pas homogène. La matérialisation des ambitions affichées par les Etats signataires demeure à ce jour conditionnée par la rationalisation de l’intégration envisagée. Cette étude vise à proposer quelques pistes de solutions en ce sens. / In stark contrast to the vision which emerged from the Treaty of Abuja, ratified by the member states of the Organisation of African Unity on the 3rd of June 1991, the present divergence of regional systems in Africa constitutes a serious distortion of the approach that was agreed upon. Indeed, in Article 6, the treaty sets forth the “strengthening of existing regional economic communities” (RECs) as a means of achieving integration on a continental scale. Along these lines, the African Union now recognizes eight RECs: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). As laid out in the treaty, the establishment of the African Economic Community is entirely dependent upon the success of these regional community systems. At the same time, the increase of other community organisations at the sub-regional level, beyond those officially recognized, on the one hand, and the implementation of similar programmes and activities, on the other hand, tend to endanger the realisation of the African project. This situation flies in the face of the original idea, which was based on the principle of the regional exclusivity of the recognized RECs. As a result of the various overlapping goals that are being pursued by difference organisations, competitive rather than complimentary relations have led to a coexistence of rival systems of integration. The relations between the RECs and the continental organization (the AU) have also made apparent the inadequacy of the coordination procedure that had been envisaged. As the African Union does not have sufficient legal means at its disposal to intervene in the implementation of regional community programmes, the execution of the Treaty of Abuja by the RECs lacks homogeneity. In order to achieve the ambitions declared by those member states who signed the treaty, a rationalisation of the proposed integration is necessary. The present study puts forward several proposals as to how such a rationalisation may be accomplished.

Humboldt-Univ., Diss.--Berlin, 2004. / Zsfassung in dt. Sprache.

L’histoire de l’intégration régionale dans les Grands Lacs est récente. Il faut attendre la colonisation pour voir le Burundi et le Rwanda entrer véritablement dans ce processus. Le mandat belge oriente les deux territoires vers le cœur de l’Afrique. Cette période va influencer la première intégration institutionnelle avec la Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs. Il convient toutefois de rester mesuré, puisque celle-ci est avant tout une intégration de papier. Elle est similaire aux autres adhésions des deux pays à cette période, qui se révèlent être en inadéquation avec leurs circuits commerciaux. Les organisations régionales sont également inefficaces pour régler la problématique des réfugiés. Les années 1993 et 1994 sont des ruptures internes pour le Burundi et le Rwanda. Elles provoquent également un renversement régional, avec la désintégration de l’Afrique des Grands Lacs : ce sont les guerres congolaises. Dans le même temps, les deux pays se réorientent vers l’Afrique de l’Est, où l’EAC leur permet enfin un réel désenclavement. L’intégration du Rwanda semble toutefois plus efficace que celle du Burundi. / The history of regional integration in the Great Lakes is recent. To see Burundi and Rwanda truly enter into this process you have to wait the colonization. The Belgian mandate turns the two territories to the heart of Africa. This period will influence the first institutional integration with the Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries. However, we should remain cautius, since it is primarily paper integration. It is similar to other memberships of the two countries in this period, which is proving to be inadequate with their commercial channels. Regional organizations are also ineffective to resolve the refugee issue. The years 1993 and 1994 are internal ruptures for Burundi and Rwanda. They also cause a regional reversal, with the disintegration of the African Great Lakes : these are the Congolese wars. At the same time, both countries are shifting towards East Africa, where the EAC finally allows them a real opening up. The integration of Rwanda, however, seems more effective than that of Burundi.

Magister Legum - LLM / The provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) generally give favourable consideration to developing and least developed countries.1 Firstly, at the core of these provisions is the principle of special and differential treatment of these countries. As such developing countries are to meet their obligations under the WTO agreements as and when the special needs of their economies permit. The GATT 1994 provisions exempt least developed countries from participating in the obligations under the WTO agreements until such a time that they attain a reasonable level of development.Secondly, the Ministerial Meeting in Doha in November 2001 adopted a development agenda (that described capacity building activities as “core elements of the development dimension of the multilateral trading system”) and called for more co-ordinated delivery of trade related technical assistance and capacity building.2 In this regard, developed members of the WTO have committed to provide technical assistance to developing and least developed members in order to build their capacity to participate effectively under the WTO.The reality of the situation on the ground is that developing and least developed countries still face a lot of challenges which hinder their full participation and realization of the benefits under the multilateral trading system. It must be appreciated, at the same time that developing countries like China and India have been active and influential in the multilateral trading system, and additionally, their economies have and are experiencing overt growth. What lessons does Africa need to learn from China and India?This study examines the causes of the poor performance of Sub Saharan Africa’s developing and Least Developed Countries in the multilateral trading system. In this regard, examples are drawn from two countries, namely, Kenya and Zambia.Further, the study examines the initiatives the WTO provides to enhance the trade capacity of its developing and least developed members. In addition, the study examines African trade capacity building initiatives such the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) Initiatives, as well as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) Initiative in order to establish how these initiatives can assist in enhancing the trade capacity of developing and least developed countries.The study further examines the role of regional trade integration in enhancing the trade capacity building of developing and least developed countries. In this case, examples are drawn from the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa-Developing Countries (COMESA). In this regard, the study concludes that fully-fledged regional integration has the potential to promote economic growth and industrial development in Africa.The study also demonstrates the importance of the participation of governments and the private sector in improving a country’s participation in the multilateral trading system. This study particularly takes key interest in the crucial role of the public-private partnerships in enhancing competitive forces and competitiveness necessary to maximize trade opportunities, which in turn produces economic development.It is observed and concluded in this study that sustainably financed technical assistance and capacity building programmes have important roles to play in so far as integration of Sub Saharan Africa into the global trading system is concerned; and that developing countries in general and LDCs in particular are to be provided with enhanced Trade-Related Technical Assistance (TRTA) and capacity building to increase their effective participation in the negotiations, to facilitate their implementation of GATT/WTO rules and to enable them adjust and diversify their economies.

No description available.

No description available.

Magister Legum - LLM

Magister Legum - LLM / South Africa

Foreign investments in SADC are regulated by Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investments (SADC FIP), as well as the laws of SADC Member States. At present, SADC faces the challenge that this regime for the regulation of foreign investments is unstable, unsatisfactory and unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States is unsatisfactory. This negatively affects the security of foreign investments regulated by this regime. The main reasons for this state of affairs are briefly explained below. The regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy reviews and amendments of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 to remove investor access to international investor-state arbitration, better known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The regulation of foreign investments in SADC has been unsatisfactory, among others because some SADC Member States have failed or neglected to harmonise their investment laws with both the 2006 and the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, SADC Member States such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have multiple Regional Economic Community (REC) memberships. This places these Member States in a position whereby they have conflicting interests and treaty obligations. Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unpredictable, due to regional integration efforts such as the recent formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Zone (T-FTA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The T-FTA is entitled to have its investment protocol, while the AfCFTA investment protocol will be negotiated from 2018 until 2020. These developments entail that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels, thereby ushering a new regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC. The unknown nature of the future regulations create uncertainty and instability among foreign investors and host states alike. This study analyses the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and selected laws of SADC Member States. In the end, it makes the three findings mentioned above. In order to address these findings, the study makes four recommendations. The first is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated at African Union (AU) level, by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol (which incidentally is now the case). Secondly, investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of a host state, optional ISDS, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) or other agreed forum. Thirdly, an African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) must be established. The AJS will act as a gateway to determine whether an investor-state dispute shall be referred to the courts of a host state, ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forums. Fourthly, the office of an African Investment Ombud (AIO) must be created. The AIO shall facilitate the early resolution of investor-state disputes, so as to reduce the number of disputes that may end-up in litigation or arbitration. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.