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Notre thèse s'intéresse aux conséquences de la sympathie du conseil d'administration (CA) vis-à-vis du dirigeant en termes de politique financière et de performance de la firme. La gouvernance d'entreprise est généralement étudiée à l'aide de la théorie de l'agence. Elle conçoit le CA comme un dispositif de surveillance disciplinaire du dirigeant protégeant les droits des financeurs. Il s'assure que les décisions prises par le dirigeant sont conformes aux intérêts des financeurs. Cette vision de la gouvernance s'oppose à celle défendue par la théorie de la dépendance aux ressources. Selon cette dernière, le CA a avant tout un rôle d'accompagnement stratégique du dirigeant. Il exerce un rôle d'interface entre la firme et son environnement, ce qui permet au dirigeant de prendre des décisions créatrices de valeur. La surveillance disciplinaire et l'accompagnement stratégique sont peu compatibles. La composition du CA détermine quel rôle est renforcé au détriment de l'autre. Ainsi, les administrateurs en relation avec le dirigeant accroissent les compétences d'accompagnement stratégique du CA tandis que sa capacité à restreindre la marge de manœuvre du dirigeant diminue. Nous nous sommes focalisés sur 78 grandes entreprises françaises cotées. Nous avons convenu qu'un administrateur peut être en relation avec le dirigeant s'ils appartiennent aux mêmes réseaux d'anciens étudiants d'une institution universitaire donnée. Les données de gouvernance utilisées ont été collectées manuellement dans les rapports annuels émis par les firmes entre 2007 et 2011. Les informations concernant les dirigeants et les administrateurs sont issues dictionnaire biographique Who's Who in France 2013 ou dans les notices biographiques des rapports annuels. Nous avons tout d'abord pu constater que la présence d'administrateurs en relation avec le dirigeant conduit à une diminution du niveau de dividendes. En même temps, le dirigeant favorise un financement par des dettes au détriment des capitaux propres. Nous avons également montré que cette relation dépend de la structure de propriété de la firme. Ainsi, le constat précédent demeure pour les firmes au capital fortement concentré, ce qui est conforme à la théorie de la dépendance aux ressources. En revanche, le dirigeant préfère financer la firme par capitaux propres mais le niveau de dividendes reste inchangé dans le cas des firmes au capital dilué. Ceci est conforme à la théorie de l'agence. Ainsi, la capacité du dirigeant à décider d'une politique financière servant ses intérêts à l'aide de ses relations sociales dépend de la structure de propriété de la firme. Lorsque le capital est concentré, l'actionnaire majoritaire préfère financer la firme par de la dette obtenue à moindre coût grâce au dirigeant et ses relations sociales. Cela empêche l'entrée d'autres actionnaires au capital. Le fait de ne pas verser de dividendes permet de renforcer les capacités financières de la firme. Lorsque le capital est dilué, le dirigeant peut éviter la pression disciplinaire de l'endettement. Suite à cela nous avons montré, conformément à cette même théorie, que le coût du capital croît lorsque des administrateurs connaissent le dirigeant. La relation est plus forte pour les firmes peu connues des marchés. Enfin, la performance croît en fonction de la sympathie du CA. Cela est conforme à la théorie de la dépendance aux ressources. Nous nous sommes également aperçus que l'effet bénéfique des relations du dirigeant se retrouve uniquement pour les firmes en phase de croissance. Ainsi, même si elle est source de coûts d'agence, la sympathie du conseil d'administration à l'égard du dirigeant est bénéfique pour les firmes ayant besoin d'accompagnement stratégique tandis qu'elle est davantage néfaste aux firmes parvenues à maturité. / This dissertation deals with the consequences of board friendliness on the financial policy and the performance of the firm. It revolves around four empirical studies. Until now, the study of corporate governance was based on Agency Theory. It conceives the board of directors as aimed at monitoring the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in order to protect claimholders' interests. However, Resource Dependence Theory states that the board of directors is aimed at bringing information and resources to the CEO. These two roles are opposing, and board composition determines its dominant role toward the other one. Thus, CEO social ties enhance the advising role of the board and impede its monitoring role. Our dissertation is based on these two theories. Our studies are based on 78 French firms. We decided that a director was a social tie of the CEO when they were graduated from the same university or grande ecole (Polytechnique, Ecole Nationale d'Administration, HEC ...). Corporate governance data are manually collected in the annual reports launched by the firm between 2007 and 2011. Data concerning CEO and directors vita are extracted from the biographical dictionary Who's Who in France 2013 or the annual reports. We first find that friendly boards lead to fewer dividends and higher leverage. We decided to refine our results and analyze the effect of ownership concentration on these two relationships. We found that these relationships remained in a context of high ownership concentration, but the relation between board friendliness and leverage turned negative. The relation between board friendliness and dividends remained negative in a context of high ownership concentration but disapeared in a context of low ownership concentration. Consequently, the possibility for the CEO to use his social ties in order to set up a financial policy to entrench depends on ownership concentration. The higher ownership concentration, the harder it is for the CEO to entrench. In the third empirical study, we found that CEO social ties lead to a higher implied cost of capital. This relationship is stronger for the most risky and opaque firms. Finally, we find that friendly boards increase the performance of the firm. More precisely, this positive effect of board friendliness is concentrated on opaque firms with a lot of growth opportunities. Consequently, even if friendly boards generate agency costs, shareholders accept them when the firm has a lot of growth opportunities because the CEO needs advice to exploit investments properly. When the CEO does not have advisory needs, CEO social ties prevent the financing of the firm at an optimal cost of capital insofar as the CEO is only entrenched.

Submitted by Timbo Noeme (noeme.timbo@metodista.br) on 2016-08-08T17:58:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Renata Toledo Reis.pdf: 1609716 bytes, checksum: 0ef0b359086f968f893067961f41419d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-08T17:58:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Renata Toledo Reis.pdf: 1609716 bytes, checksum: 0ef0b359086f968f893067961f41419d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-26 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The several theories about the capital structure motivate many studies on this subject, however without meeting a consensus. Other topic not much explored refers to the organization’s life cycle, and how it can influence in the capital structure. This study had as main objective to verify which determinants are the most relevant for the borrowing process in the companies and understand if these determinants change depending on the life cycle, supported by the theories Trade off, Pecking order and Agency’s Theory. In order to achieve the objective was used the analysis of fixed effect panel and Brazilian listed companies have been chosen as sample, finally the study was also based in secondary data available in the Economatica® between 2005 and 2013 using sections from BM&F and BOVESPA. The main result stands the same behavior among the general sample, high and low growth for accounting debt for determining Profitability presenting a negative relationship, and the determinants Growth Opportunity and size, with such a positive relationship. For high groups and some low growth determinants showed different results, such as the uniqueness resulting significance in these two groups, with positive growth in low and negative in the high growth, the collateral value of assets and non-debt tax relief were significant only in low-growth group. For the debt at market value was observed significance for the tax benefit not debt and Singularity. This result reinforces the argument that the life cycle influence the capital structure / As várias teorias acerca da estrutura de capital despertam interesse motivando diversos estudos sobre o assunto sem, no entanto, ter um consenso. Outro tema aparentemente pouco explorado refere-se ao ciclo de vida das empresas e como ele pode influenciar a estrutura de capital. Este estudo teve como objetivo verificar quais determinantes possuem maior relevância no endividamento das empresas e se estes determinantes alteram-se dependendo do ciclo de vida da empresa apoiada pelas teorias Trade Off, Pecking Order e Teoria da Agência. Para alcançar o objetivo deste trabalho foi utilizado análise em painel de efeito fixo sendo a amostra composta por empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, com dados secundários disponíveis na Economática® no período de 2005 a 2013, utilizando-se os setores da BM&FBOVESPA. Como resultado principal destaca-se o mesmo comportamento entre a amostra geral, alto e baixo crescimento pelo endividamento contábil para o determinante Lucratividade apresentando uma relação negativa, e para os determinantes Oportunidade de Crescimento e Tamanho, estes com uma relação positiva. Para os grupos de alto e baixo crescimento alguns determinantes apresentaram resultados diferentes, como a singularidade que resultou significância nestes dois grupos, sendo positiva no baixo crescimento e negativa no alto crescimento, para o valor colateral dos ativos e benefício fiscal não dívida apresentaram significância apenas no grupo de baixo crescimento. Para o endividamento a valor de mercado foi observado significância para o Benefício fiscal não dívida e Singularidade. Este resultado reforça o argumento de que o ciclo de vida influência a estrutura de capital

This thesis is concerned with the decision-making process on the tenant-owned apartment marked in Sweden. It is argued that decision-making on the market is complex and the consumer protection is in need to be strengthened. The main issues on the market is argued to be the information asymmetry and agency problems. These phenomena influence the bounded rationality in the decision-making process. The purpose is to gain an understanding of the information asymmetry and agency problems on the tenant-owned apartment market in order to explain how it influence the decision-making process. The empirical context where this research is performed is the tenant-owned apartment market in Sweden. More specifically, the relationship between buyers and brokers are examined. The descriptive and exploratory purpose of this mixed methods research calls for abductive reasoning. The choice of performing this research through mixed methods lead to the application of triangulation which influenced the choice of data collection techniques, namely interviews and a questionnaire. The broker perspective was examined with four interviews of real-estate brokers from the Kristianstad area. The perspective of the buyers was examined through three interviews with buyers from the Kristianstad area. Additionally, the questionnaire gathered the opinions from 83 respondents. If buyers desire to make decisions that is made under as little bounded rationality as possibly, efforts needs to be made regarding the procedures on the market. Bounded rationality occurs when buyers perceive limitations during the examination of properties which influence the decision-making process. Lastly, this field of research was previously rather uncovered. However, this thesis contributes with an understanding of various aspects that influence the decision-making process in the field of the tenant-owned apartment market. We believe that a further understanding of the tenant-owned apartment market would facilitate attempts to strengthen the consumer protection.

Bakgrund: Under 2015 gjordes upphandlingspliktiga inköp för cirka en sjättedel av Sveriges BNP vilket visar på de betydande pengabelopp som upphandlingsförfarandet innefattar. Samtidigt är det också ett stort antal organisationer som är berörda av upphandlingslagstiftningen där bland annat Sveriges sekundärkommuner ingår som en del av organisationerna. Tidigare studier på global nivå har visat på bristande regelefterlevnad gentemot upphandlingslagstiftning men att studera fenomenet i en svensk kontext har inte tidigare låtit sig göras. Det finns därför både samhällsrelevans såväl som teoretisk relevans att studera fenomenet närmare i en svensk kontext. Syfte: Syftet med vår studie är att bidra med ökad förståelse för hur regelefterlevnaden hos svenska sekundärkommuner har sett ut gentemot lagen om offentlig upphandling och dess grundläggande principer. För att öka förståelsen vill vi synliggöra faktorer som har påverkat regelefterlevnaden hos sekundärkommunerna. Metod: Denna studie utförs genom en innehållsanalys med både kvantitativa och kvalitativa inslag. En ansats tillämpas där både positivism och hermeneutik återfinns i olika delar av studien. Gällande empiriskt underlag så bygger det på sekundärdata i form av revisionsrapporter som sekundärkommunerna publicerat. Slutsats: Studiens resultat konstaterar att regelefterlevnaden har varit bristfällig i motsvarande 75 procent av de svenska sekundärkommunerna. De faktorer som påverkat regelefterlevnaden mest har varit interna regler och rutiner, ansvarsfördelning och uppföljning. Motsatsvis har utbildning och kompetens samt förekomst av en central databas ej visat sig ha samma påverkan på regelefterlevnaden. / Background: In 2015 procurement affairs were made for about one sixth of Swedish BNP which is pointing at the considerable amounts of money that the procurement procedure involves. Simultaneously there is also a large amount of organizations who are affected by the procurement legislation where secondary municipalities of Sweden is one of these organizations. Earlier studies on a global basis have been providing evidence pointing at lack of compliance towards procurement legislation but studying of this phenomenon in a Swedish context has not previously been done. It is therefore relevant to study this phenomenon closer, both socially as well as theoretically, in a Swedish context. Purpose: The purpose of our study is to contribute to a further understanding of how compliance in secondary municipalities of Sweden have been towards The Public Procurement Act and its basic principles. In order to contribute to this further understanding, we want to make factors visible which have affected compliance in secondary municipalities. Methodology: This study is performed through a content analysis using both quantitative and qualitative elements. An abductive approach is applied were both positivism and hermeneutic can be found in different parts of the study. Regarding the empirical basis it is built up by secondary data which is based on audit reports that secondary municipalities have published. Conclusion: The results of the study indicate that compliance towards The Public Procurement Act have been insufficient in 75 percent of the Swedish municipalities. The factors that have affected the compliance most have been internal rules and procedures, division of responsibility and follow-up of the procurement process. On the contrary, education and competence as well as the presence of a central database have not shown to have the same effect on compliance.