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This dissertation examines the evolution of the bilateral Canadian-American continental air defence operational-level command and control relationship from the 1940 Ogdensburg Agreement to the establishment of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in 1957. It takes a functional approach, focusing on the efforts of Canadian air force officers in conjunction with their American counterparts to develop efficient command and control arrangements to ensure effective air defence of North America while at the same time safeguarding Canadian sovereignty. It explores the evolution of certain command and control principles such as cooperation, unity of command, operational command, and operational control, and argues that because Canada was able to avoid having its air defence forces come under American command, Canadian sovereignty was assured. It also demonstrates that the Canada-U.S. bilateral continental air defence command and control relationship had its origins in Canadian, American, and British joint command and control culture and practice. Canadian steadfastness, along with compromise and accommodation between the two North American nations, operational and doctrinal factors, and also cordial professional working relationships and personalities, all played important roles in the evolution of this command and control relationship from the “cooperation-unity of command” paradigm of the Second World War towards “operational control” in an air defence context throughout the early Cold War. This paradigm shift culminated in 1957 with the integration and centralization of combined air defences under an overall NORAD commander exercising operational control. The thesis also demonstrates that by taking an active role in Canada-U.S. command and control arrangements, Canada was able to avoid a negative “defence against help” situation with the United States and ensure that it secured a proverbial “piece of the action” in the bilateral North American continental air defence mission. Moreover, through this active functional approach, Canadian officers were able to safeguard Canadian sovereignty and at the same time perform an effective and important operational role in the combined efforts with the United States to defend the continent from aerial attack. This dissertation therefore makes an important contribution to the study of command and control and the history of North American continental defence. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2009-12-12 17:33:33.335

The object proposed in this study is to consider both the activities and the importance of the Pathfinder Force, Royal Air Force, in the Second World War. Their story has a much earlier beginning than 15 August 1942 when the founder squadrons gathered on various R.A.F. stations in the vicinity of the cathedral city of Ely in Cambridgeshire. Some form of target finding and marking became inevitable from the moment it was acknowledged that the preparations that had been made for war during the 1930s were less than adequate. The arguments that ensued pior to August 1942 were much less concerned with the need, than with the form, such a force should take. Unfortunately, while the administrative in-fighting surged back and forth, R.A.F. aircrews went to war not only insufficiently trained but also poorly equipped. Necessity and duty drove these men to attempt to combat weather conditions and enemy defensive measures in aircraft, that all too frequently, were unfitted for the roles they were expected to fulfil. To their credit they pressed on despite the hazards of weather, the fury of enemy defences and the deficiencies of their aircraft and equipment. Regardless of the forces of nature and man ranged against them, the crews of Bomber Command and the Pathfinder Force pressed on. It is therefore fitting that 'Press on Regardless' became the unofficial motto of the Pathfinder Force. It would also provide a singularly apt epitaph for the 3,727 men of the Pathfinder Force who were killed on operations. This work has been written in tribute to all who served in the Pathfinder Force but particularly to those who failed to return.

<p>This dissertation examines a continuum of insubordination in the Air Force during the early Cold War. After World War II, a coterie of top generals in the Air Force embraced a view held by a minority in American government and the public, which believed that the United States should conduct a preventive war against the Soviet Union before it could develop its own nuclear arsenal. This strategy contradicted the stated national security policies of President Harry S. Truman and his successor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower. This influential circle of Air Force leaders undermined presidential policy by drafting preventive war plans, pushing preventive war strategies on civilian leaders in the executive branch, and indoctrinating senior field grade officers at the Air War College in preventive war thinking and strategies.</p><p>Previous accounts of preventive war activity in the Air Force centered about the Air War College and its first commandant, General Orvil Anderson. In 1950, General Anderson disparaged President Truman and urged for preventive war against the Soviet Union an interview to a local news reporter. Syndicated newspapers reprinted General Anderson's remarks, and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, relieved General Anderson from his command of the Air War College. The traditional interpretation views General Anderson's firing as the culmination of preventive war discourse and activity in the Air Force.</p><p>Examining senior leaders' private and public remarks, declassified transcripts from Air Force commanders' conferences in the early 1950s, and student essays from the Air War College, I show that the preventive war behavior persisted in the Air Force long after General Vandenberg relieved General Anderson in 1950. The culmination of the preventive war movement came in 1954, when a preventive war strategy called Project Control, devised by the Air War College and sponsored by Air Force Headquarters, stalled before the State Department. Following Project Control's failure, Air Force Chief of Staff General Nathan F. Twining finally began to direct the service to develop air power strategies that supported President Eisenhower's nuclear policy of massive retaliation.</p><p>The preventive war episode in the Air Force demonstrates an extreme example of how the military bureaucracy regulates and undermines the Constitutional authority of the president to govern national security policy. That this behavior is normal implies that active steps must be taken to ensure proper civilian control over the military. I argue that three prominent theories of civil-military relations--Samuel Huntington's objective control, Morris Janowitz's constabulary theory, and Peter Feaver's agency theory--are notable contributions to U.S. civil-military relations; however, none of these approaches could have solved the breakdown in civil-military relations that prompted the preventive war activity in the Air Force. My concept for civilian control over the military mirrors modern preventive medicine, and assumes that the military is "at risk" for undermining presidential policy. "Preventive control" empowers civilian authorities to actively monitor the military for evidence of insubordinate behavior, and to establish liberal military education programs in order help all airmen to understand and accept political limits on the use of force.</p> / Dissertation

&quotMeeting the ageing aircraft challenge&quot is not just about safety, not just about effectiveness, and not just about economy of support. It is about proactive and reactive optimization of all three service goals throughout long life cycles that span 20 or 30 years, or more, and typically, beyond the originally intended design life. It is therefore about organizational attitudes towards ongoing trend analysis and condition monitoring, and pervading cost benefit assessments of all forms of human innovation across what the author describes as 'the eight sustaining disciplines for long aerospace life cycles', including scientific and technological developments, and opportunities for reliability growth or 'refresh'. Complacency is the root cause of all problems with the design, maintenance and support of all modern infrastructure, and therefore life cycle planners and minders are required to be an enthusiastic but nervous lot - always hoping for the best, but planning for the worst impact of 'Mr Murphy'. Murphy thrives on complacency, is in bed with uncertainty, and never forgets (as we do often) that imperfection (no matter how small) breeds unreliability traps that patiently wait to surprise at some stage along the life cycle journey. He has the upper hand. ...Our best weapons against Murphy are continual, total picture and longer-term situational awareness; caution, vigilance, innovation and collaboration. This research study and thesis is intended as a broad and comprehensive management philosophy, a guide and checklist - a broad scrape of everything 'so deep', rather than coverage of any one-niche aspect of the ageing aircraft challenge in great depth. It includes a brief and simple strategic setting for Australian Military Aerospace requirements, and spans a three axes management philosophy: 1. a toolbox of eight sustaining disciplines, 2. trend analysis and 3. time-cost-benefit assessment. Along with complacency, the prime ageing aircraft 'killers' are identified, as are the key ageing aircraft 'age multipliers'. The eight sustaining disciplines are explained in varying depth, according to their broad significance to the ageing aircraft condition and life cycle. The ever-ubiquitous bathtub reliability curve - the key to understanding, predicting and controlling life cycle behaviour (including costs) - is emphasized. Engineering life cycle minding and capability management are broad focus areas. The eight areas of attention identified for this broad study are: 1. Aerospace design requirements and trends, 2. Science and technology opportunities, 3. Airworthiness, engineering and maintenance philosophy, 4. Reliability behaviour, 5. Operational use and abuse patterns, 6. Logistics support and managing obsolescence, 7. Technical workforce and organizational attitudes (requirements and outlook), and 8. Life cycle costing and budgeting. This thesis primarily draws attention to the fundamental driver of life cycle behaviour - reliability. The critical dependency that life cycle control and prediction has on consistent and high quality trend data collection and analysis is emphasized throughout, and the now pressing need for better identification of ageing aircraft cost growth drivers, and their containment, is linked to reliability trend awareness, manipulation and intervention. The human dimension is included - including coverage of organizational attitudes and what it takes to be a 'high reliability organization'. There are no magic or easy answers to the ageing aircraft condition and challenge. Trend analysis has to be done from the bottom up, system by system, for each fleet type. But over time, with consistent trend data collection, patterns emerge within the sophisticated and stochastic systems behaviour that that ageing aircraft play out. These patterns enable ongoing management of the long life cycle to be more confidently predicted, more assured and with best possible cost growth containment. The best, perhaps only, path to least surprises and best cost containment is now being re-identified in some military aviation organizations as a mature and evolving RAM engineering and RCM framework. RAM-RCM may well be the only recovery from what some admit is a death spiral of ageing aircraft cost growth.

&quotMeeting the ageing aircraft challenge&quot is not just about safety, not just about effectiveness, and not just about economy of support. It is about proactive and reactive optimization of all three service goals throughout long life cycles that span 20 or 30 years, or more, and typically, beyond the originally intended design life. It is therefore about organizational attitudes towards ongoing trend analysis and condition monitoring, and pervading cost benefit assessments of all forms of human innovation across what the author describes as 'the eight sustaining disciplines for long aerospace life cycles', including scientific and technological developments, and opportunities for reliability growth or 'refresh'. Complacency is the root cause of all problems with the design, maintenance and support of all modern infrastructure, and therefore life cycle planners and minders are required to be an enthusiastic but nervous lot - always hoping for the best, but planning for the worst impact of 'Mr Murphy'. Murphy thrives on complacency, is in bed with uncertainty, and never forgets (as we do often) that imperfection (no matter how small) breeds unreliability traps that patiently wait to surprise at some stage along the life cycle journey. He has the upper hand. ...Our best weapons against Murphy are continual, total picture and longer-term situational awareness; caution, vigilance, innovation and collaboration. This research study and thesis is intended as a broad and comprehensive management philosophy, a guide and checklist - a broad scrape of everything 'so deep', rather than coverage of any one-niche aspect of the ageing aircraft challenge in great depth. It includes a brief and simple strategic setting for Australian Military Aerospace requirements, and spans a three axes management philosophy: 1. a toolbox of eight sustaining disciplines, 2. trend analysis and 3. time-cost-benefit assessment. Along with complacency, the prime ageing aircraft 'killers' are identified, as are the key ageing aircraft 'age multipliers'. The eight sustaining disciplines are explained in varying depth, according to their broad significance to the ageing aircraft condition and life cycle. The ever-ubiquitous bathtub reliability curve - the key to understanding, predicting and controlling life cycle behaviour (including costs) - is emphasized. Engineering life cycle minding and capability management are broad focus areas. The eight areas of attention identified for this broad study are: 1. Aerospace design requirements and trends, 2. Science and technology opportunities, 3. Airworthiness, engineering and maintenance philosophy, 4. Reliability behaviour, 5. Operational use and abuse patterns, 6. Logistics support and managing obsolescence, 7. Technical workforce and organizational attitudes (requirements and outlook), and 8. Life cycle costing and budgeting. This thesis primarily draws attention to the fundamental driver of life cycle behaviour - reliability. The critical dependency that life cycle control and prediction has on consistent and high quality trend data collection and analysis is emphasized throughout, and the now pressing need for better identification of ageing aircraft cost growth drivers, and their containment, is linked to reliability trend awareness, manipulation and intervention. The human dimension is included - including coverage of organizational attitudes and what it takes to be a 'high reliability organization'. There are no magic or easy answers to the ageing aircraft condition and challenge. Trend analysis has to be done from the bottom up, system by system, for each fleet type. But over time, with consistent trend data collection, patterns emerge within the sophisticated and stochastic systems behaviour that that ageing aircraft play out. These patterns enable ongoing management of the long life cycle to be more confidently predicted, more assured and with best possible cost growth containment. The best, perhaps only, path to least surprises and best cost containment is now being re-identified in some military aviation organizations as a mature and evolving RAM engineering and RCM framework. RAM-RCM may well be the only recovery from what some admit is a death spiral of ageing aircraft cost growth.

Thesis (M.S.)--Air Force Institute of Technology, 2006. / AFIT/GIR/ENV/06-01S. "September 2006." Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Nov. 16, 2007). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 107-111).

Thesis (doctoral)--Rand Graduate School, 1999. / Vita. Series appears on p. [2] of cover as: Rand Graduate School dissertation series. Includes bibliographical references (p. 189-204).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1975. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.