Uppsatsens resultat visar att det saknas ett entydigt luftmaktsteoretiskt ställningstagande. Istället återfinns en tudelad teoribild, dels den svenska traditionella defensiva luftmaktsteorin, men också den som inriktas mot en västlig modern expeditionär luftmaktsteori. Resultatet stöds av slutsatserna från studien av förmågeutvecklingen, en utveckling som spänner över en bred men traditionell förmågebas. Huruvida ett tudelat teoretiskt ställningstagande och ett i huvudsak traditionellt förmågeutvecklingsprogram, kommer vara effektivt att möta framtidens uppgifter och ekonomiska realiteter återstår att se. / The result of this paper can be summarized in that there are different air power theories in the strategic documents. There is mainly a twofold strategy based on a national non-alliance defence concept focusing on cooperation as well as a modern western airpower theory. The paper also shows an airpower development which focuses on traditional capabilities and may in some way lacking the means for facing possible future demands on airpower. However, based on the results, the Swedish airpower will still be a major instrument for political use in the future. In regards to the efficiency of a twofold theory, based on the assumption of increasing defence cost and varied future military tasks, there is no way of saying what the consequence will be, we will just have to wait and see.

This thesis is a narrative and analytical history of the Hungarian air service. It follows its development from the Allied intervention of 1919 through the end of the Second World War. Denied an air force by the Treaty of Trianon, Hungarian airmen determined to thwart the inspection system and preserve national air power. The prohibition against military aviation persisted after the Commission was withdrawn, and through Hungarian diplomatic efforts, a relationship was established with Italy that included substantial assistance to the clandestine Hungarian air service. This low-grade arms build-up continued through the 1930s, during which there was a robust discussion about air power theory and the nature of future aerial warfare in Magyar Katonai Szemle [Hungarian Military Review]. After the rise of Hitler, Germany offered arms credits and support for Hungary’s obsession with regaining the territory lost in the post-war settlement. The air service grew mainly through imported aeroplanes, the purchase of which ceased to be secret after the Little Entente recognised Hungary’s equality of arms. The Hungarian air force became independent in 1939, and enjoyed public acclaim after decisive air-to-air victories over Slovak pilots during the occupation of Upper Hungary. The General Staff never accepted its autonomy, however, and succeeded in reclaiming control of the air force in 1941. After Hungary joined the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, the air force provided air defence and interdiction in support of the Rapid Corps. Its mounting losses were made good by German aeroplanes, some of which were produced in Hungarian factories. As the Allied bombing campaign against Hungary intensified in 1944, most of its aircraft were devoted to homeland defence. The force ceased to exist as a true national service after the German-led coup in October 1944, but continued a fighting withdrawal to the west until captured by American forces.