Insurgency is considered to be the principal form of conflict in the world today. Since the end of WWII, large-scale conventional war between states has been minimal. In Iraq, a band of insurgents are attempting to defy the strongest power in the world. This insurgency in Iraq may be the beginning of a new phenomenon of insurgency conflict. This thesis argues that the Iraqi insurgency has no center of gravity, with no clear apparent leader or leadership. As seen in other examples of insurgency throughout history, no leadership has emerged in response to any of the conditions present in Iraq. There is no attempt to seize and actually hold territory, and no single, defined, or unifying ideology. Most important, through the research of this project, there has been no identifiable insurgent organization. It is true that there are multiple organizations involved, such as Al Qa’ida and Al Ansar, but there is no clear indication of any cohesion in the insurgency. This insurgency involves small groups who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their campaigns without a precise central command. The command and control is a very loose environment where individuals gravitate toward one another to carry out armed attacks, exchange intelligence, trade weapons, and then disperse at times never to operate together again. The immediate goal of the insurgency in Iraq is to disrupt the political process and drive US forces out of Iraq. However, each element of the insurgency is also driven by its own unique motivations. No matter the differences, they fight together for a common cause. Their strategy is to seize power by draining the Coalition financially and winning popular support through coercion and fear. Their resources may be unlimited, and with support coming in from all corners of the earth, they may be unstoppable. The future will determine whether or not the insurgency in Iraq is a new type of insurgency. If the Iraqi example fails to spread to other countries, then it can be said that the insurgency in Iraq was a phenomenon unique only to Iraq and its conditions.

The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group’s (and its supporting elements’) decision-making calculus. In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it offers in dynamically drawing upon all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary. However, strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate terrorist organizations. As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable. The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the Balance Theory of strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and C) Isolation of popular support. It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as the sine qua non for success in countering an NSTO’s campaign of violence and effectively manipulating its decision-making process. Implementation of these three elements, moreover, must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other. The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis. In pursuing this end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of the methods of focused, structured comparison. The cases examined are those of: 1) The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present). The dissertation concludes with an examination of how the Balance Theory may provide insights for the formulation of counter-terrorism strategy against Al Qaeda in the current "War on Terror".