Ce travail de recherche doctoral vise à examiner les interactions entre les multinationales, les entreprises algériennes et leurs firmes communes et identifier l’impact sur la structure et la culture développée au sein de celle-ci.Il vise également à examiner les caractéristiques de la structure et de la culture des alliances dyadiques internationales et comprendre leurs spécificités dans le contexte algérien.Enfin, un autre objectif assigné est l’examen du modèle décisionnel au sein de l’alliance et l’identification des rôles joués par la joint-venture, le parent local et la multinationale.Pour ce faire nous partons du constat, issu de la littérature, stipulant que les multinationales en position de force, chercheront à imposer leur modèle de structure à la firme commune et de développer leur culture d’origine au sein de celle-ci. Elles chercheront également à dominer la relation et centraliser l’ensemble des décisions.A partir d’une étude de deux cas d’alliances, l’un conclu dans le secteur hôtelier avec une multinationale française et l’autre conclu dans le secteur pharmaceutique avec une multinationale américaine, nous démontrons que ces constats théoriques, ne sont que partiellement confirmés au sein des alliances étudiées.Cette recherche effectuée s’est insérée dans un travail de terrain, avec une étude à la fois qualitative et quantitative, sur un territoire algérien, où aucune étude similaire n’a été conduite, à notre connaissance.Nous démontrons que la multinationale impose sont modèle organisationnel, mais ne parvient pas entièrement à développer sa culture commune au sein de l’alliance.Nous démontrons également que les multinationales dominent certaines décisions managériales et partagent d’autres avec le partenaire local. Et que lorsque la multinationale tente de dominer l’ensemble, des représailles concurrentielles peuvent être envisagées par l’allié et toucher ses intérêts.Nous avons également dégagé, des caractéristiques de la structure et de la culture des alliances internationales, étudiées en contexte algérien.D’un autre côté, l’étude des alliances dyadiques internationales en contexte algérien ; semble faire apparaître l’existence de différences de comportement de l’alliance et du parent local, en fonction du statut « public » ou « privé » de ce dernier. / This work of doctoral research aims to examine the interactions between multinationals, Algerian companies and their common firms and identify the impact on the structure and culture developed within it. It also aims to examine the characteristics of the structure and culture of international dyadic alliances and understand their specificities in the Algerian context.Finally, another objective it is reviewing the decision model in the alliance and the identification of the roles of the joint venture, the local parent and the multinational.To do this we assume acknowledged, in literature, stipulating that multinational position of strength, seek to impose their structure model to the common firm and develop their own culture within it. They also seek to dominate the relationship and centralize all decisions.From a study of two alliances, one found in the hotel sector with a French multinational and the other found in the pharmaceutical sector with a US multinational, we demonstrate that these theoretical findings, are only partially confirmed within the studied alliances.This research is inserted into field work with a study of both qualitative and quantitative, on the Algerian territory, where no similar studies have been conducted, to our knowledge.We demonstrate that the multinational imposes its organizational model, but fails to fully develop its common culture within the alliance.We also demonstrate that multinationals dominate certain managerial decisions and share more with the local partner. And when the multinational is trying to dominate the whole, competitive retaliation may be considered by the ally and touch his interests.We also cleared, the characteristics of the structure and culture of international alliances studied in Algerian context.On the other hand, the study of international dyadic alliances Algerian context; seems to reveal the existence of differences in behavior of the alliance, depending on the status of "public" or "private" of the local parent.

This study attempted to explicate and empirically assess the impact of tie strength between complementors in strategic alliances on firms? innovation and performance using the embeddedness perspective. The Embeddedness perspective emphasizes the importance of the social relationships upon which the firm can draw in its strategic behavior and performance. By using a sample of 49 firms in the software industry and collecting data for a five-year period, the study tested the following four hypotheses: First, there is a positive relationship between a firm?s tie strength with its complementors and innovation; second, there is a positive relationship between a firm?s innovation and its performance; third, there is a positive relationship between the strength of a firm?s ties with complementors and their performance; and fourth, innovation partially mediates the relationship between tie strength and performance. The first and second hypotheses were highly supported. The third and fourth hypotheses were not supported. Basically, the study found that firms with strong ties with their complementors were likely to exhibit more innovations. These successful innovations improve firm performance. As a result, the study suggested that it is critical for firms in the software industry to increase both the number and the strength of their alliances with their complementors.

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The subject of cross-border alliances, and of cooperative strategy generally, is one that has been growing in importance over the last ten to fifteen years, both for practitioners and for academics. The literature on the subject has increased substantially during this time but, as with all subjects that come into vogue, there is currently no generally agreed body of theory, or even terminology to assist the student in researching and understanding the subject. This thesis, which is exploratory in nature, seeks to contribute to the strategic alliance field by means of research aimed at identifying significant associations between formation conditions, management approaches and evolving decision making taken in the case study alliances and the effectiveness of those alliances as deemed by significant partner members. The concluding chapters present findings from the research, attempt to bring together the overall findings, and arrive at some general conclusions, especially certain implications for management. / Master of Commerce (Hons)

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 66-67).

This dissertation project broadly addresses the question of how state behavior is conditioned by the structural configuration of the network in which they are embedded. It attempts to reconcile some of the discrepancies between the systemic and dyadic approaches to international relations, by arguing that the international system is a multidimensional network that results as an emergent property of the dyadic ties that exist between states.This dissertation consists of three stand alone analyses, connected by their focus on systemic configuration and the impact of various elements of international structures on the behavior of states. In contrast to most studies of international relations, dimensions of the international order are observed, rather than assumed. The first chapter focuses specifically on observing and describing the structure and tendencies of the behavioral dimension of the international system. It assesses patterns of consistency in international relations, searching for both simple, dyadic consistency as well as more complex, triadic consistency. The second chapter relies on these positive and negative relations to create a model of policy reinforcement, with a focus on the onset of militarized conflict. Structural balance theory is used to identify shared, external relations that either reinforce or dampen the impact of dyadic hostility on militarized conflict. The final empirical chapter shifts to a more localized focus, investigating the impact of alliance portfolio size on the likelihood of alliance obligation fulfillment. Here, the size and capabilities of a disputant's local alliance portfolio do not directly modify the behavior of the disputant, but instead that of the disputant's other allies.Together, these chapters demonstrate the importance of accounting for systemic factors in explaining and analyzing dyadic behavior. The characteristics of local networks, such as alliance portfolios, have significant implications for state security. The configuration of foreign policy relations provides feedback to states, influencing their willingness to take aggressive actions. Bipolarity and multipolarity can be empirically observed through the clustering of states, rather than by merely counting the number of major powers. However, perhaps most significant is the contribution these analyses make to a small but growing literature attempting to move beyond the dyad.

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This dissertation analyzes patterns of power and influence in the context of proxy alliances between states and armed, non-state groups. In particular, I explore the following questions: Why do some states have leverage over their non-state proxies, while others find themselves at the behest of their far weaker allies? Put differently, why doesn't a state's enormous material advantage systematically translate into an ability to influence the behavior of proxy groups? Governments often find themselves stymied by belligerent proxies and drawn into unwanted conflict escalation with adversaries--precisely what states sought to avoid by relying on covert, indirect alliances in the first place. I argue that the very factors that make proxy warfare appealing to states--its clandestine, informal nature--threaten to undermine governments' abilities to exert leverage over their proxies. Governments seek out proxy alliances when the material or political costs of directly confronting an adversary are unappealingly high, driven by the logic that proxy groups can help states achieve their foreign policy objectives "on the cheap" and in a way that allows states to plausibly deny involvement in a conflict. However, the actions states must take to ensure plausible deniability, specifically the decisions political leaders make about how they will manage and oversee a proxy ally, can undermine their leverage. The decisions political leaders make about alliance design and management, which have negative effects on their bargaining power, are fundamentally driven by two related logics: the requirements of plausible deniability, and attempts to navigate the preferences of domestic political veto players and bureaucracies. Plausible deniability requires establishing as much distance as possible between a decision maker and a proxy and/or operating with a minimal footprint on the ground. To do so, political leaders often delegate authority for managing tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance to covert organizations with the security sector (e.g., intelligence organizations). However, this clandestine and informal delegation is problematic in two respects. First, the bureaucratic actor to whom the political leader delegates authority for carrying out tasks pertaining to the proxy alliance has a general incentive to ensure its organization is abundantly resourced. Therefore, it has a vested interest in the perpetuation of the proxy alliance. Second, bureaucratic leaders (as well as all of the other individuals to whom authority is delegated) may have personal, political, or ideological preferences that differ substantially from those of the political leadership. If the effects of delegating authority in this way are so perverse, why do leaders do it? And why don't they reign in wayward bureaucrats? At the most basic level, leaders have a high valuation for plausible deniability for international or domestic political reasons (to avoid retaliation from an adversary or keep things secret from domestic political actors), and powerful, entrenched bureaucracies are difficult to control. Digging deeper, however, there is a compelling domestic political story that existing accounts of proxy alliances have neglected to tell. Political leaders often abdicate authority to other bureaucratic actors or individuals--even when they may foresee the issues identified above--as a strategy for protecting themselves from domestic political veto players with strong policy preferences that diverge substantially from their own. To evaluate the explanatory scope of the theory, I explore patterns of influence in proxy alliance in a series of comparative case studies, in which I use process tracing and structured, focused comparison to assess whether and to what extent decisions about alliance management affect a state's leverage over its non-state proxy. Specifically, I analyze bargaining power in six different proxy alliances: the Syria-Fatah alliance in the 1960s-70s; the alliance between the FNLA and UNITA in Angola and the United States from 1975-76; the India-Mukti Bahini alliance in East Pakistan in 1971; the United States-UNITA alliance in Angola in the 1980s; the alliance between the United States, Iran, and Israel, and the KDP in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1970s; and the alliance between India and Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka in the 1980s. I compare the explanatory scope of my theory to the interstate alliance politics literature, and find that my theory not only accounts for the unexplained variation in the universe of cases, but also offers a more complete understanding of the dynamics of state-proxy relationships.

Great power patrons frequently reassure allies of their protection, whether by stationing troops abroad, visiting allied countries, or making public statements. In the case of the United States, observers and practitioners alike have emphasized the need to instill confidence in U.S. allies. However, allied reassurance is fundamentally puzzling because it gives away a key source of bargaining leverage: the threat of abandonment. Patrons should ideally strive to limit the extent to which they are perceived as committed to allies, lest they encourage allies to free-ride on their protection and contribute little to the common defense. Existing literature tends to either treat reassurance as a secondary effect of deterrence, or to focus on understanding how patrons can reassure their allies rather than why. Studies that do provide explanations for reassurance, for their part, often regard reassurance as strategically suboptimal, and emphasize domestic political factors that drive reassurance. The causes of reassurance are thus poorly understood. I argue that although reassurance can have adverse consequences, patrons have incentives to reassure to the extent that allies have the capacity to exit the alliance. The more credible an ally’s threat to pursue outside options, and the more costs that doing so would impose on the patron, the more reassurance it will receive. Patrons thus face a dilemma, trading off between withholding reassurance to drive hard bargains with allies and reassuring allies to dissuade them from exiting the alliance. This dilemma may be mitigated, however, if a patron can make its assurances conditional on allied burden-sharing by combining its assurances with threats of abandonment. These threats are more potent to the extent that a patron faces domestic pressure to retrench from its foreign commitments, and that allies face severe threat environments. I test the theory using a mixed-method approach that combines statistical analysis of an original dataset on American reassurance and allied burden-sharing between 1950 and 2010 with qualitative historical case studies. In Chapters 1 and 2, I introduce the concepts of alliance reassurance and burden-sharing and review the literature on both concepts. I argue that reassurance is puzzling in light of existing theories of alliance bargaining which stress the threat of abandonment as a source of leverage. The “reassurance dilemma” that patrons face, however, is that withholding reassurance may encourage allies to distance themselves from the alliance and seek outside options. In Chapter 3, I present a theory of bargaining leverage in asymmetric alliances in order to identify the conditions under which this dilemma is most severe—and thus to explain variation in patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. I posit that reassurance serves the purpose of discouraging allies from leaving the alliance; the more credible allies’ threats of exit, the more reassurance they will receive. However, patrons can make their assurances conditional on allies’ burden-sharing efforts if their own threat of exiting the alliance is credible as well. I present a simple formal model illustrating both the tradeoffs between reassurance and burden-sharing, as well as the conditions under which patrons are more likely to reassure and allies are more likely to increase their contributions to the alliance. I then introduce hypotheses for testing the theory’s observable implications. Chapter 4 presents the quantitative analysis on the determinants of patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing. First, using an original dataset of U.S. reassurance collected and analyzed with automated text analysis, I use statistical models to identify correlates of U.S. willingness to offer reassurances. Second, I study allied burden-sharing using data on allies’ military spending, support for U.S. military bases, and participation in U.S. foreign military interventions. The quantitative findings strongly support the theory; the United States reassures allies that are at greater risk of exiting the alliance more, while allies more dependent on U.S. protection also spend more on defense, provide more compensation for the costs of U.S. military bases, and participate in U.S. foreign military interventions at a greater rate. In Chapters 5-8, I conduct case studies on U.S. reassurance and burden-sharing pressure toward West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom during the 1960s and 1970s. Process-tracing of these cases shows that the United States saw reassurance as a way of discouraging its allies from pursuing outside options—in particular nuclear weapons and rapprochement with the Soviet Union. However, the United States was simultaneously able to extract significant burden-sharing efforts, especially from West Germany and South Korea owing to their geographic vulnerability, and during the early 1970s due to doubts about U.S. reliability in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Finally, Chapter 9 concludes with a summary of the analysis, as well as a discussion of implications and avenues for future research. My findings suggest that by withholding reassurance and deliberately casting doubt on its protection, a patron makes its allies prone to reconsidering their reliance on it and to instead pursue outside options.

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