This master thesis deals with the driving forces and perceived benefits that form the basis for Sweden's accession to the defence cooperation Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). Since Sweden is already involved in a number of different defence and security collaborations, the question arises for what value another cooperation should be entered, and why JEF is considered appropriate.  With Russia's annexation of Crimea, there was a crucial change in the close environment which created a security policy situation that has put more focus on Northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region. This caused a need for new cooperation strategies in which Sweden together with others has to deal with this change.  By using Graham Allison's theoretical models this thesis analyse the underlying process of connecting JEF from a rational and bureaucratic perspective. The models intend to explain on what reasons connection to JEF was made, but also reveal different actors and their role and impact on the decision. From this, driving forces and benefits with JEF can be identified.   The results point to a strong political and military consensus with equal perception of external threats and opportunities. An overarching driver is to create a military integration with other regional actors in order to create a threshold and counterbalance to Russian action. Here, the UK is seen as a valuable player that Sweden wishes to have strong ties with in any crisis and conflict scenario. The cooperation is also expected to create the conditions for development of important military capabilities together with partners in the region. In contrast to former research this study shows that reasons to join cooperation’s has become more threat-driven. That might be a sign of tendency towards realism as a suitable explanatory model in times of increased threat and the pursuit of military utility in wake of Russian behaviour.

After the cold war the border or epicenter in the conflict between east and west has moved north. From central Europe to the Baltic sea region. The Åland archipelago in the middle of the Baltic Sea, is a military strategic interest for many actors in the Baltic Sea. Demilitarized and neutral according to international law. This thesis will study the Swedish, Finish, Russian and Nato perspective of which impact Åland has a on national security policy and military strategy for the Baltic region. What are the mechanisms and strategic motives for the actors in using Åland for military purposes. Will the international agreements concerning Åland have any effect in armed conflict? This case study is performed as a qualitative study based on Graham Allison and Philip Zelikows book Essence of decision which will also serve as frame of reference for the thesis. In order to understand Ålands special status according to international law, we have made a historic exposé which aims to give the reader the background needed to understand the islands significance, both historically and present. The analysis is based on four perspectives; The actors ideological position, The rational actor model (RAM), Organizational behavior and Governmental politics. The result of this study shows that Åland will not be left untouched in case of a conflict in the Baltic area. Due to the geographic position of the islands it will be affected regardless of its status in accordance with international law. The motives for using Åland for military purposes can be found with all our four actors with regards to the islands strategic location. The one who can control Åland will also increase his ability to control sea and airspace in the northern Baltics. He will also be able to control the sea lines of communication in to the bay of Bothnia. The incentive to re-militarize Åland and use the island for own military purposes however varies with the four actors. We have found that the incentive is strongest with Finland and Sweden and very limited with Russia and Nato. Ålands status as demilitarized and neutral will probably not have any big significance in an armed conflict in the Baltic sea area. However, it may delay military intervention on Åland but not stop it.