Zugl.: München, Hochsch. für Philosophie, Diss., 2006

Analogy arguments from religious experience attempt to establish a direct analogy between sense perception and certain kinds of religious experience construed in terms of a perceptual model. C. B. Martin challenges traditional analogy arguments from religious experience by contending that there is a disanalogy between both kinds of experience due to the fact that there is a society of testing and checkup procedures available to sense perception that is not available to religious experience. William P. Alston presents his own analogy argument from religious experience in Perceiving God. Alston establishes an analogy between sense perception and religious experience by arguing that certain kinds of religious experience can be construed in terms of a perceptual model. In doing so, Alston maintains that sense perception and certain kinds of religious experience that count as perception?mystical perception?produce justified beliefs in very similar ways. Thus, Alston defuses Martin's objection by arguing that both kinds of perception have testing and checkup procedures available to them, procedures which are necessary to defeat the prima facie justification of perceptual beliefs. However, I argue that because there are apparently inconsistent core beliefs in the practice of forming beliefs on the basis of Christian mystical perception, the analogy between sense perception and mystical perception is threatened. In order for Alston's analogy argument to be successful, he must address this problem.

Thesis (M.A.)--West Virginia University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains v, 173 p. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 169-173).

This study examines Christian experientialist epistemology as articulated of late by Alvin Plantinga especially and also William Alston. It situates their approach to the epistemic status of Christian belief claims within the overall outlook they have respectively developed on what features generally legitimate beliefs as being rationally responsible or even qualify some true beliefs as constituting knowledge. First to be taken up is Plantinga's journey from considering the deontological justification for basic belief in God to making his own externalist proposal for warranted belief at large. Next up for consideration is Alston's accent on adequate grounds and reliable process, attending as well to his stance on perceptual immediacy and belief-forming or doxastic practices in general. The study then looks at his case for Christian mystical practice as a dependable perceptual doxastic habit. Also treated is Alston's support for the process of forming Christian beliefs on testimony and his contention that these practices are realist and partly amenable to evaluation drawing on standards used also outside them. Then comes extended analysis of Plantinga's recent lengthy claim that, courtesy of special divine provisions, core Christian convictions can enjoy warrant even in the face of frequently alleged defeaters. / While Alston's reliabilist epistemology is not as strong as Plantinga's package on appropriate proper function, his appreciation for the communal contribution to second-level knowledge is an important supplement. He offers more perspective on the status of Christian belief overall. Plantinga's model suffers from some internal tensions which admit better resolution than he has yet supplied. His response to religious pluralism is a solid one within his framework. Like Alston, Plantinga unabashedly appeals to theology to indicate doxastic propriety, but could do so in a way more sensitive to hermeneutical challenges. Yet Plantinga's and Alston's realism is an attempt to honor the distance between God's knowledge and that of believers.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, Deerfield, Ill., 1996. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 111-117).

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, 2010. / Submitted by Jaqueline Ferreira de Souza (jaquefs.braz@gmail.com) on 2010-11-10T16:24:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_PauloEstevaoTavaresCavalcanti.pdf: 688800 bytes, checksum: d5dd0d804cf47bfa9ba3aedbe9803ac3 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Daniel Ribeiro(daniel@bce.unb.br) on 2010-11-24T23:06:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_PauloEstevaoTavaresCavalcanti.pdf: 688800 bytes, checksum: d5dd0d804cf47bfa9ba3aedbe9803ac3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-11-24T23:06:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2010_PauloEstevaoTavaresCavalcanti.pdf: 688800 bytes, checksum: d5dd0d804cf47bfa9ba3aedbe9803ac3 (MD5) / Este trabalho aborda a tese de William Alston contida em seu livro Perceiving God de que a experiência religiosa pode contribuir como elemento adicional, entre outros, de suporte racional à crença religiosa. Nesse sentido são revisadas as bases da epistemologia da experiência religiosa de Alston e a contribuição específica que a percepção pode dar para o conhecimento de um objeto. Desenvolve-se uma análise crítica da tese de Alston de que, sob certas condições, é possível justificar determinadas crenças religiosas com base em experiências místicas de percepções de Deus e se analisam as principais críticas a esta tese. O trabalho é consistente com a conclusão de que Alston apresenta um argumento sólido e coerente e que as principais críticas dirigidas à tese defendida por ele podem ser rebatidas dentro do escopo de seu argumento. _________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This dissertation deals with William Alston's thesis contained in his book Perceiving God that religious experience can contribute as an additional feature, inter alia, to the justification of religious belief. In this sense, I analyze the basis of Alton’s epistemology of religious experience and the specific contributions that perception can make to the knowledge of an object. I develop a critical analysis of Alston's argument that under certain conditions, it is possible to justify certain religious beliefs based on mystical experiences of God's perceptions and some main criticisms of this thesis are also considered. My contention is that Alston has a strong and coherent argument and that the main criticisms of his claims can be replied within the scope of his argument.

No description available.

Esta tese analisa a relação entre a abordagem das práticas doxásticas de William Payne Alston e a teoria dos poderes intelectuais do ser humano, de Thomas Reid. Após passar em revista os conceitos da epistemologia de Alston e de Reid, examinam-se em profundidade os argumentos de ambos em defesa da confiabilidade dos modos básicos de formar crenças para, em seguida, serem comparados esses autores. A análise comparativa Alston-Reid sugere fortes indícios de que os elementos essenciais das práticas doxásticas básicas, sobretudo a percepção sensorial, encontram-se na doutrina dos poderes intelectuais de Reid. Além disso, a luta contra o ceticismo quanto à confiabilidade dos modos de formação de crenças nos quais tipicamente nos engajamos parece ter sido uma motivação para o desenvolvimento dos projetos de ambos os filósofos. Mas, constataram-se diferenças importantes entre eles no que se refere ao papel desempenhado pelo ceticismo, realismo e teísmo como condições gerais à construção das teorias epistemológicas de Alston e Reid. / This thesis aims at analyzing the bearings between William Payne Alstons doxastic practice approach and Thomas Reids theory of the intellectual powers of men. After surveying the epistemological concepts of Alston and Reid, one deeply examines the arguments of each other for the reliability of the basic modes of forming beliefs and, after that, one compares both authors. The comparative analysis suggests strong evidence for the claim that the essential elements of basic doxastic practices are rooted in Reids doctrine of intellectual powers. Also, fighting against skepticism concerning the reliability of the belief forming processes we are typically engaged in seems to have been a motivation for the development of both philosophical projects. But we have found important differences between them, especially concerning the role of skepticism, realism and theism as general conditions under which Alstons and Reids epistemological theories were built.

Esta tese analisa a relação entre a abordagem das práticas doxásticas de William Payne Alston e a teoria dos poderes intelectuais do ser humano, de Thomas Reid. Após passar em revista os conceitos da epistemologia de Alston e de Reid, examinam-se em profundidade os argumentos de ambos em defesa da confiabilidade dos modos básicos de formar crenças para, em seguida, serem comparados esses autores. A análise comparativa Alston-Reid sugere fortes indícios de que os elementos essenciais das práticas doxásticas básicas, sobretudo a percepção sensorial, encontram-se na doutrina dos poderes intelectuais de Reid. Além disso, a luta contra o ceticismo quanto à confiabilidade dos modos de formação de crenças nos quais tipicamente nos engajamos parece ter sido uma motivação para o desenvolvimento dos projetos de ambos os filósofos. Mas, constataram-se diferenças importantes entre eles no que se refere ao papel desempenhado pelo ceticismo, realismo e teísmo como condições gerais à construção das teorias epistemológicas de Alston e Reid. / This thesis aims at analyzing the bearings between William Payne Alstons doxastic practice approach and Thomas Reids theory of the intellectual powers of men. After surveying the epistemological concepts of Alston and Reid, one deeply examines the arguments of each other for the reliability of the basic modes of forming beliefs and, after that, one compares both authors. The comparative analysis suggests strong evidence for the claim that the essential elements of basic doxastic practices are rooted in Reids doctrine of intellectual powers. Also, fighting against skepticism concerning the reliability of the belief forming processes we are typically engaged in seems to have been a motivation for the development of both philosophical projects. But we have found important differences between them, especially concerning the role of skepticism, realism and theism as general conditions under which Alstons and Reids epistemological theories were built.

The first half of this thesis argues that scepticism about the evidential force of religious experiences is driven by concerns about the traditional practices used to discern between 'illusory' and 'genuine' experiences. As these practices require commitment to a particular tradition, we have no way of deciding which practice to trust. Furthermore, the tests the practices employ do not bear on whether the experiences are veridical; and they are too coarse-grained for theologians to use them to regulate religious beliefs or seek theological truth. The thesis argues that we should seek new ways of evaluating religious experiences, and beliefs based on them, which address the concerns. The fourth chapter develops a procedure in which parties to religious disagreements understand God to be a perfect being, and use shared moral beliefs from outside their religious tradition to assign probabilities to putative divine actions, including religious experiences. The likelihood the divine action occurred given those moral beliefs is the likelihood the religious experience was veridical, addressing the second concern. The procedure attends closely to different sources of doubt, so avoiding the coarse granularity traditional practices are charged with. The thesis thereby argues against a sceptical response to difficulties faced by religious experiential evidence by offering a non-sceptical alternative which is articulated in enough detail to show how these difficulties can be surmounted. The fifth chapter completes the description of the procedure and shows how it can be used to formalize disputes in philosophical theology concerning the evidential import of divine hiddenness and religious diversity. The sixth chapter defends the procedure's presumption that God is a perfect being by evaluating an Anselmian account of the reference of "God".