Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Humanidades, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Gradução, 2006. / Submitted by Alexandre Marinho Pimenta (alexmpsin@hotmail.com) on 2009-10-03T21:22:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2006_Maurício Mota Saboya Pinheiro.pdf: 636303 bytes, checksum: 3bcded7e63dbd24f927677f883f1da39 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2009-10-05T12:02:21Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2006_Maurício Mota Saboya Pinheiro.pdf: 636303 bytes, checksum: 3bcded7e63dbd24f927677f883f1da39 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2009-10-05T12:02:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2006_Maurício Mota Saboya Pinheiro.pdf: 636303 bytes, checksum: 3bcded7e63dbd24f927677f883f1da39 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-07 / Esta dissertação analisa a relação entre experiência religiosa e credenciais epistêmicas das crenças teístas, com base principalmente nas obras de William Alston (Perceiving God) e Alvin Plantinga (Warranted Christian Belief). Após passar em revista os conceitos clássicos de experiência religiosa, examinam-se em profundidade os argumentos de Alston e de Plantinga em defesa do teísmo para, em seguida, serem criticados e comparados esses autores. A análise comparativa entre ambos sugere vários pontos de complementaridade que poderiam conduzir a futuros aperfeiçoamentos nos trabalhos de cada um. Em particular, uma alternativa indicada por McLeod – um holismo epistemológico de base externalista – parece ser bastante promissora no sentido de se alcançar uma síntese e uma superação de Alston e Plantinga. Tanto os conceitos centrais de prática doxástica (Alston) quanto de aparato cognitivo (Plantinga) poderiam ser integrados em uma estrutura de formação de crenças cujos dados de entrada seriam as experiências do sujeito – considerado tanto individual quanto coletivamente. Nesse esquema, a experiência religiosa ou mística teria um papel meramente causal (ou de “catalisação”) na formação das crenças teístas e estas seriam credenciadas de acordo com os critérios do holismo epistemológico, a saber: o compromisso e o poder de ordenamento do mundo, dentre outros. _________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / This dissertation aims at analyzing the bearings between religious experience and the theistic beliefs epistemic credentials, on the basis of the works of William Alston (Perceiving God) and Alvin Plantinga (Warranted Christian Belief). After surveying the classical concepts of religious experience, one deeply examines the arguments of Alston and Plantinga for the theism and, after that, one criticizes and compares both authors. The comparative analysis suggests various complementary points that could lead to improvements in each other’s works. In particular, an alternative pointed out by McLeod – an externalist epistemological holism – looks quite promising in order to attain both a synthesis and an overriding of Alston and Plantinga. The crucial concepts of doxastic practice (Alston) and of cognitive apparatus (Plantinga) could be integrated in a structure of belief formation whose inputs would be the subject’s experiences – this considered both from individual and collective points of view. Under such scheme, religious or mystical experience would have a merely causal role in the formation of theistic beliefs; these beliefs would be credentialed according to the epistemological holism criteria: the commitment and the ordering-world power, among others.

This study argues that a pragmatic conception of religion would enable philosophers to make important contributions to our ability to handle concrete problems involving religion. The term 'philosophical anthropology', referring to different interpretative frameworks, which philosophers draw on to develop conceptions of human phenomena, is introduced. It is argued that the classical pragmatists embraced a philosophical anthropology significantly different from that embraced by most philosophers of religion; accordingly, pragmatism offers an alternative conception of religion. It is suggested that a conception of religion is superior to another if it makes more promising contributions to our ability to handle extra-philosophical problems of religion. A pragmatic philosophical anthropology urges us to view human practices as responses to shared experienced needs. Religious practices develop to resolve tensions in our views of life. The pictures of human flourishing they persent reconstruct our views of life, thereby allowing more significant interaction with the environment, and a more significant life. A modified version of reflective equilibrium is developed to show how we, on a pragmatic conception of religion, are able to supply resources for criticism and reform of religious practices, so the extra-philosophical problems of religion can be handled. Mainstream philosophy of religion attempts to offer such resources by presenting analogy-arguments from religious experience. Those arguments are, however, unconvincing. A comparison of the two conceptions of religion thus results in a recommendation to reconstruct philosophy of religion.

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