Univ., Diss.--Paderborn, 2005.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2003. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-116).

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2003. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-116).

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2003. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-116).

This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking. The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski's grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature. The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem. Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-07-04T11:31:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1939689 bytes, checksum: e46ad524ecd0186e17aa965be94f3540 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-04T11:31:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1939689 bytes, checksum: e46ad524ecd0186e17aa965be94f3540 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-23 / This dissertation addresses the problem of evil placed as a challenge to the belief of classical theism. It considers the concept of God held by orthodox theism making a description of his attributes and showing that there are problems of evil can only be sustained if this conception of God is maintained. If the concept of God is modified, the problems of evil no longer make sense. It also proceeds to give a description of the various versions of the challenge of evil and some attempts to solve it in order better understand the contribution that defense of Plantinga brings to the debate. Then it makes a more detailed exposition of the logical problem of evil and how the defense of free will as posited by Alvin Plantinga seeks to answer this challenge. Additionally it also seeks to present some of the new developments that plantingian defense brought the problem of evil and how the american philosopher sought to work these new ways of problem. Finally it elaborates briefly about reformed epistemology and the insertion in his epistemological project of his defense of free will in the treatment of evil. / A presente dissertação trata do problema do mal colocado como desafio à crença do teísmo clássico. Ela considera o conceito de Deus sustentado pelo teísmo ortodoxo fazendo uma descrição dos seus atributos e mostrando que há problemas do mal que só se sustentam se esta concepção sobre Deus for mantida. Se o conceito de Deus é modificado, os problemas do mal deixam de fazer sentido. Ela procede também em fazer uma descrição das várias versões do problema do mal e de algumas tentativas de solucioná-lo a fim de melhor entender a contribuição que a defesa plantingiana traz ao debate. Se propõe a apresentar uma exposição mais detalhada do problema lógico do mal e de como a defesa do livre-arbítrio como posta por Alvin Plantinga busca responder a este desafio. Além disso ela também procura apresentar alguns dos novos desdobramentos que a defesa plantingiana trouxe ao problema do mal e como o filósofo americano procurou trabalhar esses novos caminhos do problema. Por fim ela discorre brevemente sobre a epistemologia reformada e a inserção no seu projeto epistemológico da sua defesa do livre-arbítrio no tratamento do mal.

According to the dominant tradition in Christianity and many other religions, human beings are both knowers and actors: beings with conscious beliefs about the world who sometimes act intentionally guided by these beliefs. According to philosopher of mind Robert Cummins the “received view” among philosophers of mind is epiphenomenalism, according to which mental causation does not exist: neural events are the underlying causes of both behavior and belief which explains the correlation (not causation) between belief and behavior. Beliefs do not, in virtue of their semantic content, enter the causal chain leading to action, beliefs are always the endpoint of a causal chain. If that is true the theological anthropology of many religious traditions is false. JP Moreland draws attention to two different ways of doing metaphysics: serious metaphysics and shopping-list metaphysics. The difference is that the former involves not only the attempt to describe  the phenomena one encounter, it also involves the attempt of locating them, that is explaining how the phenomena is possible and came to be given the constraints of a certain worldview. For a physicalist these constraints include the atomic theory of matter and the theories of physical, chemical and biological evolution.   Mental properties are challenging phenomena to locate within a physicalist worldview, and some physicalists involved in “serious metaphysics” have therefore eliminated them from their worldview. Most however accept them, advocating “non-reductive physicalism” according to which mental properties supervene on physical processes. Even if one allow mental properties to supervene on physical processes, the problem of mental causation remains. If mental properties are irreducible to and therefore distinct from physical properties, as the non-reductive physicalists claim, they cannot exert causal powers if one accepts the causal closure of the physical domain – which one must, if one is a “serious physicalist” according to physicalist philosopher of mind Jaegwon Kim.   Alvin Plantinga, in his Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism, shows that if mental properties, such as the propositional content of beliefs, are causally inefficacious, then evolution has not been selecting cognitive faculties that are reliable, in the sense of being conducive to true beliefs. If the content of our beliefs does not affect our behavior, the content of our belief is irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint, and so the content-producing part of our cognitive faculties are irrelevant from an evolutionary standpoint. The “reliability” – truth-conduciveness – of our cognitive faculties can therefore not be explained by evolution, and therefore not located within the physicalist worldview. The only way in which the reliability of our cognitive faculties can be located is if propositional content is relevant for behavior.   If we however eliminate or deny the reliability of our cognitive faculties, then we have abandoned any chance of making a rational case for our position, as that would presuppose the reliability that we are denying. But if propositional content is causally efficacious, then that either – if we are non-reductive physicalists and mental properties are taken to be irreducible to physical properties – implies that the causal closure of the physical domain is false or - if we are reductive physicalists and not eliminativists regarding mental properties - it shows that matter qua matter can govern itself by rational argumentation, in which we have a pan-/localpsychistic view of matter. Either way, we have essentially abandoned physicalism in the process of locating the reliability of our cognitive faculties within a physicalist worldview. We have also affirmed the theological anthropology of Christianity, in so far as the capacity for knowledge and rational action is concerned. Keywords: Philosophy of mind, mental causation, reductionism, physicalism, the evolutionary argument against naturalism, the myth of nonreductive materialism, Alvin Plantinga, Jaegwon Kim

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