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What are the consequences of Neopragmatism on truth in ethics? In the development of pragmatism, from its beginnings in Charles Sanders Peirce to one of its current incarnations in the philosophy of Richard Rorty, "truth" has received a variety of treatments. I will argue that one of the main consequences ofNeopragmatism is that our anchor is gone; there is no foundational truth in ethics. Once foundational truth is eliminated from our ethical considerations, one is left to wonder what, exactly, is left of ethics? Various critiques of traditional theories of ethics are presented, specifically against the notion of an absolute moral criterion for judgment. Yet, in the end, one must to continue to wonder, what is ethics?

The provocation for this dissertation is a brief contention: aging is not synonymous with disease. This contention is a corrective reaction to the pervasive sensibility that aging is a disease, and which therefore casts the character of time’s passing as a process of destruction. The upshot of this corrosive sensibility is that we are not aging well. Guided both by the belief that we can reconstruct the meaning of time’s passing and an ameliorative sensibility to heal human suffering, the dissertation offers an alternative, more fruitful understanding of aging in which the character of time changes from a process of destruction into one of creative individual genesis. This is how we should experience time as time passes. Living in this way is an achievement: It is the activity of ferreting out the best possible ways in which to live so that life is deep and robust with concatenated meaning. This philosophical diagnosis of aging is situated within two philosophical traditions—first, existentialism and, second and primarily, the pragmatism of classical American philosophers. The deceptively simple insights from existentialism at work in the dissertation are this: that we are ontologically free to choose our own persons and that our freedom resides in the ever-present possible. The next philosophical move that is made is the pragmatic turn: that, with a sense that there is always something better, we attend to how it is that we press into our possibilities by listening to and heeding experience so that we adapt and grow as individuals.

Thesis--Université de Paris. / On cover: Bibliographie méthodique du pragmatisme américain, anglais et italien. Paris, Alcan, 1923. The work does include bibliographical references for Italien philosophers.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1925. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 247-253).

I offer an interpretive reconstruction of John Dewey’s naturalistic metaphysics. I explore the function and interrelation of a number of terms that are central to Dewey’s metaphysics, including “nature,” “continuity,” “generic traits of existence,” the “qualitative,” “experience,” and “emergence.” In place of a strictly “pluralistic” idea of nature, I suggest that a Deweyan model provides the basis for understanding nature as a continuous whole. The generic traits of existence are the most general ontological features of nature; they are operative in all that exists, but manifest in unique ways within every particular existence. Because all things share these traits, they can be understood as the ground for naturalistic continuity, for how all existences are capable of interacting within a common world. Generic traits are best understood as the underlying patterns or rhythms of nature, patterns that are “tensional” or oppositional. I propose that “tension” is at the heart of any productive process. Through characterizing generic traits in this way, I link them to an emergent theory of generation. Thus, the generic traits of existence are the common grounds for particular existences, relations among existences, and the generation of new existences and relations. Experience is a broad term, but Dewey provides the basis for differentiating among types of experience in accordance with their functionalities, as well as their contextual “size” or “scope.” We can discuss Deweyan experience as an integrated series of emergent contexts or fields that include what he terms, in order of diminishing size, culture, mind, subconscious, consciousness, and cognitive thought. This emergent scheme shows why culture is a directive field of experience, and that cognitive or reflective thought is only a small portion of our experiential process. Through reflecting upon the nature of various experiential contexts, through treating these contexts as our empirical data, we can engage in what Dewey terms “metaphysical inquiry.” If knowledge itself is understood within a broader experiential context, the ways in which knowledge integrates into experience, the “forms” of our meanings, can tell us a great deal about basic features of existence.

This dissertation is centered on problems within the history and philosophy of biology. The project identifies the philosophical roots of the current ecological movement and shows how a version of philosophical naturalism might be put to use within contemporary ethical issues in biology, and aid in the development of research programs. The approach is historically informed, but has application for current dilemmas. The traditions from which I primarily draw include classical American philosophy, particularly C.S. Peirce and John Dewey, as well as thinkers associated with the German Naturphilosophie movement, such as Goethe and Schopenhauer. There are deep, but often overlooked, resonances between these seemingly disparate traditions and contemporary biology that are located in the conflict between the developing organism and the ever-fluctuating environment. The dissertation makes the case for a shared description of nature among these traditions and proposes applications to burgeoning contemporary ecological interpretations of issues such as hybridization and epigenetics.

Thesis--Université de Paris. / On cover: Bibliographie méthodique du pragmatisme américain, anglais et italien. Paris, Alcan, 1923. The work does include bibliographical references for Italien philosophers.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Duquesne University, 2005. / Title from document title page. Abstract included in electronic submission form. Includes bibliographical references (p. 433-456) and index.

This thesis has as its main aim to present Peirce's project as an organic system that is able to provide a reasonable account of our complex experience of freedom. For this reason, in the first chapter I will maintain that there are three conditions of possibility for human freedom that can be established according to an attentive reading of Aristotle's works, namely, the contingency of the world, the existence of a being who can take advantage of the world's contingency, and the capacity of a person to decide his or her own idea of Happiness or final good in a human community. These conditions can be tracked, consolidated, and improved through Peirce's philosophy. It can be tracked, first of all, in their common perspective regarding the world's element of contingency and openness to growth. Second, both philosophers think that human beings have the power to decide and actively participate in the world through experience and habit. Finally, both grant an important role to community in their philosophies in order to give sense to persons' actions. After establishing this background, I will focus primarily on the detailed presentation of the first condition of possibility for freedom, that is, in Peirce's idea of God as a metaphysical condition for freedom. In the second chapter, I will explore the historical development of Peirce's cosmology, in order to show that Peirce's idea of God is not the product of a stubborn religious prejudice but a genuine achievement of his philosophy that harmonizes with his general project of an evolutionary philosophy open to critique and working hand in hand with science. Finally, in the third chapter, I will try to clarify further Peirce's idea of God in dealing with some misconceptions generated by standard religious notions of God and by the philosophical conception of the Absolute. Thus, I hope to present Peirce's idea of God as a middle ground between these two approaches. I will argue that, on the one hand, he wanted to propose an idea of God that is open to scientific critique, as is the conception of the philosophical Absolute. On the other hand, he defended an idea of God that has bearing upon our conduct of life and, therefore, is sentimental and approachable as is the idea of God proposed at least by Christian religion. As a result, Peirce's God works as a condition of possibility for freedom insofar as he is the living idea of a developmental telos open to growth. That is, Peirce provided an idea of a cosmos that shares with us the general features of being reasonable and free.