This study argues that the American Relief Administration (ARA) operationally and culturally was defined by the character and experiences of First World War American military veterans. The historiography of the American Relief Administration in the last half-century has painted the ARA as a purely civilian organization greatly detached from the military sphere. By examining the military veterans of the ARA scholars can more accurately assess the image of the ARA, including what motivated their personnel and determined their relief mission conduct. Additionally, this study will properly explain how the ARA as an organization mutually benefited and suffered from its connection to the U.S. military throughout its European missions, in particular, the 1921 Russian famine relief expedition.

Reinhold Niebuhr remains at the center of a national conversation about America's role in the world, and commentators with divergent political and religious positions look to his 1952 work, The Irony of American History, in support of their views. In this study, Scott R. Erwin argues that an appreciation of Niebuhr's theological vision is necessary for understanding the full measure of Irony and his perspective on life more broadly. Such a study is important because many individuals reading Irony today fail to acknowledge the central role that his Christian beliefs played in his writings. Niebuhr described his theological vision as being 'in the battle and above it,' and, it was this perspective that led Niebuhr, in Irony, to assert that America must both take 'morally hazardous action' in combating the aggression of the Soviet Union and engage in critical self-evaluation to prevent the country from assuming the most odious traits of its Cold War foe. Niebuhr developed his theological vision over the course of the 1930s and 1940s through engagement with Christian doctrine, as most readily seen in his academic works such as The Nature and Destiny of Man, and engagement with current events, as seen in his many journalistic writings during this period. By focusing primarily on Niebuhr's writings between 1931 and 1951, Erwin traces the development of his Christian interpretation of human nature and history, establishes how it informed his theological vision, and reveals how that theological vision underlay his writings on current affairs.

Quelle est l’influence du protestantisme évangélique américain, acteur non étatique -Et transnational en pleine expansion- sur la politique étrangère américaine? La constitution des protestants évangéliques en force de pression politique, à l’initiative de certains pasteurs évangéliques, remonte au début des années 70, peu après le passage du Civil Rights Act. Les protestants évangéliques traditionnellement acquis à la cause démocrate, ont alors choisi d’accorder leurs voix au camp républicain. Si R Reagan, proche des néo-Conservateurs, leur a entre-Ouvert les portes de la Maison Blanche, George W. Bush sera le président qui gouvernera en tenant compte de considérations morales et religieuses chères aux protestants évangéliques. Le vote évangélique est ainsi très disputé lors des échéances électorales. En quelques décennies, les protestants évangéliques ont acquis une place de choix dans la politique américaine nouant des alliances fructueuses avec les néo- conservateurs ainsi qu’avec le lobby pro-Israélien, tous les deux à la manœuvre en ce qui concerne la définition des politiques. Au niveau international, les protestants évangéliques ainsi que leurs alliés néo-Conservateurs défendent d’une même voix Israël. Si les néo-Conservateurs et le lobby pro-Israélien définissent une politique commune, les protestants évangéliques mobilisent leur électorat. L’alliance est ainsi très efficace ce dont atteste entre autres l’adoption de la loi International Religious Freedom Act ( Irfa). / How influent is the evangelical protestantism over american foreign policy? Evangelicals have established a lobby, in behalf of some well known evangelical pastors, not long after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act at the beginning of the seventies. Evangelicals traditionally more supportive of the democrats, chose therefore to give their votes to the republican party. Ronald Reagan, in close partnership with the neoconservatives, opened a space to the evangelicals while G.W. Bush while ruling the country, took into account their moral and religious considerations. Evangelical vote is a real issue for both parties in an election time. In the last decades, evangelicals have acquired an influent position in American politics along with their close allies, the neo-Conservatives and the Israël lobby, both of them defining a shared policy. On an international level, evangelicals along with neo-Conservatives are harsh defenders of Israel. Their partnership proved to be efficient, particularly concerning the enactment of the law International Religious Freedom Act ( Irfa) concerning religious freedom worldwide.

The post-Cold War era saw the extraordinary expansion of UN activity in the maintenance of global peace and security. Such a rapid expansion led to organizational over-stretch and failure and many in the international community began searching for ways to improve UN peacekeeping by reducing deployment time. In the mid-1990s, the Dutch, Canadian and Danish governments released proposals for a UN rapid reaction capability. Unfortunately, of the three proposals only the Danish proposed Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was implemented. The lack of movement toward UN rapid reaction is due to a number of factors, namely the loss of post-Cold War idealism, a disconnection with the political reality of the time and cost concerns. More fundamentally, rapid reaction posed a threat to state primacy. / October 2006

Ethnic interest groups have historically played a role in the making of American foreign policy but their influence has increased especially following the end of the Cold War. This influence has important repercussions on American foreign policy towards the home countries of the powerful ethnic groups and the regions that these countries are located in. Within this context, this thesis examines the sources or the reasons of the influence of ethnic interest groups on American foreign policy, which has also affected Turkish-American relations significantly. It first focuses on the structural factors that make ethnic influence possible such as the characteristics of the American political system and the important role that Congress plays in the formulation of foreign policy. It then discusses the organizational factors such as organizational strength and using of successful persuasion and dissuasion methods that make it possible to influence American foreign policy. It ends with a normative discussion on the desirability of ethnic influence on American foreign policy.

Following the end of the Cold War and the political fall-out from the Tiananmen incident, the US and China ended the last century and began the new one with three well publicised fall outs: the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis, the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the Spy Plane Incident in 2001. In each of these incidents the two states immediately resorted to confrontation and animosity before shifting towards a peaceful resolution. How did these transformations become possible? How did this relationship plunge towards confrontation over three apparent accidents? What factors were shaping these events and the main actor's behaviour? This thesis provides an alternative framework for analysing these interactions; one that takes into account dynamics other than those emphasised in neo-utilitarian approaches to IR. Emphasising social dynamics, I ask a series of ‘how possible' questions so as to lend insight into the processes of change that have taken place. I examine each case in detail and develop an argument that focuses upon investigating how the situations arose, how meaning was constructed and renegotiated, how identities were produced, and how emotional dynamics were drawn upon. Chapter One introduces the puzzles that this thesis will be addressing before setting out the conceptual focus of the research. Chapter Two provides a theoretical discussion relating to the current literature surrounding US-Chinese relations, before setting out the theoretical assumptions and methodological tools that I employ. Chapters Three, Four and Five represent the empirical ‘heart' of the thesis, with each providing detailed analysis of the interaction in question. To finish, Chapter Six highlights the themes that have emerged over the course of the empirical investigations, before concluding with a discussion relating to the contribution to the literature and possible avenues of future research.

The United States emerged from the Second World War determined to play a leading role in the maintenance of international order. Increasing levels of tension between the United States and the forces of communism after 1945, however, slowly forced a redefinition of what might be more distinctly termed America's "global" responsibilities, such that by 1961 John F. Kennedy declared that the United States would "pay any price. . .in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." An identifiable Cold War consensus took shape based on the assumption that it was America's responsibility to lead, protect, and defend, the "free-world." Since America was effectively waging a battle to ensure the successful spread of its own values, the Cold War consensus also served to severely limit debate—dissent essentially implied disloyalty. By the mid-1960s, however, the Cold War consensus began to crack and a debate over American foreign policy began to emerge. That debate is the focus of this dissertation, which looks at the opposition to Cold War policies which emerged in the Senate, most notably among the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee --many of whom had once played a role in developing the very foreign policies they now protested. The war in Vietnam provided the focal point for much of the dissent, but the foreign aid program also became heavily criticized, as did America's NATO policy, particularly the size of the American military presence in Europe. More important, however, Senate dissenters came to question the United States' very position as the principle defender of the free world. They did not dispute the idea that America had a significant role to play in the global arena, but they did not believe that role should consist of being the world's policeman, the self-appointed arbiter of other’s affairs, and the keeper of the status quo. Because of their views, the so-called dissenters were labelled as "neo-isolationists." They saw themselves the true "internationalists," however, believing that the Cold War had led to confusion between internationalism and indiscriminate global involvement.

The post-Cold War era saw the extraordinary expansion of UN activity in the maintenance of global peace and security. Such a rapid expansion led to organizational over-stretch and failure and many in the international community began searching for ways to improve UN peacekeeping by reducing deployment time. In the mid-1990s, the Dutch, Canadian and Danish governments released proposals for a UN rapid reaction capability. Unfortunately, of the three proposals only the Danish proposed Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was implemented. The lack of movement toward UN rapid reaction is due to a number of factors, namely the loss of post-Cold War idealism, a disconnection with the political reality of the time and cost concerns. More fundamentally, rapid reaction posed a threat to state primacy.

The United States emerged from the Second World War determined to play a leading role in the maintenance of international order. Increasing levels of tension between the United States and the forces of communism after 1945, however, slowly forced a redefinition of what might be more distinctly termed America's "global" responsibilities, such that by 1961 John F. Kennedy declared that the United States would "pay any price. . .in order to assure the survival and success of liberty." An identifiable Cold War consensus took shape based on the assumption that it was America's responsibility to lead, protect, and defend, the "free-world." Since America was effectively waging a battle to ensure the successful spread of its own values, the Cold War consensus also served to severely limit debate—dissent essentially implied disloyalty. By the mid-1960s, however, the Cold War consensus began to crack and a debate over American foreign policy began to emerge. That debate is the focus of this dissertation, which looks at the opposition to Cold War policies which emerged in the Senate, most notably among the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee --many of whom had once played a role in developing the very foreign policies they now protested. The war in Vietnam provided the focal point for much of the dissent, but the foreign aid program also became heavily criticized, as did America's NATO policy, particularly the size of the American military presence in Europe. More important, however, Senate dissenters came to question the United States' very position as the principle defender of the free world. They did not dispute the idea that America had a significant role to play in the global arena, but they did not believe that role should consist of being the world's policeman, the self-appointed arbiter of other’s affairs, and the keeper of the status quo. Because of their views, the so-called dissenters were labelled as "neo-isolationists." They saw themselves the true "internationalists," however, believing that the Cold War had led to confusion between internationalism and indiscriminate global involvement.

The post-Cold War era saw the extraordinary expansion of UN activity in the maintenance of global peace and security. Such a rapid expansion led to organizational over-stretch and failure and many in the international community began searching for ways to improve UN peacekeeping by reducing deployment time. In the mid-1990s, the Dutch, Canadian and Danish governments released proposals for a UN rapid reaction capability. Unfortunately, of the three proposals only the Danish proposed Stand-by High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was implemented. The lack of movement toward UN rapid reaction is due to a number of factors, namely the loss of post-Cold War idealism, a disconnection with the political reality of the time and cost concerns. More fundamentally, rapid reaction posed a threat to state primacy.