This thesis seeks to explicate, and develop an appropriate method for the elucidation of, the antecedents to the theology of William Blake in the writings of the seventeenth-century divine, Peter Sterry (1613-1672). While the radical religious scene of the English Revolution has long been recognised as offering important antecedents to Blake's thought, Sterry is a figure who has largely been overlooked. The exception to this is an essay, published in 1929, in which Vivian de Sola Pinto asserted the existence of 'startling affinities' between their ideas. Pinto's study was, however, limited by its failure to consider, firstly, the implications of its findings for our general understanding of the antecedents to Blake's thought in the seventeenth century and, secondly, the insight Sterry's writings may be able to offer into Blake's theological vision. These are the very questions at the heart of this dissertation. By addressing them, it seeks to shed new light on the nature of Blake's theology and its anticipations in earlier English thought. Given the lack of evidence that Blake read Sterry, and the limited effectiveness of the 'genealogical' method when it comes to Blake, it pioneers a bespoke 'analogical' method for the exploration of these issues. It proposes that Sterry is actually closer to the intellectual milieu of Commonwealth radicalism than one might expect and that his writings function effectively as a lens through which it is possible to discern how Blake consistently uses 'dualistic' language and imagery in an ethical and epistemological sense. The first finding suggests that the established view of the radical religious environment in Blake studies needs to be extended; the second challenges the widespread perception that Blake's thought is ultimately dualistic in an ontological sense, thus contributing to the elucidation of a perennial problem for Blake scholarship. Together, they underline Sterry's importance as a neglected theological precursor to the thought of William Blake.

Les personnes morales sont couramment considérées comme des « êtres juridiques » incomplets par rapport aux personnes physiques et voués au seul exercice de leur activité. Pourtant la Cour de cassation a affirmé qu'elles pouvaient bénéficier de certaines protections du droit de la consommation par la qualification de non-professionnel. Cependant, la compréhension finaliste du critère d'application de cette qualification rend cette dernière inopérante à l'égard des personnes morales. Le passage d'une conception monolithique des personnes morales à une vision éclatée, couplé à une compréhension nouvelle du critère d'application permet l'émergence d'une personne morale non-professionnelle, éclairant le droit de la consommation ainsi que les droits de la personnalité des personnes morales. Les personnes morales peuvent ainsi être considérées comme des personnes juridiques différentes des personnes physiques mais néanmoins complètes / Legal persons are commonly regarded as incomplete "legal beings" in comparison with natural persons and as dedicated only to carry on their activity. Yet the French Court of Cassation said they could be protected by the non-professional qualification in French consumer law. However, the finalist understanding of the application criterion for this qualification makes it ineffective against these persons.The transition from a monolithic conception of legal persons to an exploded view, coupled with a new understanding of the application criterion allows the emergence of a non-professional legal person, clarifying consumer law and personality rights of artificial persons. Legal persons can thus be considered as legal entities different from individuals but complete however