My goal in this dissertation is to show that Searles theory of Intentionality is worth far more than it is generally given credit for. I defend Searles theory of Intentionality by addressing the main criticisms of his theory rather than by contrasting his view with other popular accounts of Intentionality. I argue that a major benefit of Searles theory is that it provides a solution to both Putnams underdetermination problem and the particularity problem that face internalism, arguing against Dretskes claim that the problem of particularity can be solved without an appeal to Intentionality, and against Bachs claim that Searles solution to the particularity problem is ultimately unsuccessful. I also defend Searles theory of Intentionality against Jacob and van Gulick, who claim that function and consciousness should precede Intentionality in an order of explanation, and I argue that Thompson and Dretskes arguments about mistaken cases of perception are based on a misunderstanding of Searles theory. In the conclusion of my thesis I address the motivation for my defense of Searles theory of Intentionality, which is that it provides the only possible groundwork for a theory of mind that is both naturalistic and non-reductionist.

My goal in this dissertation is to show that Searles theory of Intentionality is worth far more than it is generally given credit for. I defend Searles theory of Intentionality by addressing the main criticisms of his theory rather than by contrasting his view with other popular accounts of Intentionality. I argue that a major benefit of Searles theory is that it provides a solution to both Putnams underdetermination problem and the particularity problem that face internalism, arguing against Dretskes claim that the problem of particularity can be solved without an appeal to Intentionality, and against Bachs claim that Searles solution to the particularity problem is ultimately unsuccessful. I also defend Searles theory of Intentionality against Jacob and van Gulick, who claim that function and consciousness should precede Intentionality in an order of explanation, and I argue that Thompson and Dretskes arguments about mistaken cases of perception are based on a misunderstanding of Searles theory. In the conclusion of my thesis I address the motivation for my defense of Searles theory of Intentionality, which is that it provides the only possible groundwork for a theory of mind that is both naturalistic and non-reductionist.