Thesis (J.S.D.)--University of Chicago Law School, 2003. / "June 2003." Includes bibliographical references.

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Leniency Programmes have been introduced as a complementary measure in the enforcement of competition law in detecting cartels, on the basis that hard to find evidence will be provided by undertakings coming forward to confess, in exchange for immunity or reduction in fines. The advantages of leniency are deemed to be twofold, since evidence is thereby expected to be given voluntarily, and in turn it would save up the limited resources available to enforcement authorities, by reducing lengthy investigations in search of evidence. Therefore, the widely accepted view by regulators, economists, and lawyers alike is that leniency is by far the most effective method of detecting and deterring anticompetitive activities by undertakings. An 'undertaking' covers any entity engaged in an economic activity that offers goods or services in a given market. In the UK, Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 governs prohibitions that fall within the category of cartels of which price-fixing, market or customer sharing, agreements to restrict production or supply, and bid-rigging are the most serious 'hard-core cartels'. This study evaluates the efficacy of the Leniency Programme in the enforcement of competition law applied in respect of cartel infringements based on cases decided by the UK's principal enforcement authority. Chapter I cases decided and published over a twelve-year period, since the Competition Act 1998 came into force, have been analysed in order to evaluate whether the leniency programme has been an incentive for colluders to apply for leniency. The results indicate that very few leniency applications were submitted voluntarily before an investigation was begun by the enforcement authority. Moreover, the detection rate of Chapter I cases on average has been very low over the twelve-year period, less than 2 cases per year, excluding settlements. The research also shows that contrary to the accepted view that evidence relating to cartels is difficult to find, cartels studied in this thesis have left a trail of both electronic, and other evidence that the authorities were able to seize. Further, the leniency applicants were not always reliable witnesses, and despite leniency, the enforcement authorities had to conduct lengthy investigations, negating the cost saving assertion and taking resources away from ex officio interventions by the authorities. The conclusion drawn from this study is that rather than enhancing detection and deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour by undertakings, the leniency programme overlaps, and in effect, undermines the public enforcement of competition law in the UK.

Thesis (Masters)--University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, May 2001. / Includes bibliographical references.

The work is mainly concerned with how jurisdiction is allocated in private EC competition law disputes which have connections with more than one country.  The question when the English court is entitled to refuse recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment, which misapplies or neglects EC competition law, is duly examined as well.  Much of the law which provides the framework for the resolution of such disputes is derived from international legal sources, as a consequence of which English law is very similar to or the same as the law of other countries in Europe. The thesis comprises four main parts.  The <i>first</i> part introduces the sources that are relevant for jurisdiction and judgments in relation to EC competition law claims.  The second part considers the potential jurisdiction problems in antitrust claims and specifies the bases upon which the English courts may exercise jurisdiction in private proceedings arising under EC competition law.  The thesis’ <i>third</i> part focuses on questions related to the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals in EC competition law claims and the jurisdiction of English courts in proceedings ancillary to arbitration in relation to those claims.  The <i>fourth</i> part of the work is an analysis of the issue related to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements in relation to EC competition law claims. The study shows that as a result of the decentralised enforcement of EC competition law, the private international law rules, related to jurisdiction and enforcement of foreign judgments, have a vital role to play if EC competition and law is to be enforced effectively and fulfil its economic function adequately.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [268]-273).

Thesis (doctoral)--Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität zu Frankfurt am Main.

Thesis (doctoral)--Friedrich-Alexander-Universität zu Erlangen.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Zürich.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bern.