Zugl.: Saarbrücken, Univ., Diss., 2007 / Includes bibliographical references (p. 171-175).

This thesis proposes a different approach to theorising, analysing and expounding antitrust issues. It states that at present, antitrust is addressed from top-down and narrow perspectives which in effect limit or exclude issues that could otherwise be addressed as antitrust-related especially where antitrust concepts are understood and applied from a broader perspective. The justification for seeking inclusiveness is premised on the concept of procedural justice and on the democratisation of ideas. The thesis commences from a deconstructionist standpoint in order to show the weakness of top-down accounts. It is shown that the prevailing and dominant antitrust accounts cannot lay exclusive claim to antitrust. This is proved by establishing the deconstructability of such individual theories by making due reference to the position of "the Other". The failure to give adequate countenance to the position of "the Other" means that this theories will likely fail to be inclusive. Thus, with the aim of correcting the problem of exclusion attributed to top-down accounts, the thesis identifies the need to construct a bottom-up account. As a precondition, the thesis recognises that any such bottom-up account must avoid making ex ante judgments about the suitability or otherwise of the normative contents of antitrust laws and theories. Taking this condition into account, two alternative approaches based on pure procedural justice are outlined - Habermas' Discourse Ethics and the person-centred approach. The former is shown to be incapable of practical application. This makes it imperative to thoroughly substantiate the latter. The person-centred analysis showcases the conceptual value of inclusiveness by assessing antitrust law and policy through the position of the parties involved. The conceptual value of inclusiveness is also showcased from the policy perspective through the capability approach. This account also shows the value of inclusiveness to antitrust enforcement. It however falls short in terms of adjudicatory value particularly in terms of its practical application. The practical shortfall notwithstanding, this thesis concludes by emphasising how the idea behind the person-centred approach could potentially enrich antitrust discourse and also guide policy-makers and enforcers.

This study concerns the threatened imposition of the antitrust laws on baseball and the response of the sport, both in court action and in pressures upon Congress.

This thesis aims to underline the paradox surrounding cartels in general and international cartels in particular. While they are almost unanimously recognised as the most egregious form of antitrust violations, real political willingness fails to fight efficiently against cartels. Notwithstanding, this paper shows why international cooperation is essential but still unsatisfactory in eliminating international cartels through concrete examples in domestic laws, such as the Fine Arts Auctions Case and export cartel configurations. Existing national and international instruments present advantages and disadvantages. International competition law, including international cartel issues, is still subject to virulent debates within the international community, particularly with respect to the future of a WTO Multilateral Agreement. It raises the question as to what can be suggested in order to solve aspects of these debates in a satisfactory manner and thereby contribute---modestly---to ameliorate the fight against international cartels.

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Toronto, 2004. / Adviser: Jonathan Putnam.

Written for the Institute of Air and Space Law. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2010/03/31). Includes bibliographical references.

Zugl.: Heidelberg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 261-280).

No description available.

Zhang, Chuqi. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [141-151]). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter I --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1. --- The Question --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1.1. --- Definition of Jurisdiction --- p.1 / Definition of Jurisdiction --- p.1 / Limits on Jurisdiction in International Law --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1.2. --- The Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction --- p.3 / Basis for Jurisdiction in International Law --- p.3 / Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Problem --- p.4 / Chapter 1.1.3 --- Extraterritorial Jurisdiction based on Effect Principle --- p.5 / The Alcoa Case --- p.5 / After Alcoa Case --- p.6 / Key Question of This study --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2. --- Literature Review --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2.1. --- The Perspective of Jurisdictional Doctrine in International Law --- p.8 / Sovereignty Concern --- p.8 / Concurrent Jurisdiction & Conflicting Jurisdiction --- p.9 / In the Context of Globalization --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.2. --- Evaluating Effect Principle and Its Development --- p.12 / "Development of Effect Principle´ؤ´ؤ""Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect""" --- p.12 / Restriction on Effect Principle´ؤInternational Comity --- p.14 / Restriction on Effect principle´ؤ´ؤReasonableness --- p.16 / Chapter 1.2.3. --- From the Perspective of International Competition Law --- p.18 / International Competition Law --- p.18 / Appraisal of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in International Competition Law --- p.19 / Chapter 1.3. --- Structure of the Thesis --- p.20 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- Inadequacies of the Research on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Competition Law --- p.20 / Chapter 1.3.1. --- Approach of This Study --- p.21 / Chapter 1.3.2. --- Structure of the Study --- p.21 / Chapter Chapter II. --- Theoretical Framework --- p.23 / Chapter 2.1 --- Strict Territoriality --- p.24 / Chapter 2.1.1. --- Theoretical Foundation --- p.24 / Definition of State --- p.24 / Territoriality of Sovereignty --- p.25 / Chapter 2.1.2. --- Jurisdiction Rules in Strict Territoriality Theory --- p.26 / Exclusive Territory Principle --- p.26 / National Principle´ؤthe Only Exception --- p.28 / Effect Principle in Strict Territoriality Theory --- p.29 / Chapter 2.1.3. --- Reflections on Strict Territoriality --- p.31 / Appraisal of Strict Territoriality Theory --- p.31 / Challenge of Globalization to Strict Territoriality Theory --- p.32 / The Appraisal under International Law´ؤS.S. Lotus case --- p.33 / Chapter 2.2. --- Close connection theory --- p.34 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Theoretical Foundation --- p.34 / Concept of State --- p.34 / Sovereignty and Allocation of Power --- p.35 / International Comity --- p.36 / Chapter 2.2.2. --- Jurisdictional Rules --- p.37 / Contact/connection/link --- p.37 / The Requirement of Reasonableness --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.3. --- Appraisal of Close connection theory --- p.40 / Approval for Close connection theory --- p.40 / Criticisms on Close connection theory --- p.40 / Chapter Chapter III. --- Effect Principle in Practice --- p.42 / Chapter 3.1. --- Anticompetitive Effect in Competition Law --- p.43 / Chapter 3.1.1. --- Brief Introduction of Competition Law --- p.43 / Chapter 3.1.2. --- Anticompetitive Effect --- p.46 / Anticompetitive Activities --- p.46 / Anticompetitive effect --- p.46 / Chapter 3.2. --- National Connection in Competition Law --- p.47 / Chapter 3.2.1. --- Transnational Corporation and Its Nationality --- p.48 / Nationality of Corporations --- p.48 / Transnational Actors --- p.49 / Chapter 3.2.2. --- Home State Lacks Incentives to Regulate Transnational Anticompetitive Activities --- p.52 / State's Incentive to Regulate --- p.52 / Example: Export Cartel Exemption in the United States --- p.54 / Chapter 3.3. --- Territorial Connection in Extraterritorial Cases in Competition Law --- p.56 / Chapter 3.3.1. --- Establish A Territorial Connection Through Subsidiary --- p.56 / Parent & Subsidiary --- p.56 / Dyestuff Case --- p.59 / Chapter 3.3.2. --- Implementation Principle in the European Union --- p.59 / Woodpulp case --- p.59 / Relationship between Implementation Principle & Effect principle --- p.61 / Chapter 3.4. --- Development of Effect Principle --- p.61 / Chapter 3.4.1. --- Effect on Domestic Commerce --- p.63 / Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act --- p.63 / Chapter 3.4.2. --- Effect on Export --- p.64 / Footnote 159 --- p.64 / Effect on Export --- p.65 / Chapter 3.4.3. --- "Direct, Substantial & Reasonably Foreseeable Effect" --- p.67 / "The Application of The Direct, Substantial and Reasonably Foreseeable Effect" --- p.67 / Direct Effect --- p.68 / Substantial Effect --- p.70 / Reasonably Foreseeable Effect --- p.70 / Chapter 3.5. --- Conclusion --- p.71 / Chapter Chapter IV. --- Aftermaths of Extraterritorial jurisdiction --- p.73 / Chapter 4.1 --- Inefficient Enforcement --- p.73 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Extraterritorial Enforcement Practice --- p.73 / The Grey Area --- p.75 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Conflicts caused by Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Uranium Litigation --- p.76 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Response to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Blocking Statutes --- p.77 / Discovery-blocking statutes --- p.77 / Judgment blocking statutes --- p.79 / Clawback provision --- p.79 / Chapter 4.1.4 --- Application of Blocking Statutes: Laker Airway Litigation --- p.80 / Chapter 4.2 --- Concurrent jurisdiction --- p.81 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Introduction --- p.81 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Multinational Merger Control --- p.83 / The Characteristics of Merger Control --- p.83 / Example I: Boeing case --- p.84 / Example II: GE/Honeywell Merger case --- p.85 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Problems with Concurrent Jurisdiction --- p.85 / Transaction Cost --- p.85 / Conflict and Bias --- p.87 / Chapter 4.3 --- Global welfare --- p.87 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Different Competition Laws in Different States --- p.87 / Reexamining GE/Honeywell case --- p.87 / Are differences between substantive competition laws avoidable? --- p.88 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Discrepancy between National Optimum and Global Optimum --- p.89 / Strict law wins --- p.39 / Definition of Efficiency in Economics --- p.90 / Chapter 4.4 --- Conclusion --- p.91 / Chapter Chapter V. --- Transnational Regulatory Modes --- p.93 / Chapter 5.1.1. --- Auxiliary mode based on Comity: EU-US Cooperation --- p.96 / US' Experience in Bilateral Cooperation --- p.96 / Positive Comity --- p.97 / Development of Positive Comity --- p.98 / Chapter 5.1.2. --- Auxiliary mode Based on Harmonization: Cooperation between Australia and New Zealand --- p.100 / Harmonization in Substantive Rules --- p.100 / Bilateral Jurisdiction --- p.101 / Chapter 5.1.3. --- The Role played by International Organizations --- p.102 / Characteristics of OECD --- p.102 / Promoting Convergence of Substantive Rules --- p.102 / Promoting Cooperation Between States --- p.103 / Chapter 5.1.4. --- Appraisal and Limits --- p.104 / Chapter 5.2 --- Supplementary mode --- p.105 / Chapter 5.2.1. --- Relationship between Trade Law and Competition Law --- p.106 / Compatibility --- p.106 / Differences --- p.107 / Chapter 5.2.2. --- "WTO,s role in promoting the adoption of Competition law" --- p.108 / Characteristics of Competition Rules in WTO --- p.109 / Promote the Adoption of Competition Law --- p.109 / Chapter 5.2.3. --- WTO's Role in Mitigating Distorting Effect Resulting from State Interest --- p.110 / Obliging States to Implement Competition Law in A Just Way --- p.110 / Remedy for Improper Implementation of Competition Law --- p.111 / Chapter 5.2.4. --- WTO's role in Regulating States' Behavior That May Have An Anticompetitive Effect --- p.111 / Safeguard Agreement --- p.112 / The Kodak-Fuji Film case --- p.112 / Chapter 5.3 --- Alternative mode --- p.113 / Chapter 5.3.1. --- Two Aspects of Common Market --- p.115 / The Internal Aspect of Common Market --- p.115 / The External Aspect of Common Market --- p.116 / Chapter 5.3.2. --- Harmonization in Substantive Competition Law --- p.116 / The Status of the Agreement --- p.116 / Competition law of Member States --- p.117 / Chapter 5.3.3. --- Supranational Institution --- p.117 / The Function of a Supranational Institution --- p.117 / The Jurisdiction of Supranational Institution --- p.118 / Chapter 5.3.4. --- Alternative mode at the Global Level --- p.119 / Past Efforts to Create an Alternative mode --- p.119 / Criticism on international competition law --- p.120 / Chapter Chapter VI. --- Conclusion --- p.122 / Chapter 6.1. --- Legitimacy of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Competition Law --- p.122 / Chapter 6.1.1. --- A Refined Doctrine of Jurisdiction --- p.122 / Demise of Territoriality --- p.122 / The Close Connection Theory --- p.123 / Chapter 6.1.2. --- Extraterritorial Jurisdiction on Competition Law --- p.125 / Effect as a Close Connection --- p.125 / Reasonableness of Effect Principle --- p.127 / Territoriality and Democracy Concern --- p.128 / Chapter 6.2. --- Sufficiency of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Competition Law --- p.130 / Chapter 6.2.1. --- Inadequacies of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Competition Law --- p.130 / State as a Regulator in Globalization --- p.132 / Inadequacies of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Competition Law --- p.133 / Chapter 6.2.2. --- Three Regulatory Modes in International Competition Law --- p.134 / Types of Transnational Regulatory Modes --- p.134 / Implication of the Three Modes --- p.136 / Conclusion --- p.138 / Bibliography --- p.141

This dissertation develops and empirically tests a theory of interaction between the federal appellate courts and the bureaucracy with regard to bureaucratic prosecution. Modeling the bureaucracy as a forward-looking and risk-averse institution and assuming that there is no uncertainty at the district court level, I posit that institutional uncertainty created by appellate courts' random assignment of judges and cases affects the likelihood of bureaucratic prosecution. Given that the decision from a specific panel of a circuit court can be estimated by its median judge's policy position and that the bureaucracy does not know which panel will hear the case, there exists institutional uncertainty at the appellate court level in terms of ideological differences among panels represented by their median judges. I contend that increasing ideological heterogeneity within an appellate court measured by its ideological variance among judges increases institutional uncertainty with respect to the bureaucracy's policy position, which in turn discourages bureaucratic prosecution. My examination of the Antitrust Division's prosecution record from 1950 to 1994 demonstrates that ideological variance within the federal circuit courts has a significant impact on the likelihood of prosecution by the agency. The Antitrust Division is less likely to prosecute when facing a circuit court with large ideological variance among judges. Studies of judicial decision-making and judicial control of the bureaucracy have not fully examined the implication of appellate courts' institutional practice of randomly assigning judges and cases. The development of ideological variance among circuit judges, in this project, as a measure of the institutional uncertainty created by the random assignment process suggests that the courts' unique institutional practice can now be fully incorporated into future studies of the interaction between the judiciary and the bureaucracy.