Law / LL.M.

Law / LL.M.

LL.M. / Modern competition occurs in a global market and straddles various state borders. This international dimension of competition law (antitrust law) subsequently raises concerns whether one state can apply its competition rules extraterritorially against an undertaking in another country, when the latter behaves in an anti-competitive manner that, for example, have adverse effects in the territory of the former. In the context of such extraterritorial enforcement, the concept of the Effects doctrine as created and developed in the antitrust jurisprudence of the United States plays an important role. In this dissertation the issue of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction is investigated in an attempt to suggest a suitable basis for assertion of such jurisdiction. The evolution of the Effects doctrine in the United States and its further development and qualification in American Antitrust jurisprudence is addressed as well as its interrelation with the concept of international comity. Thereafter the basis for assertion of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction by the European Community is investigated. In this regard the long favoured Single Economic Entity Theory is addressed as well as the development of a form of Effects doctrine by the European Commission which eventually culminated in acceptance of an “Effects/Implementa-tion doctrine” by the European Court of Justice in the Wood Pulp case. It should however be noted that the scope of the extraterritorial application of the competition rules of the European Community is extended by the EC Merger Control Regulation 139/2004. Thus, the jurisdictional range of the Merger Control Regulation is considered in chapter 4. It is submitted that although the Effects doctrine is competent as sole basis for exercising extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction, it has various disadvantages, inter alia that it evokes conflict between states due to differences in competition law and policy and various states interests. Consequently co-operation on a bilateral level is investigated in chapter 5 as a possible solution. Finally, the South African stance on the extraterritorial enforcement of its Competition Act 89 of 1998 is investigated in chapter 6 and certain observations and suggestions are made for future exercise of extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit, option recherche" / In the past decade, we have seen a resurgence of patent pools. These pools have emerged in our high-tech world to overcome a number of transaction costs involved in assembling patents necessary for the creation of new technologies. While patent pools can be pro-competitive; they can also present a number of anti-competitive features, such as sheltering collusion and eliminating competition between rival firms. This has been said to explain the enormous swings in the analytical approach of enforcement agencies with respect to patent pools. The introduction of the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property by American competition authorities marked an important shift in patent pool enforcement, reflecting the view that intellectual property and competition law are actually complementary, both seeking to enhance innovation as well as competition. Based on these Guidelines, enforcement agencies' identified potential problems and have offered a number of guiding principles and recommendations - in the form of Business Review Letters - to help pooling parties avoid running afoul of competition law. A review of some of these guidelines reveals that following them indiscriminately, without regard to the particular circumstances, can in fact have a negative impact on innovation and industry. Four areas where a clarification and refinement of policy are necessary are highlighted; namely, the essentiality doctrine, pool, independent licensing and grantback clauses. We maintain that guidance from the competition authorities is too rigid, and that a more carefully tailored approach is necessary to achieve an optimal outcome in both competition and innovation. / Au cours de la dernière décennie, nous observons une renaissance de l'institution des communautés de brevets (patent pools), constitués pour surmonter les coûts afférents a la réunion des brevets nécessaires pour la création des nouvelles technologies. Bien que ces communautés de brevets en général favorisent la concurrence, elles peuvent aussi avoir des effets anti-concurrentiels, entre autre, en permettant la collusion et l'élimination de la concurrence entre compagnies rivales. On a dit que ceci explique les étonnantes oscillations dans l'approche analytique qu'ont adoptée les organismes d'application à l'égard des communautés de brevets. L'introduction des Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property par les autorités de la concurrence américaines marque un point tournant dans l'analyse des communautés de brevets, reflétant le fait que les lois de la propriété intellectuelle et celles de la concurrence sont, en réalité, complémentaires en ce qu'elles tendent toutes les deux à améliorer l'innovation et la concurrence. Se basant sur ces lignes directrices, les agences ont identifié les problèmes potentieis et ont offert un certain nombre de directives et de recommandations sous forme de lettres de revue (Business Review Letters) pour aider ceux qui entendent constituer des communautés de brevets à éviter d'enfreindre la Loi. Toutefois, une révision de certaines de ces lignes directrices démontre que, suivies d'une façon inconsiderées, sans égard aux circonstances particulières, elles peuvent avoir un impact négatif sur l'innovation et l'industrie. Quatre sections ont été mises en évidence où les règles doivent être clarifiées et nuancées, à savoir la doctrine de l'essentialité, les droits d'exclusivité, les services indépendants délivrant les licences et les clauses de rétrocession. Nous soutenons que les règles adoptées par les autorités de la concurrence sont trop rigides et qu'une approche plus nuancée est nécessaire pour atteindre un résultat optimal, à la fois pour la concurrence et pour l'innovation.

In the past decade, we have seen a resurgence of patent pools. These pools have emerged in our high-tech world to overcome a number of transaction costs involved in assembling patents necessary for the creation of new technologies. While patent pools can be pro-competitive; they can also present a number of anti-competitive features, such as sheltering collusion and eliminating competition between rival firms. This has been said to explain the enormous swings in the analytical approach of enforcement agencies with respect to patent pools. The introduction of the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property by American competition authorities marked an important shift in patent pool enforcement, reflecting the view that intellectual property and competition law are actually complementary, both seeking to enhance innovation as well as competition. Based on these Guidelines, enforcement agencies' identified potential problems and have offered a number of guiding principles and recommendations - in the form of Business Review Letters - to help pooling parties avoid running afoul of competition law. A review of some of these guidelines reveals that following them indiscriminately, without regard to the particular circumstances, can in fact have a negative impact on innovation and industry. Four areas where a clarification and refinement of policy are necessary are highlighted; namely, the essentiality doctrine, pool, independent licensing and grantback clauses. We maintain that guidance from the competition authorities is too rigid, and that a more carefully tailored approach is necessary to achieve an optimal outcome in both competition and innovation. / Au cours de la dernière décennie, nous observons une renaissance de l'institution des communautés de brevets (patent pools), constitués pour surmonter les coûts afférents a la réunion des brevets nécessaires pour la création des nouvelles technologies. Bien que ces communautés de brevets en général favorisent la concurrence, elles peuvent aussi avoir des effets anti-concurrentiels, entre autre, en permettant la collusion et l'élimination de la concurrence entre compagnies rivales. On a dit que ceci explique les étonnantes oscillations dans l'approche analytique qu'ont adoptée les organismes d'application à l'égard des communautés de brevets. L'introduction des Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property par les autorités de la concurrence américaines marque un point tournant dans l'analyse des communautés de brevets, reflétant le fait que les lois de la propriété intellectuelle et celles de la concurrence sont, en réalité, complémentaires en ce qu'elles tendent toutes les deux à améliorer l'innovation et la concurrence. Se basant sur ces lignes directrices, les agences ont identifié les problèmes potentieis et ont offert un certain nombre de directives et de recommandations sous forme de lettres de revue (Business Review Letters) pour aider ceux qui entendent constituer des communautés de brevets à éviter d'enfreindre la Loi. Toutefois, une révision de certaines de ces lignes directrices démontre que, suivies d'une façon inconsiderées, sans égard aux circonstances particulières, elles peuvent avoir un impact négatif sur l'innovation et l'industrie. Quatre sections ont été mises en évidence où les règles doivent être clarifiées et nuancées, à savoir la doctrine de l'essentialité, les droits d'exclusivité, les services indépendants délivrant les licences et les clauses de rétrocession. Nous soutenons que les règles adoptées par les autorités de la concurrence sont trop rigides et qu'une approche plus nuancée est nécessaire pour atteindre un résultat optimal, à la fois pour la concurrence et pour l'innovation. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit, option recherche"

This thesis will analyze the work of Mr. Justice Tom C. Clark, in one field of law -- antitrust legislation. It is hoped to gain insight into the accomplishments and shortcomings of Mr. Justice Clark and to provide an appraisal of the Supreme Court's participation in the formulation of policy in the antitrust field.

81 Summary This thesis focuses on predatory pricing in competition law of European Union and United states of America. The main goal of the thesis is to analyze the development of predatory pricing on the both sides of Atlantic and to show where the approach to predatory pricing is similar and where was used different perspective. The thesis is divided to three chapters. First part of first chapter describes predatory pricing in general. It supplies a complete view on basic elements of predatory pricing that were and some still are used to identify them. Second part of first chapter brings overview of the most important tests of costs and basic economic terminology, that is important for price tests. Last part introduces most important schools of competition law, that had the biggest impact on forming of approaches to predatory pricing. Second chapter deals with main milestones of development of predatory pricing in the United States. It brings chronological overview of laws and decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, and analyses their importance for next judicial practice. End of this chapter summarizes development of predatory pricing in the USA on basis of foregoing findings. Third chapter similarly describes historically younger, but equally dynamic development of predatory pricing in European Union. At...

Le résumé en français n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur. / Le résumé en anglais n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur.

Thesis advisor: Utku Unver / This dissertation consists of three theoretical and empirical essays. In all essays strategic behavior is a key factor. The first essay tries to explain certain pricing behaviors in cellular communication markets using social interactions as a basis for modeling. The second essay estimates the demand in the Turkish dishwasher market. It utilizes the complaint call rate for a firm as a new explanatory variable in the estimation process. The last essay examines the effects of market share restrictions on the cost reduction efforts of firms in a market. The first essay develops a model of competition in cellular network markets. People's choices are investigated in their social environments with differing utilities for different calls, which creates the distinctive part of this article. People get higher utilities from talking to people who are closer to them in the social environment. In the constructed market, different tariff types, per unit pricing and two part tariffs are examined for the existence of non-monopoly equilibria. In the well-known papers of the literature, different prices for in-line and between-line calls are justified with different cost structures for in-line and between-line calls. This essay is different from the literature because it is able to explain price discrimination with customer necessities and without cost differences. For per unit charging, assuming each firm has different costs which are larger than zero, the smaller cost firm gets a higher share with lower prices in the equilibrium. For two part tariffs with costs higher than zero and different from each other, a two firm equilibrium is reached in which the higher cost firm charges higher prices and a lower fixed fee, whereas the lower cost firm charges lower prices and a higher fixed fee. The second chapter is the empirical essay of this dissertation. In demand estimations, unobserved characteristics like perceived quality or after-sale service quality of products have created omitted variable bias. In the essay, the complaint call rate for a product is offered as a proxy to solve the endogeneity problem that arises from unobserved heterogeneity. Using demand and supply estimations of the Turkish dishwasher market, the complaint call rate is shown to be a valid proxy to solve the problem. Use of this proxy is possible under less restrictive assumptions than the popular instrumental variable method, which is also offered for the solution of the same problem. In addition, the model constructed in the essay has strong testable implications and is demonstrated to be consistent with a stable market of a leader firm and followers. Demand and supply elasticities of dishwashers are estimated for Turkey, which can help durable goods firms to use their investment and marketing resources more efficiently in emerging countries. The third essay studies the effects of market share restrictions on research and development effects of firms in a market. Market share of firms are closely followed by regulatory authorities and restrictions are applied in many cases around the world. This essay investigates if these restrictions affect the cost reduction efforts of the firms in a market. The theoretical model constructed shows that under the no exit assumption, market share restrictions lower the level of competition and possible rewards from R&D efforts, therefore causing smaller levels of R&D efforts both for big and small firms in the market. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

This thesis presents three essays on the motives for mergers and the determinants of U.S. horizontal merger antitrust case selection. These essays contribute to the debate on whether mergers increase social welfare and on the efficiency of antitrust intervention. The first essay explores the market power motive for horizontal mergers by examining the relation between the announcement wealth effects to merging firms and their reliant corporate customers. Large sample studies generally conclude that efficiency considerations drive horizontal mergers and find little market power, which implies a non-negative wealth effect relation between these two parties along the supply chain. When I examine the endogenous stock market reactions to merger announcements with instrumentation, however, my results overturn this inference: I find that greater abnormal returns to merging firms systematically relate to lower abnormal returns to reliant customers. This wealth transfer effect exists for deals in industries with little foreign competition but not for deals in industries with intense foreign competition. These results suggest that increased market power is a key driver of horizontal mergers. In the second essay, I investigate the determinants of U.S. antitrust invention by examining horizontal merger antitrust case selection in the U.S. manufacturing sector during 1980-2009. I find no evidence supporting the consumer protection claim of the government's antitrust agencies. Instead, I find that the likelihood of antitrust intervention is negatively related to foreign import pressure. Hitting a market concentration hurdle criterion also predicts intervention. In addition, industry rivals seem able to exert pressure for antitrust intervention to avoid a competitive disadvantage. I identify two rival groups that account for the demand for antitrust regulation, local rivals and rivals producing less specialised products. The third essay examines the motives for related mergers from the perspective of product market similarity. Using Hoberg and Phillips' (2014) text-based product similarity measure, I find that when an acquirer's product is more similar to those of its rivals, a related merger results in a greater post-merger product price and lower market share for the combined firm. Moreover, for related mergers in more homogenous product markets, the stock market reactions to the merger announcement are higher for the combined firm and for product market rivals, but lower for reliant corporate customers. Overall, the evidence on both product market real performance and stock market reactions is consistent with the wealth transfer effect of related mergers, and suggests that the primary motive for firms to merge with product market competitors is to gain market power rather than to achieve efficiencies.