Cette thèse s'intéresse à l'impact des mécanismes de coordination créés autour des projets de standardisation technologique sur l'innovation. Nous nous intéressons plus particulièrement aux standards technologiques développés dans les secteurs des technologies de l'information et de la communication (3G...) et à deux types de mécanismes de coordination particuliers que sont les patents pools et les consortiums technologiques. Cette thèse est constituée de quatre articles économétriques analysant l'impact des pools et consortiums sur les incitations à innover et les stratégies d'innovation des entreprises participantes.

Patent pools are agreements between patent holders to license their rights to central entity and then to sale these licenses to third parties. In the Czech Republic there is no such cooperation between firms. In this thesis I would like to describe this phenomenon to Czech public and firms. The othel goal is to find out if this cooperation is efficient.

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit, option recherche" / In the past decade, we have seen a resurgence of patent pools. These pools have emerged in our high-tech world to overcome a number of transaction costs involved in assembling patents necessary for the creation of new technologies. While patent pools can be pro-competitive; they can also present a number of anti-competitive features, such as sheltering collusion and eliminating competition between rival firms. This has been said to explain the enormous swings in the analytical approach of enforcement agencies with respect to patent pools. The introduction of the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property by American competition authorities marked an important shift in patent pool enforcement, reflecting the view that intellectual property and competition law are actually complementary, both seeking to enhance innovation as well as competition. Based on these Guidelines, enforcement agencies' identified potential problems and have offered a number of guiding principles and recommendations - in the form of Business Review Letters - to help pooling parties avoid running afoul of competition law. A review of some of these guidelines reveals that following them indiscriminately, without regard to the particular circumstances, can in fact have a negative impact on innovation and industry. Four areas where a clarification and refinement of policy are necessary are highlighted; namely, the essentiality doctrine, pool, independent licensing and grantback clauses. We maintain that guidance from the competition authorities is too rigid, and that a more carefully tailored approach is necessary to achieve an optimal outcome in both competition and innovation. / Au cours de la dernière décennie, nous observons une renaissance de l'institution des communautés de brevets (patent pools), constitués pour surmonter les coûts afférents a la réunion des brevets nécessaires pour la création des nouvelles technologies. Bien que ces communautés de brevets en général favorisent la concurrence, elles peuvent aussi avoir des effets anti-concurrentiels, entre autre, en permettant la collusion et l'élimination de la concurrence entre compagnies rivales. On a dit que ceci explique les étonnantes oscillations dans l'approche analytique qu'ont adoptée les organismes d'application à l'égard des communautés de brevets. L'introduction des Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property par les autorités de la concurrence américaines marque un point tournant dans l'analyse des communautés de brevets, reflétant le fait que les lois de la propriété intellectuelle et celles de la concurrence sont, en réalité, complémentaires en ce qu'elles tendent toutes les deux à améliorer l'innovation et la concurrence. Se basant sur ces lignes directrices, les agences ont identifié les problèmes potentieis et ont offert un certain nombre de directives et de recommandations sous forme de lettres de revue (Business Review Letters) pour aider ceux qui entendent constituer des communautés de brevets à éviter d'enfreindre la Loi. Toutefois, une révision de certaines de ces lignes directrices démontre que, suivies d'une façon inconsiderées, sans égard aux circonstances particulières, elles peuvent avoir un impact négatif sur l'innovation et l'industrie. Quatre sections ont été mises en évidence où les règles doivent être clarifiées et nuancées, à savoir la doctrine de l'essentialité, les droits d'exclusivité, les services indépendants délivrant les licences et les clauses de rétrocession. Nous soutenons que les règles adoptées par les autorités de la concurrence sont trop rigides et qu'une approche plus nuancée est nécessaire pour atteindre un résultat optimal, à la fois pour la concurrence et pour l'innovation.

There has been little understanding of how the existence and exercise of formal intellectual property rights (IPR) such as patents influence the direction of OSS innovation. This dissertation seeks to bridge this gap in prior literature by focusing on two closely related topics. First, it investigates how OSS adoption and production are influenced by IPR enforcement exercised by proprietary incumbents. It suggests that when an IPR enforcement action is filed, user interest and developer activity will be negatively affected in two types of related OSS projects--those that display technology overlap with the litigated OSS and business projects that are specific to a focal litigated platform. The empirical analyses based on data from SourceForge.net strongly support the hypotheses. Second, it examines the impact of royalty-free patent pools contributed by OSS-friendly incumbents on OSS product entry by start-up firms. It argues that increases in the size of the OSS patent pool related to a software segment will facilitate OSS entry by start-up firms into the same segment; further, the marginal effect of the pool on OSS entry will be especially large in software segments where the cumulativeness of innovation is high or where patent ownership in a segment is concentrated. These hypotheses are empirically tested through examining the impacts of a major OSS patent pool--the Patent Commons, established by IBM and a few others in 2005--on OSS entry by 2,054 start-up firms from 1999 to 2009. The empirical results largely support these hypotheses and are robust to adding a variety of controls as well as to GMM instrumental variables estimation.

In the past decade, we have seen a resurgence of patent pools. These pools have emerged in our high-tech world to overcome a number of transaction costs involved in assembling patents necessary for the creation of new technologies. While patent pools can be pro-competitive; they can also present a number of anti-competitive features, such as sheltering collusion and eliminating competition between rival firms. This has been said to explain the enormous swings in the analytical approach of enforcement agencies with respect to patent pools. The introduction of the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property by American competition authorities marked an important shift in patent pool enforcement, reflecting the view that intellectual property and competition law are actually complementary, both seeking to enhance innovation as well as competition. Based on these Guidelines, enforcement agencies' identified potential problems and have offered a number of guiding principles and recommendations - in the form of Business Review Letters - to help pooling parties avoid running afoul of competition law. A review of some of these guidelines reveals that following them indiscriminately, without regard to the particular circumstances, can in fact have a negative impact on innovation and industry. Four areas where a clarification and refinement of policy are necessary are highlighted; namely, the essentiality doctrine, pool, independent licensing and grantback clauses. We maintain that guidance from the competition authorities is too rigid, and that a more carefully tailored approach is necessary to achieve an optimal outcome in both competition and innovation. / Au cours de la dernière décennie, nous observons une renaissance de l'institution des communautés de brevets (patent pools), constitués pour surmonter les coûts afférents a la réunion des brevets nécessaires pour la création des nouvelles technologies. Bien que ces communautés de brevets en général favorisent la concurrence, elles peuvent aussi avoir des effets anti-concurrentiels, entre autre, en permettant la collusion et l'élimination de la concurrence entre compagnies rivales. On a dit que ceci explique les étonnantes oscillations dans l'approche analytique qu'ont adoptée les organismes d'application à l'égard des communautés de brevets. L'introduction des Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property par les autorités de la concurrence américaines marque un point tournant dans l'analyse des communautés de brevets, reflétant le fait que les lois de la propriété intellectuelle et celles de la concurrence sont, en réalité, complémentaires en ce qu'elles tendent toutes les deux à améliorer l'innovation et la concurrence. Se basant sur ces lignes directrices, les agences ont identifié les problèmes potentieis et ont offert un certain nombre de directives et de recommandations sous forme de lettres de revue (Business Review Letters) pour aider ceux qui entendent constituer des communautés de brevets à éviter d'enfreindre la Loi. Toutefois, une révision de certaines de ces lignes directrices démontre que, suivies d'une façon inconsiderées, sans égard aux circonstances particulières, elles peuvent avoir un impact négatif sur l'innovation et l'industrie. Quatre sections ont été mises en évidence où les règles doivent être clarifiées et nuancées, à savoir la doctrine de l'essentialité, les droits d'exclusivité, les services indépendants délivrant les licences et les clauses de rétrocession. Nous soutenons que les règles adoptées par les autorités de la concurrence sont trop rigides et qu'une approche plus nuancée est nécessaire pour atteindre un résultat optimal, à la fois pour la concurrence et pour l'innovation. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit, option recherche"

Cette thèse étudie le rôle des brevets essentiels pour la coordination de l'innovation dans les standards des Nouvelles Technologies d'Information et de Communication (NTIC). Les firmes actives dans la standardisation ont réagi au défi de la marée de brevets essentiels en créant des mécanismes innovateurs de coordination, et notamment des consortia informels de standardisation et des pools de brevets. La thèse met en lumière le mécanisme d'appropriation original que représentent les brevets essentiels. Ce mécanisme peut cependant générer des incitations à recourir à des stratégies opportunistes. Les pools de brevets peuvent exacerber ces incitations, mais induisent également une augmentation du nombre de brevets déposés autour des standards technologiques. Les consortia informels ont un effet positif sur le nombre de brevets liés aux standards si les incitations à innover sont insuffisantes. L'effet des consortia est plus faible, voire négatif, si les incitations à innover sont excessives. Les brevets essentiels influencent le progrès technologique des standards, notamment en donnant lieu à un progrès plus continu, consistant dans de nombreuses mises à jour et évitant les remplacements de standards. / This thesis studies the role of essential patents for the coordination of innovation in ICT standards. The increasing number of essential patents around technological standards is an increasing challenge for standardizing firms. In response, these firms have developed innovative coordination mechanisms, and in particular patent pools and informal standards consortia. This thesis sheds light on the function of essential patents as a distinctive appropriation mechanism tailored to cumulative innovation. This mechanism can however induce incentives for opportunistic strategies, which can be even exacerbated by patent pools. Nevertheless, patent pools also lead to an increase in the number of patented technologies developed for technological standards. Informal consortia induce an increase in the number of standard-related patents when incentives to innovate are insufficient. When the incentives to innovate are excessive, the effect of consortia on the number of patents is weaker, or even negative. Essential patents have an incidence on the technological progress of standards. For instance, inclusion of essential patents induces a more continuous type of technological progress, consisting in many small standard updates, and avoiding discontinuous standard replacements.

Embora os direitos de Propriedade Intelectual (PI) sejam supostamente instituídos de forma a fomentar a inovação e o bem-estar em longo prazo, seu uso pode ensejar comportamentos oportunistas e abusivos como os Artigos 8.2 e 40 do TRIPS expressamente admitem. Sempre que tal tipo de comportamento afetar a concorrência em determinado mercado excluindo concorrentes, impondo barreiras à entrada, prejudicando consumidores por meio de aumento de preços ou redução da oferta o Direito de Concorrência será chamado a intervir. Considerando tais questões, o objetivo desse trabalho é identificar um quadro de trabalho brasileiro para tratar de questões envolvendo questões de Direito de Concorrência relacionadas à Propriedade Intelectual. O autor buscou delinear os conceitos de uso abusivo de direitos de Propriedade Intelectual, Dominação de Mercado por meio de uso da Propriedade Intelectual e de abuso de posição dominante, considerando o novo quadro regulatório introduzido pela Lei 12.259/2001. / While intellectual property (IP) rights are usually claimed to be designed to foster innovation and welfare in the long run, their use may give rise to opportunistic, abusive behavior - as Articles 8.2 and 40 of TRIPS openly admit. Whenever such sort of behavior affects competition in a given market - whether by dislodging competitors, imposing barriers to entry, harming costumers, raising prices or reducing output - competition law is called to intervene. Considering these issues, the purpose of this paper is to identify a Brazilian legal framework for dealing with IP related competition issues. The author sought to draw the legal concepts of abusive of IP rights, market domination and abuse of dominant position considering the new regulatory framework introduced by Law 12.259/2011.

Embora os direitos de Propriedade Intelectual (PI) sejam supostamente instituídos de forma a fomentar a inovação e o bem-estar em longo prazo, seu uso pode ensejar comportamentos oportunistas e abusivos como os Artigos 8.2 e 40 do TRIPS expressamente admitem. Sempre que tal tipo de comportamento afetar a concorrência em determinado mercado excluindo concorrentes, impondo barreiras à entrada, prejudicando consumidores por meio de aumento de preços ou redução da oferta o Direito de Concorrência será chamado a intervir. Considerando tais questões, o objetivo desse trabalho é identificar um quadro de trabalho brasileiro para tratar de questões envolvendo questões de Direito de Concorrência relacionadas à Propriedade Intelectual. O autor buscou delinear os conceitos de uso abusivo de direitos de Propriedade Intelectual, Dominação de Mercado por meio de uso da Propriedade Intelectual e de abuso de posição dominante, considerando o novo quadro regulatório introduzido pela Lei 12.259/2001. / While intellectual property (IP) rights are usually claimed to be designed to foster innovation and welfare in the long run, their use may give rise to opportunistic, abusive behavior - as Articles 8.2 and 40 of TRIPS openly admit. Whenever such sort of behavior affects competition in a given market - whether by dislodging competitors, imposing barriers to entry, harming costumers, raising prices or reducing output - competition law is called to intervene. Considering these issues, the purpose of this paper is to identify a Brazilian legal framework for dealing with IP related competition issues. The author sought to draw the legal concepts of abusive of IP rights, market domination and abuse of dominant position considering the new regulatory framework introduced by Law 12.259/2011.