The opening chapter briefly introduces the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist and the history of its appropriation into the systematic rational discourse of philosophy, as culminating in Thomas Aquinas’ account of transubstantiation with its metaphysical elaboration of the separability of accidents from their subject (a substance), so as to exist (supernaturally) without a subject. Chapter Two expounds St. Thomas’ account of the separability of accidents from their subject. It shows that Thomas presents a consistent rational articulation of his position throughout his works on the subject. Chapter Three expounds Dietrich of Freiberg’s rejection of Thomas’ view, examining in detail his treatise De accidentibus, which is expressly dedicated to demonstrating the utter impossibility of separate accidents. Especially in light of Kurt Flasch’s influential analysis of this work, which praises Dietrich for his superior level of ‘methodological consciousness,’ this chapter aims to be painstaking in its exposition and to comprehensively present Dietrich’s own views just as we find them, before taking up the task of critically assessing Dietrich’s position. Chapter Four critically analyses the competing doctrinal positions expounded in the preceding two chapters. It analyses the various elements of Dietrich’s case against Thomas and attempts to pinpoint wherein Thomas and Dietrich agree and wherein they part ways. It argues that Thomas’ arguments have a strength and consistency which Dietrich’s arguments clearly lack. Chapter Five applies the argumentative findings from Chapter Four to an assessment of the analyses found in recent philosophical literature of the dispute between Thomas and Dietrich. My analysis indicates that there are some serious and persistent deficiencies in these analyses – first, those treating Thomas’ position, and consequently those treating Dietrich’s – and offers some diagnosis of the root causes of these deficiencies. I conclude with remarks addressed to general doubts about the status of the question of the separability of accidents as an actual ‘philosophical’ question. Résumé: Le chapitre initial décrit brièvement la doctrine catholique de l’Eucharistie et l’histoire de l’appropriation de cette doctrine dans un cadre de discours systématiquement rationnel (c’est-à-dire, philosophique), terminant avec la doctrine de la transsubstantiation et l’élaboration métaphysique, tel que rendu par Thomas d’Aquin, de la séparabilité des accidents de leur sujet (une substance), c’est-à-dire, de la possibilité (surnaturelle) de l’existence des accidents sans aucun sujet. Le deuxième chapitre élabore l’explication de Thomas d’Aquin de la séparabilité des accidents de leur sujet. Est montré qu’au long de sa carrière Thomas n’a jamais basculé dans son articulation rationnelle de sa position. Au troisième chapitre est examiné le refus de la doctrine thomiste par Dietrich de Freiberg, surtout dans son traité De accidentibus, lequel se donne expressément à la démonstration de l’impossibilité absolue d’un accident séparé. En vue de l’analyse influent de Kurt Flasch, selon lequel Dietrich représente admirablement une ‘conscience de la méthode,’ ce chapitre vise à exposer soigneusement le progrès de l’argumentation du traité, tout juste comme le présente Dietrich, avant d’avancer à un analyse critique de sa position. Dans le quatrième chapitre sont soumises à l’analyse les positions rivales, celle de Thomas et celle de Dietrich. Les éléments du critique qu’apporte Dietrich contre Thomas sont examinés et l’analyse différencie les points d’accord et de désaccord entre les deux penseurs. Est démontré que l’argumentation de Thomas a une force et une consistance bien supérieure à celui de Dietrich. Dans le cinquième chapitre, sont appliquées les conclusions du quatrième chapitre à l’analyse de la littérature récente traitante de la dispute entre Thomas et Dietrich. Est montré que cette littérature comporte de graves méconnaissances de la position de Thomas, et aussi, en conséquence, de la critique de celle-ci apporté par Dietrich, et j’essaie d’élucider ce que sont les racines des inconséquences remarquées dans la littérature. Je termine en offrant quelques remarques qui s’addressent à certaines doutes générales concernant le vrai statut ‘philosophique’ de la question de la séparabilité des accidents.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / This dissertation undertakes to do two things: to defend the thesis that Hegel, via his concept of relation, solves certain inconsistencies germane to that concept present in both Aristotle and Aquinas, and to clarify, if not solve, some of the traditional problems that surround the concept of relation. It is suggested that a decision as to the nature of relation is not simply a logical decision but a metaphysical and epistemological one. The aims of chapter I are to set forth the Aristotelian doctrine of the category of relation and to consider its effects on Aristotle's logic, epistemology and ontology. It is suggested that the theory of relation Aristotle defends and the theory of relation his philosophy requires, and at points presupposes, are mutually opposed and inconsistent. [TRUNCATED]

This dissertation advances a critical appropriation of Thomas Aquinas's thought on the virtue of humility. Humility has received relatively little scholarly attention since early modernity, and the attention it has received has been largely negative, due to humility's association with religiously inspired attitudes that diminish the human drive for excellence. In recent decades a small number of philosophical and religious ethicists and political theorists have argued that humility, properly understood, is indeed a virtue. However, these accounts have not paid sufficient attention to the way various forms of oppression force a shift in thinking about what humility is and why it is of value. Feminist thought illuminates the social and psychological dynamics of oppression, but it has almost completely ignored the topic of humility. Where humility has been discussed by feminists, it has generally been dismissed as supportive of patriarchy and thus destructive of women's well-being. Humanity is in need of a new account of humility that answers to important criticisms. This dissertation offers such an account by critically appropriating Aquinas's thought on humility. It argues that humility is crucial to the realization of relational selfhood, and it definitely promotes the common good, but only if its operations are coordinated with the exercise of courage and justice.

No description available.

Thesis advisor: Dominic Doyle / I argue for a performative reading of the Summa theologiae in relation to Thomas Aquinas’s coordination of the trinitarian processions with the trinitarian image and the process of teaching and learning. Specifically, I argue that the Summa is skillfully arranged in order to initiate the student into the graced process of conceiving words about the Triune God that burst forth into love—the very processions by which we are ad imaginem Dei and become more like God. Learning to speak truly and love rightly prepares students to preach about God within their culture, just as Thomas’s own efforts to preach the trinitarian mystery indicate. My argument takes into account Thomas’s life as a Dominican preacher and teacher in thirteenth-century Europe as well as his theology of the mixed life of contemplation and action. With respect to the latter, Thomas maintained that the Dominican must draw in contemplation what he will pour out later on in preaching (contemplata aliis tradere). Thomas wrote the Summa theologiae with this pastoral orientation in mind. In light of this historical context, I argue that the Summa is a performative text and transformative encounter with sacra doctrina written to prepare Dominican students to hand on the fruits of their contemplation. This interpretation of the Summa theologiae and Thomas’s trinitarian theology enriches standard contemporary interpretations of the psychological analogy. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2017. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: Jeremy D. Wilkins / The basic question of this dissertation is, “Why a crucified God?” The history of this question is traced through strategically chosen increments in Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and Lonergan. Each contributes in some important way to the development of a tradition that focuses on the choice of divine love and wisdom to answer evil through the justice of the cross rather than by coercion. In light of these earlier transpositions and Lonergan’s own development, this dissertation examines the meaning and justice of the cross, as epitomized in Lonergan’s Law of the Cross, and re-contextualizes this law in relation to our collective responsibility in and for history. This teleological re-reading of Lonergan’s soteriology brings to the forefront that a fitting remedy to the problem of a dis-ordered love is a re-ordering and (re-)ordered love, not coercive power. According to Lonergan’s Law of the Cross, the intrinsic intelligibility of redemption is the transformation of evil into good by love. This love, caritas ordinata et ordinans, is understood by analogy with the antecedent offer of diffusive friendship and by analogy with sacramental penance. The restoration of right order through the cross is fitting because, if the laws of nature and history are not suspended, retaliation would only multiply the objective surd. The constructive part of this dissertation further specifies ontological conditions for the fittingness of the cross by bringing the lex crucis into dialogue with Lonergan’s general theory of historical process. In continuity with the emerging world order (as subject to classical, statistical, dialectical, and genetic laws), the cross manifests an orderly communication of divine friendship to sinners. Correspondingly, the justice of the cross regards, not retributive justice, but the possibility of justice among sinners. This possibility, it is argued, is inaugurated by Christ’s transformation of suffering into the means of a new finality in history, the probabilities of which are decisively shifted in the cross event and concretely realized through the emergent agape network, the higher integration of the human good of order through the whole Christ, head and members, by the power of the Holy Spirit. The justice of the cross, then, is an emergent agapic justice which proceeds from the dynamic state of being in love with God as its principle and is realized in a dialectic unification of all things in Christ, constituting the “cruciform” transformation of human (inter-)subjectivity and the recovery of human progress as ordered to the eschatologically definitive reign of God. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

No description available.

Thesis advisor: Eileen Sweeney / Motion is the central phenomenon that Aristotle's physics endeavors to explain, and the whole superstructure of his natural philosophy is bound to it. This was certainly understood by Thomas Aquinas, who produced a most careful and thorough account of the Aristotelian theory of motion. What is rarely recognized is that in so doing he developed and improved that theory in a number of respects. This dissertation is a study of the theory of physical motion in Aquinas. It has two principal results. The first regards the concept of motion itself. Aquinas accepts Aristotle's definition of motion, but gives his own explanation of it, one which employs non-Aristotelian ideas like participation, and places motion in a more general and cohesive system of relations between non-being and being. The second regards what is called natural motion, i.e., that which inanimate matter exhibits of its own accord. How Aquinas explains this has rarely been understood and has frequently been misunderstood. I provide a thorough, systematic treatment that sets forth the principles underlying Aquinas's theory of natural motion, explains in what sense such motion is said to be caused, and notes – what commentators are prone to overlook – the critical role played by analogy as an aid to grasp the causality of natural motion. Chapter 1 briefly introduces Aquinas as a medieval "physicist", i.e., natural philosopher, specifies the scope of the dissertation, and lays out the path to be followed in the succeeding chapters. Chapter 2 summarizes what Aristotle says about motion in his Physics. His definition of motion is presented, and the terms in which it is given are analyzed. As the definition is famously perplexing, and its meaning a matter of debate, the opinions of a number of modern commentators are reviewed. After having explained the primacy that Aristotle assigns to locomotion and the connection he establishes between motion and time, the chapter concludes with a section on the causes of motion. This covers Aristotle's arguments for the eternity of motion, his denial of pure self-motion, introduces his views on animal, natural, and violent motion, and concludes with the first mover and first motion reached at the end of the Physics. Chapter 3 is a short introduction to the tradition of Aristotelian commentary. It contains brief reviews of some of what Simplicius, John Philoponus, Averroes, and Avicenna say about the Aristotelian theory of motion, with especial attention given to those aspects of it with which they disagree or which they find troublesome. The next three chapters are devoted to Aquinas. Chapter 4 covers how Aquinas interprets Aristotle's definition of motion and how he integrates it into his own metaphysics. The chapter begins with two preparatory notes. First, it introduces Aquinas as a commentator, and stresses the importance of having the context of the commentary tradition in mind when reading Aquinas, because he belongs to it and approached Aristotle in much the same way as earlier commentators. This has the consequence that his own developments are somewhat concealed, since what he says in his commentary on the Physics is presented as straightforward exposition, without any suggestion of originality. Second, modern readers are cautioned not to import modern senses of "motion" unwittingly into Aquinas, as this leads to confusion. The point is made that his Latin usage is regular and well-defined. After this, Aquinas's interpretation of the definition of motion is presented and what he means by calling it "imperfect act" is explained. This involves a sophisticated theory of the order of act to act, and incorporates the Neoplatonic language of participation and perfection. The next section of the chapter presents some of the analyses that Aquinas makes of motion, including its mental character and categorization. It is noteworthy, yet in fact quite unnoticed, that Aquinas provides a subtle and inventive solution to a modern debate over the proper interpretation of the definition of motion (the so-called "process" vs. "non-process" debate) which reconciles the two sides. Finally, I present a visual analogy as an aid for grasping how motion fits into a larger Thomistic metaphysical scheme concerning the relationship between non-being and being. Chapter 5 treats Aquinas's account of natural motion. It begins by noting some of the problems involved with Aristotle's explanation of natural motion, including, critically, that of the cause of such motion. It then highlights the work of James Weisheipl, who rejected a motor coniunctus interpretation of natural motion and offered in its stead his own, one which has since become well-known. But a careful examination of what Aquinas says shows that Weisheipl's interpretation of him is incorrect, and must also be rejected. The chapter then lays out (1) the principles of motion and their schematic organization; (2) Aquinas's theory of efficient causality and how we are to understand his denial of the possibility of action at a distance; (3) his use of analogies to indicate how we are to understand the efficient cause of natural motion; and then finally (4) shows, first, how the multiplicity and variation of the analogies lead commentators to misread Aquinas, and, then, how they illuminate other aspects of his theory of motion. Chapter 6 treats, in turn, the much debated principle that "everything that is moved is moved by another", and then the arguments that Aquinas gives for the existence of an unmoved mover, which he takes to be God. With regard to the first, it is pointed out that the theory of inertia is not nearly so fatal to the principle as many historians of science assume. Indeed, understood in light of what was said about Aquinas's understanding of the efficient causality involved in natural motion in the preceding chapter, it is compatible with inertia. However, a review of the three arguments Aquinas takes from Aristotle purporting to prove the principle are all found to be subject to serious objections. Greatest attention is given to the argument drawn from the claim that a thing cannot simultaneously be in act and in potency in the same respect. With regard to the second, it is shown that what Aquinas has to say about the unmoved mover is perplexed and inconsistent. Aquinas accepts two series of arguments from Aristotle, one from the Physics that concludes to a first moving cause, another from the Metaphysics that concludes to a final cause. From the former, Aquinas constructs his own argument from motion, most famously presented as the prima via, but at times he attempts to combine the two Aristotelian series. It is shown that these attempts at harmonization involve Aquinas in inconsistencies. What the prima via revision concludes to is also discussed. An important observation is that the prima via is manifestly intended by Aquinas to be an argument from physical motion. Yet numerous commentators, perceiving its weakness, attempt to recast it in a non-physical form, such that "motion" no longer signifies what Aquinas intends. The chapter ends with some cautious remarks on the state of these highly controversial topics. Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation, first, with a brief recapitulation of some of its major points, and then with some speculation as to what use its results may have for future scholarship. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Stephen J. Pope / Thesis advisor: Dominic Doyle / Thesis (STL) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. School of Theology and Ministry. / Discipline: Sacred Theology.

In recent decades, a number of philosophers have sought to explain the nature of human action using Aristotle’s theory of material constitution. According to these neo-Aristotelian accounts, material objects serve as the paradigm cases for analysing the concept of action. As composites of matter and form, material objects—and, in particular, biological organisms—possess a kind of constitutive unity: they are “hylomorphic wholes”. The same kind of unity purportedly exists with regard to actions, which are constituted likewise. My task in this paper will be to give a precise articulation of this thesis and what it entails. If the neo-Aristotelian claim is right, then material objects really do serve as the paradigm cases for understanding the constitution of action. In Chapter III, I will simply presume the truth of this general claim, in order to focus my attention on the relative merits and weaknesses of specific arguments given in support of it. Before considering these arguments, however, we will need to first clarify Aristotle’s thesis concerning material objects. This will be my aim in Chapter II. In general, I will accept the conventional Aristotelian position that a material thing, qua concrete substance, is constituted by substantial form in matter, a unified whole. I will presume as correct the Thomistic conception of such composites, which employs the distinction between act and potency: matter is pure potentiality for the reception of form, and form is “a determinate actualisation of this potentiality”. / text