O objetivo deste trabalho foi compreender, do ponto de vista da política internacional, os fatores que viabilizaram a fundação de Israel no território da Palestina, provocando um dos mais prolongados e dramáticos conflitos da história contemporânea. A criação de Israel, decidida na ONU, em 1947, violou os direitos fundamentais do povo árabe palestino (70% do total da população nesse ano), garantidos pela Carta das Nações Unidas e pelo Pacto da Sociedade das Nações, ambos fontes do Direito Internacional, e violou o título jurídico adquirido pelos árabes através do acordo firmado com os países da Entente, durante a Primeira Guerra Mundial, que garantia a independência da Palestina, causando revolta generalizada no mundo árabe, já profundamente ressentido do imperialismo ocidental na região. Considerando a conjuntura internacional desse período, delineada pela Guerra Fria, e considerando que os principais atores do sistema internacional tinham consciência de que tal decisão causaria a hostilidade dos países árabes, acarretando altíssimos custos militares, políticos e econômicos, uma vez que a Liga Árabe declarou não reconhecer uma decisão que considerava ilegal, tivemos interesse em conhecer quais foram as expectativas de ganhos que levaram os EUA, a ex-URSS e outros países a assumirem os riscos e os custos dessa decisão. Várias conclusões foram obtidas. Os EUA não tinham nenhuma expectativa de ganho com o apoio à criação de Israel, pelo contrário, esse evento acarretou pesados custos à nação norte-americana, advertidos permanentemente pelos Secretários de Estado e Defesa. A decisão pró-Israel foi uma iniciativa do Presidente Truman para defender seu interesse pessoal nas eleições seguintes, quando pretendia contar com o apoio da comunidade judaica de seu país. A posição de Truman garantiu a forte pressão dos EUA, na forma de chantagem e suborno, sobre vários países que sustentavam posições contrárias, na votação da partilha, na ONU. Quanto à decisão soviética, não há uma compreensão conclusiva. Stalin, durante muitos anos, um antagonista intransigente ao projeto sionista, surpreendeu a todos apoiando de última hora a criação de Israel, na votação na ONU. Grande parte dos estudiosos considera que o objetivo soviético era simplesmente prejudicar a Grã Bretanha. Aparentemente, nessa mudança de posição momentânea, houve um equívoco nos cálculos políticos, percebido pouco tempo depois, levando esse país a reconsiderar novamente sua posição em favor dos árabes. Grande parte dos países de ambos os blocos assumiram simplesmente o alinhamento automático às decisãos das duas superpotências. Por último, cabe destacar que o interesse do Brasil era permanecer alinhado com os EUA e, nesse sentido, Oswaldo Aranha, como Presidente da Assembléia Geral, prestou um serviço fundamental. No dia da votação, devido à avaliação de que a proposta pró-Israel seria derrotada, Oswaldo Aranha decidiu encerrar mais cedo os trabalhos, adiando a votação, dando, assim, aos sionistas o tempo que necessitavam para “convencer" os países contrários, a fim de mudar seu voto. / The aim of this research was understand, through the aproach of international policy, the factors that make possible to establish Israel in Palestine, event that caused one of the most extended and dramatic conflicts of contemporary history. The creation of Israel, decided at UN in 1947, violated the fundamental rights of the Palestinian Arab people (70% of the whole population in that year), rights that were assured by the UN Charter and by the Pact of the League of Nations, both sources of international law, and violated the juridical title acquired by Arab people through the agreement signed with the countries of the Entente, during the First World War, that guaranteed the independence of Palestine, provoking uprising in the whole Arab world, already deeply resentful of Western imperialism in the region. We had the interest to know what was the expectation of profits that led USA, former USSR and other countries to assume the risks and costs of this decision, taking into account the international scenery of the Cold War in 1947 and that the main actors of international system was aware that such decision would cause the hostility of Arab countries bringing high military, plitical and economic costs, since that Arab League declared not recognize that illegal decision. The conclusion was that USA didn’t have any expectation of gains supporting the creation of Israel, on the contrary, this event caused heavy costs to American nation. The decision of support Israel was a initiative of President Truman to defend his personal interest in the following election, opposing the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, because he wanted guarantee the vote of American Jews. The decision of Truman assured the strong prssure of United States by extortion and bribery over many countries to make them to vote on behalf of the creation of Israel. We didn’t find a conclusive understanding about the Soviet decision. Stalin, that was for many years an intransigent antagonist to the Zionist project, surprised everybody supporting the creation of Israel at UN. Mostly of scholars consider that the Soviet intent was just to damage Britain. There seemingly was a mistake in the Soviet political calculation, perceived later, leading this country to change its position. Many countries of both blocs only asumed an automatic alignment with the decisions of the two superpowers. Finally, it’s important to point out that Brazilian interest was to remain aligned with the USA and, in this sense, Oswaldo Aranha, the President of General Assembly, was very useful. In the day of partition voting, due to appraisal that the pro-Israel proposal would be defeated, Oswaldo Aranha simply decided finish earlier the session, postponing the voting, in order to give time to Zionists make pressure and suborn over the opponent countries, to change their votes.

L’effondrement et le démantèlement de l’Empire ottoman à la suite de la Première Guerre mondiale ont conduit les Grandes puissances européennes à opérer un partage territorial du Proche-Orient, légitimé par le système des mandats de la Société des Nations (SDN). Sans précédent, cette administration internationale marqua le point de départ de l’internationalisation de la question de la Palestine, dont le droit international allait servir de socle à une nouvelle forme de colonialisme. Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l’Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) continua l’action entreprise par la SDN en s’occupant également de cette question sur la demande des Britanniques. En novembre 1947, l’ONU décida du partage de la Palestine en deux Etats pour résoudre les conflits entre sionistes et nationalistes arabes. Si ce partage fut accepté par les sionistes, il fut rejeté par les Etats arabes voisins et de nombreux Arabes palestiniens. Les affrontements opposant nationalistes arabes et sionistes de Palestine laissèrent place au conflit israélo-arabe après la proclamation d’Indépendance de l’Etat d’Israël en mai 1948. Au commencement de la guerre froide, les Etats-Unis et l’URSS prirent conscience de l’intérêt géostratégique de cette région, progressivement désinvestie par la France et la Grande-Bretagne. Dans cette étude, nous verrons comment la scène interétatique et la communauté internationale, successivement composée de la SDN puis de l’ONU, ont en partie scellé le sort du Proche et Moyen-Orient. Nous consacrerons également une analyse au rôle joué par les idéologies nationalistes arabes et sionistes, qui tiennent une place centrale au sein de ce conflit. / The collapse and dismantling of the Ottoman Empire following World War I, led the great European powers to engage in a territorial division of the Middle East, legitimized by the mandates system of the League of Nations. Without any precedents, that international administration marked the beginning of the internationalization of Palestine’s thorny issue. The international law would serve as the pillar for a new form of colonialism. The day after World War II, the United Nations continued the action taken by the League of Nations, as well as for the demand of the British. In November 1947, the UN decided to divide Palestine into two States. If the Zionists had accepted that split, their neighbors, Arab States and Palestinian Arabs, would have rejected it. The clashes opposing the Arab Nationalists and the Palestine Zionists gave space to the Arab-Israeli conflict after the independence of Israel, on May 14, 1948. At the beginning of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union became aware of the geo-strategic interest in this region, gradually divested by France and Great Britain. In this study, we will see how the interstate scene and the international community, successively composed by the League of Nations and the United Nations, have partially sealed the fate of the Near and the Middle East. We will also devote a preliminary analysis related to the role played by the Arabs and Zionists nationalist ideologies, which are central in this conflict.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 274-290). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 274-290). Also available on the Internet.

This research questions whether Israel and Palestine should be divided into two states. Viewed through the International Relations (IR) theories of Realism and Liberalism, the ‘Two-State’ solution is the orthodox policy for Israel and Palestine. But Israelis and Palestinians are interspersed and share many of the same resources making it difficult to create two states. So, this research critiques the aforementioned IR theories which underpin the ‘Two-State’ solution. The conclusion reached is that there ought to be new thinking on how to resolve the Israel-Palestine issue.

No description available.

The thesis "Framing of the conflict in the Middle East in Czech Daily Newspapers" explores how Czech print media report on the conflict in the Middle East through the analysis of Mladá fronta Dnes and Právo news coverage of the Second Lebanon War (2006) and the Gaza war (2008- 2009). The theoretical part of the thesis deals with the role of the media in times of war and focuses mainly on the popular even though somewhat fragmented concept of media framing, which became the basis for the analysis of the above mentioned newspapers. The research draws on the extensive literature on media framing as well as foreign research on framing of the Arab- Israeli conflict, combining quantitative and qualitative analytical tools. The aim of the quantitative part of the analysis was to obtain hitherto missing data about the framing of the conflict in the Middle East by Czech media that could be compared to similar data that are already available for foreign media. Quantitative analysis also focused on news sources and topics used while referring about the Middle East conflict. The purpose of the qualitative analysis was to gain a deeper insight into the problem and generate a list of specific frames used to interpret the conflict in the Middle East by Czech print media.

Ce mémoire s’intéresse aux conditions qui ont mené à la guerre de six jours de 1967 au Moyen-Orient. Tout particulièrement, mon mémoire investiguera les dynamiques domestiques qui influent sur la prise de décision politique. L’hypothèse principale suppose que le mode de gestion de la société, choisi par le gouvernement au pouvoir, influe et contraint les options de politique étrangère disponibles à celui-ci. . Un régime peut recourir à deux modes de gestion de la société : l’exclusion et l’inclusion, à plusieurs degrés. En fonction du mode de gestion choisi, le gouvernement aura besoin de plus ou moins de ressources pour le mettre en place et pour le préserver. La quantité et la nature des ressources utilisées au niveau domestique contraindront les options de politique étrangère disponibles au régime Les guerres du Moyen-Orient, et la politique étrangère des pays de la région sont souvent interprétées selon des principes réalistes : la recherche du pouvoir et de sécurité guide la politique étrangère. Ce mémoire cherche à souligner l’importance de dynamiques domestiques sur le processus de prise de décision politique, mais également l’influence qu’a le conflit israélo-arabe sur la structure, le fonctionnement et la société des pays concernés. / This thesis looks at the conditions that led to the outbreak of the 1967 Six Day War in the Middle East. Specifically, my thesis investigates the domestic dynamics that influence the political decision-making process. The main hypothesis suggests that the type of societal management chosen by the government in power will influence and determine the foreign policy options available. A regime may choose between two types of societal management: exclusion and inclusion, which can be applied to greater or lesser degrees. Depending on the type of societal management chosen, the government will need more or less resources to implement and maintain it. The quantity and nature of resources used domestically will determine the foreign policy options available to the regime. In the Middle East, wars and foreign policy are often interpreted according to realist principles: the quest for power and safety are said to be the main determinants of foreign policy. This thesis seeks to highlight the importance of domestic dynamics in the process of political decision-making, but also the influence of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the structure, development and society in the countries involved.

Techn. Univ., Diss.--Dresden, 2006. / Literaturverz. S. 463 - 478. CD-ROM enth. ausführliches Inhaltsverz., Anh. 1: UN-Resolutionen, Anh. 2: Dokumente zum Friedensprozess.

Despite the increasingly common situation of statelessness in the contemporary Middle East, a majority of the theoretical tools used to study nationalism are contingent upon the existence of a sovereign state. As such, they are unable to fully explain the mechanisms of national identity, political participation, and integration in non-institutional contexts, where other social identities continue to play a significant political role. In these contexts, the position of demographic minorities in society is significant, as actors with the most popular support –majorities -- tend to have the strongest impact on the shape of the political field. This thesis demonstrates what we can learn from studying the mechanisms of nationalism and political participation for one such minority group, the Palestinian Christians, particularly with regards to how national identity fails or succeeds in instilling attachment to the state and society. This is accomplished by applying the theoretical framework of social identity theory to empirical field research conducted in the West Bank in 2014, combined with an analysis of election and survey data. It is argued that the level of attachment individuals feel towards the “state” or confessional communities is dependent on the psychological or material utility gained from group membership. If individuals feel alienated from the national identity, they are more likely to identify with their confessional community. If they are alienated from both, then they are far likelier to emigrate. Additionally, I suggest that the way in which national identity is negotiated in a stateless context is important to future state building efforts, as previous attempts to integrate national minorities into the political system through, e.g., devolved parliaments and quotas, have failed to instil a universal sense of the nation.