Strawson famously classified Aristotle as a descriptive metaphysician, alongside himself, and in contrast to more revisionary philosophers like Plato. The extent to which Aristotle was merely concerned to describe our conceptual scheme has, however, been over-estimated by some. Although common-sense beliefs are among the starting-points from which Aristotle pursues his metaphysical inquiries, the conclusions of those inquiries are in fact quite radical. In chapter one, we identify three interpretative questions about Aristotle's notion of substance: (1) does Aristotle change his mind about what things are the substances between writing the Categories and the Metaphysics? (2) are matter, form and the compound of the two all substances, albeit to different extents, or are only forms substances? (3) however we resolve these questions about hylomorphism, what range of forms count as substantial, and why? In chapter two, we examine the criteria of being a substance. These provide evidence for Aristotle's changing his mind between the Categories and Metaphysics. An examination of the 'χωρıστóv' criterion also supports the view that only forms are substances: Aristotle claims that compounds are separate simpliciter, since they can exist without items in other categories, and not vice versa, but this claim cannot be supported. Only forms are separate in definition, and so, on the assumption that being separate is necessary for being a substance, only forms are substances. If we are to understand the claim that only forms are substances, we should acquire a better understanding of what is meant by 'form', and why Aristotle thinks there are such things. Chapters three to five undertake this task. Chapter three discusses Aristotle's introduction of matter and form in the Physics to account for substantial generation, and his argument in Z.17 that form is substance, since it is what makes some matter one thing. In chapter four, this unificatory role is distinguished from the role of a principle of individuation, and it is argued that only individual forms are suitable to play the latter role. In chapter five, we examine some recent attempts to blur the distinction between matter and form, by maintaining that form is essentially matter-involving. We argue that the view according to which form is defined independently of matter is preferable. In chapters six and seven, we address the third interpretative question. Chapter six argues that artefacts are not substances (and not merely substances to a lesser degree than organisms) because they are not separate, since they depend on the intentional activity of their creators or users. Chapter seven considers Aristotle's views about mixtures. These are also compounds of matter and form, but fail to be substances because, like matter, they depend on a higher form to make them one thing.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The aim of this dissertation is to show that Aristotle’s ontology cannot provide a model for mathematics. To show this, I argue that (i) mathematical objects must be seen as fictional entities in the light of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and (ii) Aristotle’s mathematical fictionalism is not compatible with his metaphysical realism. My interpretation differs from that of other fictionalists in denying this compatibility. For Aristotle, mathematical objects are “something resulting from abstraction ([Greek phrase]).” For example, geometry investigates a man not qua man, but qua solid or figure. Traditionally, Aristotle’s abstraction has been interpreted as an epistemic process by which a universal concept is obtained from particulars; I rather show his abstraction as a linguistic analysis or conceptual separation by which a certain group of properties are selected: e. g., if a science, X, studies a qua triangle, X studies the properties which belong to a in virtue of a’s being a triangle and ignores a’s other properties. Aristotle’s theory of abstraction implies a mathematical naïve realism, in that mathematical objects are properties of sensible objects. But the difficulty with this mathematical naïve realism is that, since most geometrical objects do not have physical instantiations in the sensible world, things abstracted from sensible objects cannot supply all the necessary objects of mathematics. This is the so-called “precision problem.” In order to solve this problem, Aristotle abandons his mathematical realism and claims that mathematical objects exist in sensibles not as actualities but ‘as matter ([Greek phrase]).’ This claim entails a mathematical fictionalism in metaphysical terms. Most fictionalist interpretations argue that the fictionality of mathematical objects does not harm the truth of mathematics for Aristotle, insofar as objects’ matter is abstracted from sensibles. None of these interpretations, however, is successful in reconciling Aristotle’s mathematical fictionalism with his realism. For Aristotle, sciences are concerned with ‘what is ([Greek phrase])’ and not with ‘what is not ([Greek phrase]).’ Aristotle’s concept of truth rests on a realist correspondence to ‘what is ([Greek phrase])’: “what is true is to say of what is that it is or of what is not that it is not.” Thus, insofar as mathematical objects are fictional, Aristotle’s metaphysics cannot account for the truth of mathematics. / text

The protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to a number of moral abuses committed by members of the U.S. military. Media reports have focused particular attention on the human cost incurred by these abuses, the torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib and the massacre of civilians at Haditha being but a few, tragic examples. However, the human cost of these abuses is measured not just in the lives of noncombatants, but also by the number of military suicides that are a byproduct of traumatic combat experiences and the subsequent violation of moral norms. In light of this, any society that is sincere in its concern for the moral well-being of its soldiers, and the noncombatants with whom they interact, should seek to reduce the occurrence of such abuses. In this dissertation, I argue that the development of moral character, particularly the conception of moral character that Aristotle promotes in his ethical theory, is fundamental to preventing the moral abuses that soldiers commit, both in combat and during peacetime. This project is composed of five chapters. The first chapter is devoted to describing the moral challenges that confront soldiers, particularly on the battlefield. Chapter Two articulates the broad outlines of Aristotelian virtue ethics with a specific emphasis on four key features of Aristotle’s virtue theory and how they can be harnessed to promote ethical conduct within the military institution. Arguably, the most important component of moral character is practical reason, the ability to assess a moral problem, weighing all the various considerations that affect it, and arrive at an ethical solution. Considering this, Chapter Three examines how practical reason can guide the soldier’s understanding of obedience, loyalty and respect, traits that are widely considered military virtues, but which are also at the root of a great deal of unethical behavior. Chapter Four examines the military’s code of professional ethics and how the possession of practical reason is necessary if soldiers are to make ethical decisions in situations the code does not explicitly address. The final chapter, Chapter Five, argues for more emphasis on the development of practical reason in military ethics education. / text

No description available.

No description available.

There has recently been a reengagement with Aristotle’s ethical thought. One only needs to mention contemporary virtue ethics, which explicitly names him as its inspiration. However, not all aspects of his ethical thought have received the attention, and engagement, they deserve. This is especially true of his egoism. In order to facilitate this engagement, this dissertation will offer a thorough account of Aristotle’s egoism. It will focus on his seminal work, the Nicomachean Ethics. Chapter One serves as a methodological introduction. It argues that Aristotle often uses a certain investigative procedure. He often posits preliminary positions that he later revises or rejects. Therefore, to properly grasp his thought, we must take care to distinguish his merely preliminary from his final positions. Chapter Two argues that Aristotle accepts a form of psychological egoism, namely that each person acts ultimately for the sake of his own happiness (εὐδαιμονία). This chapter both gives evidence for this interpretation and responds to two challenges that have been brought against it. The first challenge stems from Aristotle’s claim that friends benefit their friends for their friends’ own sake. The second challenge stems from Aristotle’s claim that virtuous action is kalon (“noble” or “fine”) and “for the sake of the kalon.” However, kala actions were popularly identified with actions of selfless beneficence. Chapter Three argues that Aristotle defends his view that we act ultimately for the sake of our own happiness. It is widely thought among those who agree that he holds this view that he never attempts to defend it. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that he does. It shows that he raises a challenge to his view that each person acts ultimately for the sake of his own happiness and then responds to it. This challenge is the popular view that virtuous people act in a selfless or self-disregarding way, especially in relation to their friends. This chapter then argues that Aristotle responds to this challenge through his discussion of friendship. He attempts to show, despite the popular view to the contrary, that virtuous people are not self-disregarding in relation to their friends.

The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an account of the metaphysical status of mathematical entities in Aristotle. Aristotle endorses a form of realism about mathematical entities: for him as well as for Platonists, anti-realism, the view that mathematical objects do not exist, is not a viable option. The thesis consists of two main parts: a part dedicated to the objects of geometry, and a part dedicated to numbers. Furthermore, I have included an introductory chapter about a passage in the second chapter of Book B of the Physics (193b31- 194a7) where Aristotle endorses a form of naïve realism with regard to mathematical entities. Many of the passages that give us an insight into Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics are to be found in the third chapter of Book M of the Metaphysics. Aristotle's primary concern there, however, is not so much to present his own positive account as to provide answers to a series of (not so obvious) Platonic arguments. In the second chapter of my thesis, I discuss some of those arguments and highlight their role in Aristotle's own position about the metaphysical status of geometrical entities. In a passage that is of crucial importance to understand Aristotle's views regarding the mode of existence of the objects of mathematics (Meta. M.3, 1078a25-31), Aristotle allows for the potential existence of them. I argue that Aristotle's sketchy remarks in Meta. M.3 point towards a geometry based on the commonsensical notion of the solid. This account can be further developed if we take into consideration the purpose of the preceding chapter M.2: to refute Platonic arguments that attribute greater metaphysical status to 'limit entities' (entities bounding and within a physical body), that is, to points, lines, and surfaces. According to Aristotle, such 'limit entities' have only a potential existence-what does this claim amount to? To answer this question, I will explore a more traditional reading of this claim and I will also put forward a more radical one: from a contemporary perspective, this reading makes Aristotelian geometry a distant cousin of modern Whiteheadian or Tarskian geometries. Providing an account of the metaphysical status of number in Aristotle poses quite a few challenges. On the one hand, the scarcity of the evidence forces commentators to rely on a few scattered remarks (primarily from the Physics) and to extract Aristotle's own views from heavily polemical contexts (such as the convoluted arguments that occupy much of books M and N of the Metaphysics). On the other hand, the Fregean tradition casts a great shadow upon the majority of the interpretations; indeed, a great amount of the relevant scholarship is dominated by Fregean tendencies: it is, for example, widely held that numbers for Aristotle are not supposed to be properties of objects, much like colour, say, or shape, but second-order properties (properties-of-properties) of objects. The scope of the third chapter is to critically examine some of the Fregean-inspired arguments that have led to a thoroughly Fregean depiction of Aristotle, and to lay the foundations for an alternative reading of the crucial texts.

No description available.

This thesis considers how Martin Heidegger treats “wonder” (thaumazein) in Plato and Aristotle versus how it appears to be treated by them. The introduction outlines how the problem of wonder arises when Heidegger mentions particular instances from Plato’s Theaetetus and Aristotle’s Metaphysics as the basis for his claim that philosophy originates in wonder. In chapter one, I analyze each of the twenty-four occurrences of wonder in Plato’s Theaetetus, beginning with a preliminary discussion of Heidegger’s delimitation of wonder from the wondrous. In chapter two, I examine the relation between philosophy and wonder in chapters one and two of Book Alpha of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. In chapter three, I begin by considering Heidegger’s later lecture, What is that—Philosophy?, before turning to his earlier writing, The Need and Necessity of the First Beginning and the Need and Necessity of an Other Way to Question and to Begin. I end by reflecting on Heidegger’s account of pre-Socratic versus Socratic philosophy in these writings and consider how Leo Strauss seems to provide an alternative to Heidegger’s analysis. Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the relation between wonder and Eros in Plato and Aristotle. / 1 / Ryan Patrick Crowley