In this dissertation, I formulate and solve four philosophical puzzles on Aristotle's conception of pleasures and pains by using the Aristotelian dialectical method. The first puzzle concerns the nature of pleasure. In the Nicomachean Ethics book VII, Aristotle describes pleasure as an unimpeded activity of our natural state. In book X, however, he states that pleasure is something that supervenes on activity. I reconcile these two descriptions of pleasure by drawing on Aristotle's scientific works and his works in ethics. By offering this holistic view, I argue that pleasure is a passion or a way of being affected unimpededly. The second puzzle concerns the nature of pain. I develop a perceptual model to understand Aristotle's conception of pain. I also propose a mirroring method to understand pain by utilizing Aristotle's theory of contrariety. I argue that (1) like pleasure, pain is a passion; but (2) unlike pleasure, pain is a way of being affected impededly. Aristotle observed that there are two seemingly conflicting ways of thinking about the nature and significance of pain. On the one hand, perhaps all kinds of pain are evil and must be categorically avoided. On the other hand, perhaps some pains are intrinsically good and necessary in a virtuous life. In the third puzzle, I explore these apparently competing conceptions of pain. I argue that the solution to the puzzle is to affirm the common intuition that all pains are intrinsically bad, but at the same time to reject the claim that pain must always be avoided at all costs. Finally, I formulate a puzzle that comes from the work of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who entertains two opposing ethical intuitions concerning pain. The first intuition is that not all pains are bad, while the second intuition is that all pains are intrinsically bad. To solve the puzzle, I argue that pains are good insofar as they are a type of alienation. Furthermore, using Aristotle's theory of contrariety, I argue that even though all pains are intrinsically bad, it is not the case that all pleasures are good.

Baseball was once seen as America's pastime, but somehow lost its way. Baseball was inherently American, and stood for more than a game. Yet a number of events caused baseball to fall from grace. Using Ernest Thayer's poem “Casey at the Bat: A Ballad of Republic Sung in the Year 1888” as a frame work, this project identifies three events that caused baseball's fall and three additional events that currently threaten the game, which will be evaluated according to Aristotle's doctrine of the mean. Understanding the game's past and present will help to develop a methodology to apply to threats of the game to ensure baseball's future.<br> To begin, this project identifies three events that originally caused baseball's fall: the Black Sox Scandal in the 1919 World Series, two franchises moving from New York to Los Angles, and the Labor Strike of 1994. Each event creates distance between the game of baseball and its idealized past. The first chapter also propels the following three chapters by viewing the current threats of the game as three imaginary pitches for Casey with the goal of attempting to change his original fate from the poem, in which he struck out.<br> Chapter II, Casey's first imaginary pitch, deals with the steroids crisis. The home run era helped to revitalize the game after the Labor Strike, but the success was short-lived. “The Mitchell Report” was first published on December 13, 2007. The report was the culmination of a 21-month investigation of anabolic steroid-use in baseball, and identified 89 MLB players linked to steroids. Although the records and statistics were put into question, the harshest result of this event was that it called into question the ethics of the baseball – with the ongoing suspicion and a lack of trust toward the game, baseball no longer fosters havens of trust. Additionally, the lack of an immediate response by the league showed a delayed reaction, one of deficiency. This is the first strike to Casey in the imaginary at bat.<br> Perhaps propelled by the Steroid Era, the next event that continues to threaten the game is the sabermetric movement, marked by the publication of Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (Lewis, 2003). Sabermetrics in general attempt to provide new and more technologically driven metrics to better understand the game. Although learning more about the game is good, dismissing old statistics causes people to lose ground and connection to the past. The over-emphasis of sabermetrics shows excess, again causing Casey to swing too early and miss another pitch. The final event that threatens the game of baseball is the implementation of technology, namely instant replay, into the game, which occurred in 2008. The game of baseball assessed the successes of other sports’ uses of instant replay, withheld implementation over 20 years later than the NFL, and originally made modest additions to the game. The focus on the past helps to preserve tradition and helps to foster a good connection for the game in the present game. With the third pitch, Casey found the balance between deficiency and excess and hit a home run. The final chapter lists ongoing problems to each of the three events identified in Chapters II-IV, provides a detailed critique of progress as understood through Modernity, assesses the ways in which Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean can be used as a philosophical framework to deal with ethical issues, theorizes various uses of this methodology, and finally discusses the ways in which baseball can be preserved for the next century.<br> The afterward revisits the original poem of “Casey at the Bat” and provides an updated version, “Casey’s Hope.” / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Communication and Rhetorical Studies / PhD; / Dissertation;

Ce travail a pour objet d'interroger le statut épistémologique de l'éthique comme science pratique et d'expliciter l'affirmation d'Aristote selon laquelle l'éthique est une science. Nous abordons cette question en deux temps : le premier est celui d'une confrontation de l'éthique avec les autres savoirs aristotéliciens dans le but de spécifier la catégorie de savoir pratique dégagée en metaph. E. 1, le second est une étude des principales particularités du savoir pratique. Dans le but de déterminer ces différentes particularités, nous revenons sur les obstacles à la scientificité de l'éthique et nous analysons ce que nous considérons être des instruments du savoir pratique : le syllogisme pratique, les endoxa, les portraits et les exemples. / In this work, I will question the epistemological status of ethics as practical knowledge and I will explain the Aristotelian affirmation that ethics is a science. I will proceed in two axes : the first one is a confrontation of the ethics to the other knowledges in order to specify the nature of the category of practical knowledge brought out in metaph. E. 1, and the second one is a study of main particularities of practical knowledge. In order to specify those particularities, I will define the impediments to ethics' scientificity and I will analyze what I identified as instruments for the elaboration of a practical knowledge : practical syllogism, endoxa, portraits and examples.

In this doctoral thesis, I address questions concerning teleology, chance, and necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. These three concepts are closely related. Aristotle considers chance in relation to teleology, and contrasts his conception of teleology with his own and his predecessors' views of necessity. He explains accidental causation on the basis of the absurdity of necessitarianism. In Chapter I, I clarify Aristotle's definitions of chance events and chance in Physics B 4-6 on the basis of a detailed examination of 'coming to be accidentally' (196b23), 'for the sake of something' (196b21), 'might be done by thought or by nature' (196b22). I analyze accidental and non-accidental relations involved in the marketplace example. In Chapter II, I argue that Aristotle accepts that the regularly beneficial winter rainfall is for the sake of the crops in Physics B 8. I scrutinize Empedocles’ view as described by Aristotle and show that it is not a theory of natural selection. I seek to show that the rival view against which Aristotle argues is an amalgam of reductionism and eliminativism. In Chapter III, I analyze what Aristotle means by 'simple necessity' and 'necessity on a hypothesis' (199b34-35), and argue that, in Physics B 9, he only acknowledges hypothetical necessity. Scrutinizing the wall example and Aristotle’s reply to it, I clarify his view of the relation between teleological causation and material necessity. In Chapter IV, I clarify Aristotle's conception of accidental causes, while taking his presentation of the necessitarian argument in Metaphysics E 3 as a reductio ad absurdum. I criticize the view that Aristotle himself accepts necessitation in this chapter. In doing so, I argue that, although this point is not explicitly stated in Physics B, Aristotle thinks that what is accidental is not necessary prior to its occurrence.

Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / This thesis examines the place of the family in Aristotle’s politics with a specific concentration on the place of the husband and wife. It argues that the husband and wife share in both the public and the private according to Aristotle. This thesis is meant to contribute to the ongoing debate about the relationship between public and private, and male and female, in the political science of Aristotle and aims to disprove interpretations that claim that there is sharp public-private or political-household divide between males and females. It does so in part by considering the household in relation to the city, the husband in relation to the wife, and the functions of man and woman in the household. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / Disharmony in the Constitution: Aristotle and Plato on the Education of Women and the Spartan Regime by Brenna R. Strauss Dissertation Advisor: Robert C. Bartlett ABSTRACT In their critiques of Sparta in the <italic>Politics</italic> and the <italic>Laws</italic>, Aristotle and Plato write that, where women are poorly regulated, the city cannot be happy. Using Sparta as a case study, I argue that Aristotle and Plato agree on crucial points regarding the education and regulation of women in a well-ordered regime. Such a regime recognizes the importance of the expression of love of one's own through stable, private families as well as the erotic character of human nature. Stable families require that men be assured of their paternity and therefore that women not mix freely in public. Because women will therefore have different roles than men, women and girls will not receive an education equal to that of men or boys, or one as consistent with the aim of the regime. As a result, most regimes will be characterized by tension between the public and private spheres, as was the case in Sparta. The erotic character of human beings exacerbates this tension. Men's immoderate desire generally gives women authority over men, undermining the legislator's attempts to educate and regulate women and men alike. Even in the well-ordered regime, most human beings will not be able to attain a moderate disposition, but will merely achieve self-restraint supported by law and custom. Although there is no indication that women are incapable of human excellence, their inferior education will make them less capable of prudence or philosophy. The domestic role and inferior character of women in the well-ordered regime are due, I conclude, to an attempt to reconcile our individual, mortal natures and our need to live together in political community. The consequent disharmony in the constitution reflects the inherent tension between these two aspects of human nature. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / This project sets out to answer the following question: according to Aristotle, what does movement contribute to or change about being? The first part works through the argument for the existence of movement in the Physics. This argument includes distinctive innovations in the structure of being, notably the simultaneous unity and manyness of being: while material and form are one thing, they are two in being. This makes it possible for Aristotle to argue that movement is not intrinsically related to what is not: what comes to be does not emerge from non-being, it comes from something that is in a different sense. The second part turns to the Metaphysics to show that and how the lineage of potency and activity the inquiry into movement. A central problem is that activity or actuality, energeia, does not at first seem to be intrinsically related to a completeness or end, telos. With the unity of different senses of being at stake, Aristotle establishes that it is by showing that activity or actuality is movement most of all, and that movement has and is a complete end. Thus, it is movement that leads Aristotle to conclude that substance and form are energeia, and that unity of being is possible. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Arthur Madigan / Since at least Galileo, not only the technological abilities of natural science but the meaning of science's claims have been shaken to their very foundations, according to Edmund Husserl. We know what scientists say, but we do not know what they mean. Nor, Husserl claims, do they know what they mean. They do what works. They measure, they tabulate, they calculate. But they do not thereby really know the world. And since they are the standing authorities of knowledge in our culture, we do not have a reliable referent to which we can turn for an appropriate standard of meaning. At some level we realize that this piece of paper in my hand is not precisely a geometrical rectangle, in which all four angles are exactly ninety degrees and both sets of sides are exactly parallel to each other, but for the most part we simply identify it as a rectangle and move on. In our everyday experience, Husserl would say, we tend to conflate geometrical space and experiential space. We do not, however, have any real idea why we can do so effectively, even if we are engineers or physicists. Geometrical shapes are categorically different from the shapes we daily experience in our interactions with the world. No matter how carefully I draw lines or cut edges, I can never make a piece of paper (or, for that matter, a cow) that exactly meets the requirements of a geometrical rectangle. Even the fact that geometrical rectangles are, by definition, plane figures, which means they only have two dimensions, rather than the (at least) three that structure any perceptible thing, prevents perceptible things from ever meeting the strict requirements of geometrical figures. Given this basic disparity, what is it that justifies our using these geometrical figures to describe the perceptible world in which we live? If we want to know the world, Husserl tells us, we need to know what our scientific claims mean. This, he claims, is the only way we can meaningfully ground our increasingly science-governed lives. Plan of the Dissertation In this dissertation, then, I undertake the project of identifying more precisely what this problem is and offering some solution to it. My argument will have three steps. I shall argue first that to solve the problem Husserl so helpfully lays out, we need to go back to Aristotle's Metaphysics; second, that although Aristotle proposes a solution for the metaphysical problems implied by using mathematics to know perceptible things, this solution fails to answer the questions as he presents them, even if it is broadly interpreted; and, finally, that there are within Aristotle's metaphysical thought implicit resources for constructing this missing metaphysical justification, and that these can be found explicitly in his way of thinking about the distinction between actuality and potency, in his discussion of the metaphysical implications of knowing, and in his discussion of material causality. The basic problem is that mathematical objects and perceptible things are different kinds of things. We would not say that `Joe's idea is hungry' in anything other than a very metaphorical way, because we recognize that ideas are not the kinds of things that get hungry. Hunger is the province of animals. Ideas are not animals. Ideas, then, cannot be hungry. Mathematical objects and perceptible things, though, while also different kinds of things, are regularly combined. We do say, `This piece of paper is rectangular', although it would seem that pieces of paper (or cows) are not the kinds of things that could be rectangles. In this dissertation, I begin in chapter one with a careful recapitulation of Husserl's articulation of this problem of thoughtlessly conflating mathematical and experiential things. Husserl takes this to be the root of the crisis, not only of the meaning of the sciences, but also of all human meaning. I use Husserl's articulation, rather than simply explaining the problem as I understand it and moving directly to Aristotle's Metaphysics, where I see the roots of its solution, in part because Husserl's work was so influential in shaping my own understanding of the problem. More importantly, though not unrelatedly, Husserl helpfully contextualizes the problem both culturally and historically. He tells us why this matters, and he tells us how it seems to have happened. Both of these seem to me to be crucial to any ultimately successful resolution to the problem. In Husserl's articulation of the problem, he identifies Galileo as responsible for taking it as `obvious' that the `universally valid' shapes of geometry constituted the objectively real component of all things. He argues that Galileo inherits a tradition in which our approximations to `limit shapes' and the increased precision in replicating these made possible by technological advances gradually meld together, such that we learn to take the world to be fundamentally a mathematical manifold. In taking over this tradition, Galileo simply presumes that the world is fundamentally mathematizable and sets about developing methods by which even the concrete sensory plena through which any experienced shape is necessarily presented can be mathematized. Since we take as `given' these assumptions, whose origin Husserl attributes to Galileo, and which remain unjustified metaphysically, Husserl's tracing of the development of these assumptions can help us notice and evaluate them. This will be helpful in recovering the meaning of our mathematical scientific claims, and, ultimately, in recovering the meaning of our non-scientific claims. While Husserl helpfully identifies the problem and begins the historical tracing he proposes with his analysis of Galileo's assumptions, he does not complete the latter project, in part because he died so soon after beginning it. His project in the Crisis, as with many of the projects he undertook as a scholar, gets developed in many different directions, without any of these being completed. He proposes a philosophical-historical retracing of the assumptions of geometry, from its earliest inception through the present. He proposes a simultaneous careful consideration of the metaphysical assumptions at work in mathematical science and the justification necessary for it. He proposes transcendental phenomenology as the way to correctly understand the correlation between mathematical claims and the perceptible world they describe. While the development of transcendental phenomenology and the ways that it can help us come to understand more correctly our interaction with the world are fascinating, in this dissertation I want to focus on Husserl's other proposals toward a solution, namely the philosophical-historical retracing of assumptions and the metaphysical analysis. Specifically, I want to focus on the metaphysical analysis that Aristotle performs on the problems generated by presuming that one can use mathematical objects to know perceptible things. In chapter two, then, I explain more thoroughly the first two proposals toward a solution that Husserl proposes, and defend my claim that this metaphysical analysis in Aristotle is an appropriate continuation of Husserl's project. For completeness, Husserl's project needs, in addition to his tracing of the historical sources of lazy assumptions, an Aristotelian metaphysical analysis of what material and mathematical things are, to clarify whether and how mathematics could be appropriately (or inappropriately) applied to material things. In chapter three, I turn to Aristotle's Metaphysics and cull from its pages, primarily from Books III and XIII, the basic metaphysical questions and problems that arise in Aristotle's discussion of the use of mathematical objects to know perceptible things. I organize these into six central questions: 1) What exactly are the mathematical objects Aristotle discusses? 2) Are these mathematical objects substances? 3) Are these mathematical objects separable from perceptible things? 4) Are these mathematical objects constituents of perceptible things? 5) Are these mathematical objects principles or causes of perceptible things? 6) Is knowledge of these mathematical objects somehow knowledge of perceptible things? From these six questions, the basic problem that emerges is that knowledge of mathematical objects requires these objects to be exact, unchangeable, and indivisible, whereas the perceptible things of which they are supposed to provide knowledge are less determinate, changeable, and divisible. It seems like the mathematical objects would have to be separate from these perceptible things to be objects of mathematical knowledge, but if they were so, it is unclear how knowledge of them could be taken to also be knowledge of the perceptible things. These mathematical objects would have to somehow be part of the causal structure of these perceptible things for knowledge of them to be knowledge of these perceptible things. In chapter four, I take up the solution that Aristotle proposes for these difficulties, the `insofar as'/ `qua' (hêi) structure of knowing. Various attributes belong to a given perceptible thing in virtue of various ways of its being. Being green belongs to a plant, for example, insofar as it is a surface. The method of abstraction (aphairesis) allows us to separate out in thought the relevant way of being of the thing, so as to make the appropriate attribution to it. We can know a thing as something, even if that `something' is not itself actually separable. This proposal of Aristotle's begins to resolve some of the metaphysical problems that chapter three articulated. It is not itself, however, metaphysically justified. While it seems that we do regularly make these kinds of claims about perceptible things, it is not clear what justifies us in separating in thought what is not separate in fact, nor just how these various ways of being belong to the unified perceptible thing such that knowledge of them provides knowledge of the thing. This difficulty in giving a metaphysically coherent account of Aristotle's model of abstraction pervades the scholarly literature. Aristotle, it seems, does not have a satisfactory solution to the troubling metaphysical problems he raises about using mathematical objects to know perceptible things. In my fifth, and final, chapter, I undertake to construct from other texts in Aristotle's corpus a metaphysical justification for his model of abstraction that can, in fact, resolve the metaphysical problems that he and Husserl have raised. I find this metaphysical justification in an implicit claim of Aristotle's, to be found in the same section where he proposes his model of abstraction as a solution (Met XIII.3): the claim that mathematical objects are potential substances. I examine what these potential substances are, how they are related to their own actualizations and how they are related to the perceptible things of which they are supposed to provide knowledge, relying primarily on Metaphysics VIII and IX. I consider how knowledge of these could be possible, using texts from De Anima III, and then explore a connection between these potencies and the material cause of perceptible things in Physics II.9. I conclude at last that we are, in fact, justified in using mathematical objects to describe perceptible things. These objects, however, are mathematically describable only insofar as they are material, by which Aristotle means, insofar as they are potential, rather than actual. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / At the beginning of the fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that, according to common opinion, justice is lawful and fair. He concludes his examination of justice with a discussion of equity, which proves to be neither strictly lawful nor strictly fair—and yet Aristotle tells us that equity is, in a certain sense, the highest form of justice. This dissertation explains how Aristotle reaches this startling conclusion. I begin with an exploration of the careful taxonomy of justice that Aristotle lays out in the first half of book five. But Aristotle abruptly abandons this taxonomy midway through the book when he turns from the simply just to the politically just. For this reason and others, I argue that the second half of the book is not, as some have asserted, the application of the universal principles of justice to a political situation, but a new beginning and a fresh attempt to articulate the virtue of justice, free from the flaws we discover through a careful study of the first half of the book. Aristotle’s political justice takes its bearings from the health of a republican government, that is, a government of free and equal citizens. And yet political justice, like political courage, remains on the level of politics. Aristotle’s discussion of equity at the end of the book presents the virtuous form of justice, which corrects the flaws of justice as lawfulness and justice as fairness and permits justice to take its place in the economy of a noble human life. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

Thesis (Ed.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / This study explores the ways a small group of girls, ages 11-13, spoke about courage over a two-year period. Using Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics as a guide, the purpose of the present study is to discover how courage is present in the lives of a select group of girls, what their thoughts and perceptions are on courage, and how these thoughts and perceptions explain the operation of emotion and rationality in producing courage. This last question is based off Marcia Homiak's (1993) suggestion that Aristotle offers a way to explain how emotion and rationality operate together to develop positive, caring, independent and strong individuals. Differing from the predominant framework of Carol Gilligan's theory of an "ethic of care" in girls' developmental research, the present study uses and suggests that the practice of returning to the classical work of Aristotle offers a different approach to studying girls' development. The girls were interviewed in an effort to discover personal conceptions of courage, their thoughts on the relevance of intention, experience, emotion, sanguinity, and ignorance to courage, as Aristotle describes these terms, and how courage is present in their lives. The girls also performed an essay-writing task to clarify their thoughts. Several dominant themes resulted from this study. These included the participants stating that (1) a courageous act must stem from good intentions; (2) courage comes as a matter of experience or practice; (3) with enough practice courage can become a habit and thus part of your character; (4) while emotion is a precursor to courage, a courageous act cannot be done rashly and requires a degree of rationality to act in order to be considered true courage; and (5) their own recollections of acting courageously are in early development and thus far have been minimal. An additional finding was the degree to which participants found overly aggressive girls spur opportunities for courage. Implications for a model of active learning, character education, and further research on girls' development are suggested. / 2031-01-02