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Thesis advisor: Michael Kelly / This thesis is an assessment of the notion of justice through the eyes of various philosophers including Aristotle, Montesquieu, the Federalists/Anti-Federalists, Rawls, and Sandel. These philosophies of justice are then applied to the Republican and Democratic platforms to assess which platform is the most just. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Carroll School of Management Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy Honors Program. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / This thesis seeks to explain why Aristotle considers piety a necessary component of the best regime that he presents in book 7 of the Politics. It argues that Aristotle includes piety in the best regime because the pious belief in divine providence, that is, divine reward for virtuous human beings and punishment for vicious human beings, provides an essential justification for moral virtue that enables the best regime to habituate its citizens in the practice of moral virtue without compelling them to deny their natural longing for happiness. Only this pious conception of divine providence enables the citizens of the best regime to be happy as they cope with the demands of moral virtue and citizenship. / Thesis (MA) — Boston College, 2019. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2007. / Thesis directed by Catherine H. Zuckert for the Department of Political Science. "November 2007." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 315-325).

In what sense, if any, is time related to nature? In this dissertation, I argue that Aristotle's Treatise on Time (<italic>Physics</italic> iv 10-14) must be read in light of his foregoing discussion of nature (<italic>phusis</italic>) in Physics i-iv 9. Thus, Aristotle's definition of time (<italic>chronos</italic>) in Physics iv 11, that time is the number (<italic>arithmos</italic>) of motion (<italic>kinesis</italic>) with respect to before and after (219b1), is highly contextualized and as such must be understood as not only derivative of both Aristotle's definition of nature, as the inner capacity for motion and rest (192b13-22), and of his explanation of kinêsis, but also parallel to his analyses of the infinite (<italic>apeiron</italic>), place (<italic>tops</italic>), and void (<italic>kenos</italic>). What is more, I bring attention to the fact that Aristotle's understanding of nature is shaped fundamentally by the distinction he makes in the <italic>Physics</italic> and elsewhere (<italic>Metaphysics</italic> iv) between potentiality (<italic>dunamis</italic>) and actuality (<italic>entelecheia</italic>). With this in mind, I distinguish between the potential for time and actual time in Aristotle and conclude that the human being, along with actual motion, is both the necessary and sufficient condition for actual time on his account. Time, for Aristotle, then, results from an interaction between two or more parts of nature. It is not an a priori substance to be examined qua itself. My conclusions, therefore, offer a solution to those who read Aristotle's Treatise on Time as a confused inquiry, i.e. one that oscillates between a theory of knowledge and a theory of reality and combines what many believe to be Aristotle's characteristic realism with idealism. Finally, I use these conclusions to show a likeness between the account of time I attribute to Aristotle and what I suggest to be a return to thinking about time as derivative of a theory of nature in early Schellingian <italic>Naturphilosophie</italic>. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

This dissertation is a study of the relation between Aristotle’s ethics and the crafts (or technai). My thesis is that Aristotle’s argument is at key points shaped by models proper to the crafts, this shaping being deeper than is generally acknowledged, and philosophically more problematic. Despite this, I conclude that the arguments I examine can, if revised, be upheld. The plan of the dissertation is as follows – Preface: The relation of my study to the extant secondary literature; Introduction: The pre-Platonic concept of technē, as evidenced in Greek philosophical and literary sources, in particular the early Hippocratic corpus; Chapter one: The Platonic concept of technē, followed by an investigation of whether Plato affirms a virtue-technē in the Protagoras and Republic; Chapter two: Aristotle’s concept of technē, followed by scrutiny of his arguments in NE VI.5 against a virtue-technē, and of his analyses of slavery and deliberation; Chapter three: An exposition of Aristotle’s function argument, followed by a dominantist interpretation of it, and an explanation of dominantism as in part a technē-influenced doctrine; Chapter four: An examination of Aristotle’s ethical mean and its problems, with a diagnosis of these in terms of influence by the Philebus, and by paradigms derived from the crafts; Chapter five: Argument that Aristotle’s theory of habituation suffers from two significant opacities, these being a function of influence both by the Republic, and by models of craft-learning; Conclusion: Response to key objection; Aristotle’s ethics revised, defended.

This dissertation is a study of the relation between Aristotle’s ethics and the crafts (or technai). My thesis is that Aristotle’s argument is at key points shaped by models proper to the crafts, this shaping being deeper than is generally acknowledged, and philosophically more problematic. Despite this, I conclude that the arguments I examine can, if revised, be upheld. The plan of the dissertation is as follows – Preface: The relation of my study to the extant secondary literature; Introduction: The pre-Platonic concept of technē, as evidenced in Greek philosophical and literary sources, in particular the early Hippocratic corpus; Chapter one: The Platonic concept of technē, followed by an investigation of whether Plato affirms a virtue-technē in the Protagoras and Republic; Chapter two: Aristotle’s concept of technē, followed by scrutiny of his arguments in NE VI.5 against a virtue-technē, and of his analyses of slavery and deliberation; Chapter three: An exposition of Aristotle’s function argument, followed by a dominantist interpretation of it, and an explanation of dominantism as in part a technē-influenced doctrine; Chapter four: An examination of Aristotle’s ethical mean and its problems, with a diagnosis of these in terms of influence by the Philebus, and by paradigms derived from the crafts; Chapter five: Argument that Aristotle’s theory of habituation suffers from two significant opacities, these being a function of influence both by the Republic, and by models of craft-learning; Conclusion: Response to key objection; Aristotle’s ethics revised, defended.

This paper is a comparative project between a philosopher from the Western tradition, Aristotle, and a philosopher from the Eastern tradition, Sankara. These two philosophers have often been thought to oppose one another in their thoughts, but I will argue that they are similar in several aspects. I will explore connections between Aristotle and Sankara, primarily in their theories of causation. I will argue that a closer examination of both Aristotelian and Advaita Vedanta philosophy, of which Sankara is considered the most prominent thinker, will yield significant similarities that will give new insights into the thoughts of both Aristotle and Sankara.