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The essay charts forty years of Zionist history to illuminate the remarkable evolution of Israel's unified, apolitical army and Israel's "democratic civil-military tradition," forged in the fires of opposing military styles, ideological rivalry, competing underground forces, war and civil war.

This study attempts to address the performance of military and civilian regimes in promoting socioeconomic development and providing military policy resources in the Third World. Using pooled cross-sectional time series analysis, three models of socioeconomic and military policy performance are estimated for 66 countries in the Third World for the period 1965-1985. These models include the progressive, corporate self-interest, and conditional. The results indicate that socioeconomic and military resource policies are not significantly affected by military control. Specifically, neither progressive nor corporate self-interest models are supported by Third World data. In addition, the conditional model is not confirmed by the data. Thus, a simple distinction between military and civilian regimes is not useful in understanding the consequences of military rule.

Thesis (MMil (Military Strategy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Military intervention remains controversial when it happens, as well as when it fails to. Since the end of the Cold War, military intervention has attracted much scholarly interest, and it was demonstrated that several instances of the use of force or the threat to use force without Security Council endorsement were acceptable and necessary. Matters of national sovereignty are the fundamental principle on which the international order was founded since the Treaty of Westphalia. Territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs, remain the foundation of international law, codified by the United Nations Charter, and one of the international community’s decisive factors in choosing between action and non-intervention. Nonetheless, since the end of the Cold War matters of sovereignty and non-interference have been challenged by the emergent human rights discourse amidst genocide and war crimes. The aim of this study is to explain the extent to which military intervention in Africa has evolved since the end of the Cold War, in terms of theory, practice and how it unfolded upon the African continent. This will be achieved, by focusing on both successful and unsuccessful cases of military intervention in Africa. The unsuccessful cases being Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, and Darfur in 2003; and the successful cases being Sierra Leone in 2000 and the Comoros in 2008. The objective of this study is fourfold: firstly it seeks to examine the theoretical developments underpinning military intervention after the end of the Cold War; secondly, to describe the evolution of military intervention from a unilateral realist to a more multilateral idealist profile; thirdly, to demarcate the involvement in military intervention in Africa by states as well as organisations such as the AU and the UN and finally, discerning the contributions and the dilemmas presented by interventions in African conflicts and how Africa can emerge and benefit from military interventions. The intervention in Somalia produced a litmus test for post-Cold War interventions and the departure point for their ensuing evolution. Rwanda ensued after Somalia, illustrating the disinclination to intervene that featured during this episode. Darfur marked the keenness of the AU to intervene in contrast with the ensuing debates at the Security Council over naming the crime whether or not “genocide” was unfolding in Darfur. Positively though, the intervention by Britain in Sierra Leone and the AU intervention in the Comoros are clear illustrations of how those intervening, were articulate in what they intend to do and their subsequent success. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Militêre intervensie, of die afwesigheid daarvan wanneer nodig, bly ‘n twispunt binne internasionale verhoudinge. Namate die impak van die Koue Oorlog begin vervaag het, het militêre intervensie besonder prominent in die literatuur begin figureer en is soms so dringend geag dat dit soms sonder die goedkeuring van die Veiligheidsraad van die Verenigde Nasies (VN) kon plaasvind. Aspekte van nasionale soewereiniteit bly nietemin ‘n grondbeginsel van die internasionale orde soos dit sedert die Verdrag van Wesfale beslag gevind het. Territoriale integriteit van state en die beginsel van geen-inmenging in die binnelandse aangeleenthede van ‘n staat nie bly ook ‘n grondslag van die Internasionale Reg soos deur die VN erken word en dit rig steeds standpunte van die internasionale gemeenskap vir of teen intervensie. Sedert die einde van die Koue Oorlog het soewereiniteit en beginsel van geen-intervensie egter toenemende druk ervaar met groeiende klem op menseregte midde in ‘n opkomende diskoers oor volksmoord en oorlogsmisdade. Die klem van hierdie studie val op militêre intervensie en veral hoe dit na die Koue Oorlog ontvou het in terme van teorie en praktyk, in die besonder op die Afrikakontinent. Die bespreking wentel om suksesvolle en onsuksesvolle gevalle van militêre intervensie in Afrika. Die onsuksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Somalië (1992), Rwanda (1994), en Darfur (2003). Die meer suksesvolle gevalle wat bespreek word is Sierra Leone (2000) en die Komoro Eilande in (2008). Die studie omvat vier aspekte van bespreking: eerstens, die teoretiese ontwikkelinge wat militêre intervensie na die Koue Oorlog onderlê, tweedens, die ewolusie van militêre intervensie vanaf ‘n eensydige realisme tot ‘n meer multilaterale idealistiese verskynsel, derdens, die betrokkenheid in militêre intervensie in Afrika deur state en organisasies soos die VN en Afrika-Unie (AU) en laastens, die bydraes en dilemmas van intervensies in Afrika. Die betrokkenheid in Somalië was ‘n kritieke toets vir intervensies na die Koue Oorlog en het baie stukrag verleen aan die daaropvolgende debat. Rwanda het die huiwerigheid ontbloot om in te gryp waar dit werklik nodig was. Darfur vertoon weer die gewilligheid van die AU om in te gryp in weerwil van lang debatte in die VN oor volksmoord en die gebeure in Darfur. Aan die positiewe kant figureer die Britse optredes in Sierra Leone en optredes deur ‘n AU-mag in die Komoro Eilande as gevalle wat toon hoe die vasberadenheid van partye om in te gryp en bedreigings in die kiem te smoor, suksesvolle militêre intervensies kan bevorder.

Thesis (MMil)-- Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Germany’s declaration of war on Poland on 1 September 1939 and the consequent war in Europe not only found the Union of South Africa politically divided but militarily unprepared to fight a modern war let alone make any worthwhile contribution toward its European allies’ war effort. The task of getting South Africa into the fight fell to newly appointed Prime Minister J.C. Smuts who cleverly outmanoeuvred J.B.M. Hertzog as leader of the nation. Not only was the Union Defence Force (UDF) severely ravaged by several budget cuts during and after the depression but it seemed to have no inclination of embracing the kind of mechanisation that was the hallmark of most European armies. Within the space of a year Smuts managed to transform the UDF and on 17 July 1940 the 1st South African Infantry Brigade set sail for East Africa where Mussolini’s Italians reigned supreme after brushing aside a couple of British border guards and laying claim to a few miles of British territory. One of the units dispatched by Smuts was the 1st Royal Natal Carbineers from Pietermaritzburg in Natal. Throughout the campaign the Regiment’s C Company fought with distinction but had the dubious honour of being the South African unit that suffered the most casualties during the whole campaign. Several of C Company’s men then become the vehicles through which the remainder of the war is experienced as the men were moved from one theatre of battle to another. Through their eyes the hunting trips into the East African bush and the death of their Commanding Officer, among other things, are relived. The victorious Springboks are then sent to Egypt where they were needed in an effort to break the deadlock that existed between the British 8th Army and the German Afrika Korps. Amidst the ebb and flow of the battle the men of C Company still found time to experience the sights and sounds of Africa’s most populous cities, Cairo and Alexandria. Here many young soldiers were exposed to pleasures and pastimes not to be had back in the Union. In spite of the eventual defeat of the German forces North Africa C Company witnessed the destruction of the 5th South African Brigade at Sidi Rezegh and suffered the loss of a combined platoon when Tobruk capitulated on 21 June 1942. After a brief period on home leave in 1943 C Company was back in action, this time in Italy as part of the 6th South African Armoured Division. Here they faced mountains, heavy snow and an enemy desperately fighting for every hill, stream and building. In the months which followed C Company were often in the midst of the action and many men lost close friends on the slopes of the Italian mountains. As final victory became apparent during the first months of 1945, C Company’s men began preparing for their post-war lives and when the first planes and ships left for the union at the end of April 1945 the men felt that they have served their country well and did their regiment proud. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Ten tyde van Duitsland se oorlogsverklaring Pole op 1 September 1939 wat die weg gebaan het het vir die gevolglike oorlog in Europa was die Unie van Suid-Afrika nie net polities verdeel nie maar ook militêr onvoorbereid op 'n moderne oorlog. Die kans dat Suid Afrika n beduidende bydrae tot sy Europese bondgenote se oorlogspoging sou kon maak was ook skraal. Die taak om Suid-Afrika voor te berei vir die komende stryd het op die skouers van die nuutaangestelde premier J.C. Smuts gerus wat deur middel van politieke manuvrering vir J.B.M. Hertzog uitoorlê het as leier van die volk. Nie net was die Unie Verdedigings Mag (UVM) erg uitgemergel deur verskeie besnoeings in sy begroting tydens en ná die depressie nie, maar daar was klaarblyklik geen begrip vir die proses van meganisasie gehad waarmee die meeste Europese weermagte doenig was nie. Binne die bestek van 'n jaar het Smuts daarin geslaag om die UVM te transformeer en op 17 Julie 1940 seil die 1ste Suid-Afrikaanse Infanterie Brigade Oos-Afrika toe waar Mussolini se magte die kruin van die golf ry nadat hulle ‘n paar Britse grensposte eenkant toe gevee het en 'n paar myl Britse grondgebied beset het. Die 1st Royal Natal Carbineers van Pietermaritzburg was een van die eenhede wat in Oos Afrika teen die Italianers sou veg. Tydens die veldtog veg die Regiment met onderskeiding, maar verwerf ook die twyfelagtige eer om die Suid-Afrikaanse eenheid te wees wat die meeste ongevalle gely het gedurende die hele veldtog. Verskeie van C Kompanie se manne word gebruik as ‘n lens waardeur die res van die oorlog ervaar word soos die troepe van een front na die ander verskuif word. Deur middel van hul wedervaringe word, onder andere, die jagtogte in die Oos-Afrikaanse bos en die dood van hul bevelvoerder herleef. Na Oos-Afrika word die seëvierende Springbokke na Egipte gestuur waar hulle benodig word om die Britse 8ste Leër by te staan in in die stryd teen die Duitse Afrika Korps. Te midde van die stryd kom die manne van C Kompanie nog tyd vind om Afrika se mees digbevolkte stede, Kaïro en Alexandrië te besoek waar baie jong soldate blootgestel is aan genot en tydverdryf wat nie beskikbaar was in die Unie nie. Ten spyte van die uiteindelike nederlaag van die Duitse magte in Noord-Afrika was C Kompanie teenwoordig tydens die vernietiging van die 5de Suid-Afrikaanse Brigade by Sidi Rezegh en ervaar ook die verlies van 'n gekombineerde peloton toe Tobruk oorgegee op 21 Junie 1942. Na 'n kort tydperk in Suid Afrika is C Kompanie terug in aksie, hierdie keer in Italië as deel van die 6de Suid-Afrikaanse Pantserdivisie. Hier word hulle gekonfronteer deur berge, swaar sneeu en 'n vyand wat desperaat veg vir elke heuwel, stroom en bouval. In die daaropvolgende maande bevind C Kompanie hom dikwels te midde van die aksie sterf vele goeie vriende teen die hange van die Italiaanse bergreekse. Namate dit duidelik begin raak dat die Duitsers die oorlog gaan verloor begin C Kompanie se manne hulself voorberei vir hul na-oorlogse lewens. Met die vertrek van die eerste vliegtuie en skepe na die Unie teen die einde van April 1945 was die manne van Natal oortuig daarvan dat hulle hul land na die beste van hulle vermoë gedien het en dat hulle die goeie naam van hulle regiment gestand gedoen het.

This thesis explores what Telford Taylor called the “ethos of Nuremberg” and how it shaped antiwar resistance during the Vietnam War in the United States. The Vietnam War was a monumental event in the twentieth century and the conflict provided lawyers, academics, activists, and soldiers the ability to question the legality of the war through the prism of the Nuremberg Principles, the various international treaties and U.S. Constitutional law. As many legal scholars and historians have lamented, the Cold War destroyed hopes for the solidification of an international court empowered to preside over questions of war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes against peace. In the absence of cooperation among the international community, the antiwar movements in the United States and around the world during the Vietnam War utilized these legal instruments to form what I call a war crimes movement from below. A significant component of this challenge was the notion that individual citizens – draft noncooperators, military resisters, tax resisters, and the like – had a responsibility under the Nuremberg Principles to resist an illegal war. In the numerous United States military interventions after World War II, none had been challenged as openly and aggressively as the war in Vietnam. As this thesis will demonstrate, the ideas that crystallized into action at Nuremberg played a major role in this resistance.