Art History, Visual Arts and Musicology / M.A. (Fine Arts)

Like writing, art making is primarily a means of human expression, a means of communication – both “allow us to categorize our (inner and outer) environment as represented by symbols” (Appignanesi, 1999: 7). Yet it is language in the traditional Western garb of rational, philosophical discourse that has been perceived as the primary means of manifesting knowledge and positing truth, not only regarding the character of human existence, but also the nature of art. This infers the acceptance of both works as literally “truth of things”, and of “a language of reason” that “perfectly represents the real world” (Appignanesi, 1999: 77). Going against the grain of this traditional bias, Jacques Derrida holds that, firstly, “human knowledge is not as controllable or as cogent as Western thinkers would have it”: secondly, that language functions in “subtle and often contradictory ways” thus rendering certainty, truth, and perfect representation ever elusive to us (Lye, 1997: 2); and, thirdly, that “practices of interpretation which include art but are not limited to language, are extended discourses” (Appignanesi, 1999: 79). So, the “work of reason” (or rationalism) in this sense, is no longer the definitive “voice” of authority when it comes to ascribing meaning, proclaiming a message, defining truth, etc. Having the grip of its authority loosened and thus its rigid, imposing borders opened up, the communication of knowledge as a form of “aesthetic fiction” (Megill, 1987: 265) is allowed entry into the rarefied field of philosophical discourse. Moreover, if visual art (one such “aesthetic fiction”) is a process of sign-making, as is written and spoken language; if it therefore constitutes a signifying system, as does written and spoken language (Bal and Bryson in Preziosi, 1998: 242); and, if art is not just about autonomous, in-house formalism, then can it not, in any case, validly offer a form for discourse, albeit a different kind of discourse, a discourse that is not “truth seeking” (Sim, 1992: 33)? Here, the maker of the proposed artwork-asdiscourse would not be attempting to establish the truth or falsity of a philosophical position, but, as Derrida would have it, create a form which, without mimicry, would evocatively allude to Plato, his “deconstructor” and the maker of the proposed artwork. Discourse in this sense, then, would generate “active interpretation… infinite free association” (Megill, 1987: 283), because, as in Derrida’s writing, interpretation no longer aims at “the reconciliation or unification of warring truths (Sim, 1992: 10); in other words, it breaks with the (phal)logocentric tradition of discourse as dialectical and becomes questioning without closure. For visual art to enter the exalted arena of philosophical discourse, it cannot be selfreflexive in the Greenbergian or formalist sense – it has to be about something philosophical and this ‘something’ will be a deconstructive response to Plato’s doctrine of the two worlds in the Timaeus. What I propose presenting, then, is an imagographic rather than (phal)logocentric exposition of philosophical content where the aim is not to shape a certainty or to infer an absolute presence or essence of anything, but rather to suggest traces of the maker of the artwork reading Derrida, reading Plato. The proposed artwork as a response to texts will thus be a “pre-text” of my own endeavour.

M.Tech. / My research investigates the relationship between context and the interpretation of signs within ‘scripto/visual’ communication processes. I focus on the belief that no interpretation is context free. I have experienced that context is not consistent as it is based on the cultural, social and personal backgrounds of each individual. As there is always a context that serves to anchor the sign to our experiences, we construct a specific meaning when we interpret a sign. This specific meaning is, however, not necessarily the one originally intended by the sender. Central to my project is the argument that the choices made which affect the interpretation of signs when encoding and decoding them are influenced by the context of both the sender and the receiver, as well as the specific context within which the exchange takes place. I have chosen, amongst many other modes of sign interpretation, the operational processes of similarity and association. I investigate why both of these processes, in relation to the unfixed nature of context, are problematic and result in miscommunication. I have chosen to include discussions on specific artworks by two South African artists: Joni Brenner and Willem Boshoff as I feel that both artists make work in response to the fact that interpretation does not produce a ‘fixed truth’.

No description available.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1961 D34

論文(碩士)--香港中文大學,1968. / Manuscript. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 237-243). / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue,1968.

Ammonius Saccas instructs Plotinus towards a synthesis of ancient Greek philosophy. A brief introduction to the historical Plotinus is offered. The Hypostases: The One or Supreme Reality, the Divine Mind, Nous, and the Universal Soul, Logos, are discussed in the context of Plato's eternal ideas, Beauty, Truth and Good. / An examination of the dialogue Plotinus has with art and beauty is offered. The relationship between Plato's divine intelligibles and art is discussed in context of the treatise On Beauty. The intelligible beauty of ideas, cosmos, nature and art are examined in context of the treatise On Intellectual Beauty. Plotinian theory of art is summarized. / Plotinus advances an "iconic" dialectic that serves his theological theory of art. The more important critical issues that arise from his description of the realm of art are addressed. Plotinian mysticism, and the subject of matter and form, identity and difference, is discussed. The opposing ways of the "picture" and the "word" are briefly summarized. / The appearance of theos is an event of hierophany . The meaning of art points towards the object of our ultimate concern. A Plotinian studio program for the painter concludes the thesis.

Purposes of this study were to explore philosophical implications of existential-phenomenological thought for art education and to experimentally investigate, in the art classroom, an adaptation of basic participatory techniques of existential psychotherapy. The philosophical study considered two related areas: existentialist implications for strategies facilitating individual development toward free choosing in self-actualization of unique potential, and expansion of student-teacher empathy through existential-phenomenological approaches to the total aesthetic event, which expresses individually discovered value truths as beauty in a communicative art product.Existential aesthetic growth of individual students was seen as resulting in qualitative attitudinal changes toward concepts concerning self-and-others. Theoretically, these changes ought to be reflected as approximately equal qualitative changes in student art production.The experimental treatment had teachers freely disclosing personal values by becoming producing artists in company with students. Evidence from existential psychotherapy and humanistic psychology supported the notion that open disclosure of teacher values and creative struggles should elicit reciprocal openness from students, thereby facilitating mutually empathic relationships. The questions of whether or not this expanded mutual understanding could influence direction, intensity, and acceleration of student attitudinal changes toward self-and-others, and whether or not these changes showed relationships to qualitative changes in their art production, became the problem of the research.Experimental groups were exposed to the treatment for ten weeks; control groups were not exposed. Research procedure included pre-post administration of identical semantic differentials to measure concept attitudinal changes as related to presence or absence of the treatment, and use of a similar instrument to measure qualitative changes between first and last art production. Three-factor analyses of variance, with repeated measures, computed difference scores. Relationships between these d-scores were established by use of product-moment correlations. Review of the data resulted in the following major conclusions, inferences, and recommendations:(1) The writer's experimental thesis, that the experimental treatment had the potential of accelerating concept attitudinal changes in those exposed to it, was modestly, but generally, supported.(2) Product-moment correlations did not support the notion that attitudinal changes would be reflected as a qualitative changes in art production. This apparently resulted from a too-short experimental period.(3) Teaching styles of teacher-experimenters were a powerful variable mediating effects of the experimental treatment, which had to be taken into account in analyses of data.(4) Judges subjectively responded most definitely to art works from both groups of two teachers having strongly directive or non-directive teaching styles.(5) Concept d-scores showed all subjects tending to evaluate self-in-relation-to-others in objective terms, with little depth of feeling or strength of conviction. This appeared to result from conditioning too entrenched to be overcome in ten weeks.(6) Short duration of the experimental period appeared to be mainly responsible for weak intensities of results. It was inferred that replication of the experiment should have considerably longer duration.(7) The study showed definite trends, tending to support the writer's ideas about experimental treatment effectiveness and about relationships of qualities of art production to attitudinal changes. Presumably, these trends would have developed into more definitive results with a longer time period. Further study of the possible effectiveness of the experimental teacher-as-student strategy, in various teaching and environmental situations, with a diversity of teaching approaches, and with a considerably longer experimental period, is recommended.

This practice-led research concerns how participatory and dialogic art practice can come to terms with conditions after the Anthropocene (Crutzen & Stoermer 2000), the epoch when humans were recognized as 'an earth-changing force' (Lorimer 2015). These forms of art practice draw heavily on a social-constructivism that emphasizes human cultural endeavour above all else. But if we are to live in an epoch when humans can no longer presume to have mastery over nature (Plumwood 1993), then how can such a anthropocentric practice remain tenable? Indeed, it now seems impossible, inappropriate even, to make such a clear distinction between humans and others things. This is not to claim the end of the human. Rather, it is an invitation to think the 'more-than-human' (Whatmore 2002; 2006), and to ask, who else takes part with us in the social forms enacted through participatory and dialogic art practice after the Anthropocene? In doing so, this research turns towards aspects of new materialism (Dolphijn & van der Tuin 2015), and despite the associated risks - most obviously an accusation of "vulgarity" in insisting on the materiality of relations which subtend cultural and social ones - concludes that the benefits abound as the rest of the universe suddenly becomes our kin (Haraway 2015), our collaborators in research (Barad 2007), participants in art, and interlocutors in dialogue. This research is conducted through art (Frayling 1993), and is presented as a series of artworks and accompanying printed publications. Together, they attempt to admit the more-than-human into art practice - both as things and as a concept.

This thesis examines the nature and value of art. It is primarily concerned to advance an argument which makes sense of the significance we ordinarily afford art, rather than rendering it merely aesthetic and thus cognitively trivial. Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, it is argued that 'art' does not have two distinct senses. Rather, we should understand art as an inherently evaluative, evolving cultural practice. Thus, I argue, 'art' is essentially a cluster concept. I consider an account of art according to which it is in the pleasure art affords, that its value lies. However, though we derive pleasure even from apparently unpleasant artworks, the mark of art's value lies elsewhere. That is, the pleasure we derive from art is the result of an artwork's being of value in some other way. Through critically assessing the standard accounts of art's value, I argue that art's pleasures are primarily cognitive. Furthermore, I argue, the cognitive value of art arises primarily from the engagement of our imagination and interpretation of artworks. That is, we enjoy the imaginative activity of engaging with artworks and the promotion of particular imaginative understandings. Furthermore, as imaginative understanding is of fundamental importance in grasping the nature of our world and others, art may have a distinctive significance. That is, art may afford insights into and thus promote our imaginative understandings of our world and others. Thus, through the promotion of imaginative understanding, art may cultivate our moral understanding. Therefore, art is of profound significance and import.