The problematics of transfer pricing in Czech and International tax law Constant globalization leads to the boom of business and property-related companies, which we call multinational. Multinational companies carry out so-called intra-company transactions within their group of companies under different conditions than they would in normal business. We call these transactions dependent, because they are carried out between affiliates, in an environment that is not competitive but related. Transfer pricing issues are usually associated with tax optimization because, with the help of these transactions, multinationals are able to achieve a lower tax burden. Aggressive tax optimization prevents proper transfer pricing for intra-company transactions. Transfer pricing of intra-company transactions is set up properly if they are in line with the arm length's principle, which in its own way attempts to simulate a competitive environment. The aim of this work is to outline the regulation of transfer pricing in Czech and International tax law and to analyse the problems of the regulation. In Czech law, the transfer pricing is mainly regulated in the Income Tax Act and in the non-binding instructions of the Ministry of Finance, which rely heavily on international regulation. At international level, the...

The diploma thesis deals with the impact of the BEPS on taxation of loan interests paid by legal entities. The aim of the thesis is to describe and evaluate the current legal situation, changes introduced into the area of tax deductibility of interest through BEPS action plans and propose a methodology for assessing tax deductibility of costs under the new rules.

Transfer pricing Abstract The thesis focuses on transfer pricing which falls within a scope of international taxation. The aim of the theses is to define transfer pricing, describe transfer pricing rules and to assess these rules. The first part of the theses focuses on international taxation, especially BEPS. Double tax treaties and ATAD directive are further described. The second part of the diploma theses focuses on transfer pricing from international perspective. Transfer prices are prices agreed between associated enterprises. The fundamental concept of transfer pricing is arm's length principle. The prices agreed between associated enterprises should equal to prices which would have been agreed between independent parties. The arm's length principle is included within the double tax treaties. The theses further focuses on OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, especially comparability analysis and transfer pricing methods, which are used for setting up of transfer prices. The third part of the theses focuses on transfer pricing rules from the Czech perspective. The respective rules are included within the Income Taxes Act and legally non-binding guidance, which follow the international rules. The Czech Tax Authorities increase their attention on...

När relaterade bolag belägna i olika länder säljer varor och tjänster sinsemellan kan det av olika anledningar ske till ett pris som avviker från det marknadsmässiga. Det kan bero på skatteplanering, men också på diverse andra omständigheter. För att kunna fastställa vilket som är rätt marknadspris och därigenom kunna ta ut rätt skatt är de flesta länder bundna av dubbelbeskattningsavtal, som vanligtvis är utformade efter OECD: s modellavtal. I artikel 9 i detta modellavtal finns regler om internprissättning och där definieras ”Armlängdsprinci-pen”, som säger att prissättningen ska följa de marknadsmässiga principerna. Vid en från marknadspris avvikande prissättning måste det konstateras om bolagen är relaterade eller ej, då reglerna för internprissättning endast gäller relaterade bolag. Enligt OECD: s modellav-tal kan bolag vara relaterade på grund av kontroll genom kapital, ledning eller annan kon-troll, och det är det sista kriteriet, begreppet ”annan kontroll”, som skapar störst förvirring. Varken OECD: s artikel 9 eller modellavtalet som sådant innehåller någon definition av be-greppet och det står inte heller att läsa hur de tre kriterierna förhåller sig till varandra. Vida-re saknas vägledning om vilka situationer som omfattas av artikeln. Enligt Art 3(2) i modellavtalet ska odefinierade termer tolkas enligt nationell lagstiftning om inte omständigheterna kräver annorlunda. Art. 9 ges ofta en vidare definition än den given i OECD:s modellavtal, vilket kan resultera i en inkorrekt skattesituation. Eftersom dubbelbeskattningsavtalet endast rör justering av dubbelbeskattning, kan en justering inte äga rum genom användande av modellavtalet. Genom att utvidga beskattningsrätten, bryter länderna mot den gyllene regeln, vilken de flesta dubbelbeskattningsavtal bygger på, att ett dubbelbeskattningsavtal aldrig kan användas för att utvidga beskattningsrätten, endast in-skränka denna. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur man kan ge kontrollbegreppet en riktig definition som överensstämmer med Art. 9. Eftersom tolkning via nationell lag kan ge oönskade resultat, kräver omständigheterna ett annorlunda tolkningssätt. Genom att ge kontrollbegreppet en autonom konventions tolkning som reflekterar syftet och bakgrunden till Art. 9, undviks problemet. / When associated enterprises situated in different countries sell goods and services between themselves, the transfer price may, because of different reasons, diverge from the market price. The divergence may be a consequence of tax planning, but it may also arise from other circumstances. To determine the right market price and thereby be able to make a correct taxation, most countries are committed to double taxation agreements, which are usually designed after the OECD Model Convention (hereafter OECD MC). Art. 9 of the convention provides for transfer pricing regulations and in this article the “arm’s length principle” is defined, stating that the pricing should be set according to the market price principles. When the transfer price diverges from the market price it must be established if the enterprises are associated or not, since the transfer pricing regulations only applies to associated enterprises. According to the OECD MC enterprises may be associated through capital, management or control, and it is the last notion, the notion of “control” that creates the greatest confusion. Neither in Art. 9 nor in the rest of the OECD MC, a definition of the notion exists, and it is nowhere stated how the criteria relate to each other. Further-more, guidance is missing describing in which situations the article is meant to be applica-ble. According to Art. 3(2) OECD MC, undefined terms shall be interpreted according to domestic law, unless the context otherwise requires. Art. 9 is often given a wider definition than the one provided in the OECD MC when domestic interpretation is used, which may result in an incorrect tax situation. Since the double taxation agreement only deals with the adjustment of double taxation, an adjustment cannot be justified by the use of the OECD MC. By broadening the scope of the article, the countries break the golden rule upon which most double taxation agreements rely, that a double taxation agreement may never be used to expand the right of taxation, only restrict it. The purpose of the thesis is to investigate how to give the term control an appropriate definition in line with Art. 9. Since the use of domestic interpretation may give unwanted results, the context requires an alternative way of interpretation. By giving the notion of control an autonomous treaty interpretation that reflects the purpose and context of Art. 9, the problem is avoided.

<p>När relaterade bolag belägna i olika länder säljer varor och tjänster sinsemellan kan det av olika anledningar ske till ett pris som avviker från det marknadsmässiga. Det kan bero på skatteplanering, men också på diverse andra omständigheter. För att kunna fastställa vilket som är rätt marknadspris och därigenom kunna ta ut rätt skatt är de flesta länder bundna av dubbelbeskattningsavtal, som vanligtvis är utformade efter OECD: s modellavtal. I artikel 9 i detta modellavtal finns regler om internprissättning och där definieras ”Armlängdsprinci-pen”, som säger att prissättningen ska följa de marknadsmässiga principerna. Vid en från marknadspris avvikande prissättning måste det konstateras om bolagen är relaterade eller ej, då reglerna för internprissättning endast gäller relaterade bolag. Enligt OECD: s modellav-tal kan bolag vara relaterade på grund av kontroll genom kapital, ledning eller annan kon-troll, och det är det sista kriteriet, begreppet ”annan kontroll”, som skapar störst förvirring. Varken OECD: s artikel 9 eller modellavtalet som sådant innehåller någon definition av be-greppet och det står inte heller att läsa hur de tre kriterierna förhåller sig till varandra. Vida-re saknas vägledning om vilka situationer som omfattas av artikeln.</p><p>Enligt Art 3(2) i modellavtalet ska odefinierade termer tolkas enligt nationell lagstiftning om inte omständigheterna kräver annorlunda. Art. 9 ges ofta en vidare definition än den given i OECD:s modellavtal, vilket kan resultera i en inkorrekt skattesituation. Eftersom dubbelbeskattningsavtalet endast rör justering av dubbelbeskattning, kan en justering inte äga rum genom användande av modellavtalet. Genom att utvidga beskattningsrätten, bryter länderna mot den gyllene regeln, vilken de flesta dubbelbeskattningsavtal bygger på, att ett dubbelbeskattningsavtal aldrig kan användas för att utvidga beskattningsrätten, endast in-skränka denna. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur man kan ge kontrollbegreppet en riktig definition som överensstämmer med Art. 9. Eftersom tolkning via nationell lag kan ge oönskade resultat, kräver omständigheterna ett annorlunda tolkningssätt. Genom att ge kontrollbegreppet en autonom konventions tolkning som reflekterar syftet och bakgrunden till Art. 9, undviks problemet.</p> / <p>When associated enterprises situated in different countries sell goods and services between themselves, the transfer price may, because of different reasons, diverge from the market price. The divergence may be a consequence of tax planning, but it may also arise from other circumstances. To determine the right market price and thereby be able to make a correct taxation, most countries are committed to double taxation agreements, which are usually designed after the OECD Model Convention (hereafter OECD MC). Art. 9 of the convention provides for transfer pricing regulations and in this article the “arm’s length principle” is defined, stating that the pricing should be set according to the market price principles. When the transfer price diverges from the market price it must be established if the enterprises are associated or not, since the transfer pricing regulations only applies to associated enterprises. According to the OECD MC enterprises may be associated through capital, management or control, and it is the last notion, the notion of “control” that creates the greatest confusion. Neither in Art. 9 nor in the rest of the OECD MC, a definition of the notion exists, and it is nowhere stated how the criteria relate to each other. Further-more, guidance is missing describing in which situations the article is meant to be applica-ble.</p><p>According to Art. 3(2) OECD MC, undefined terms shall be interpreted according to domestic law, unless the context otherwise requires. Art. 9 is often given a wider definition than the one provided in the OECD MC when domestic interpretation is used, which may result in an incorrect tax situation. Since the double taxation agreement only deals with the adjustment of double taxation, an adjustment cannot be justified by the use of the OECD MC. By broadening the scope of the article, the countries break the golden rule upon which most double taxation agreements rely, that a double taxation agreement may never be used to expand the right of taxation, only restrict it. The purpose of the thesis is to investigate how to give the term control an appropriate definition in line with Art. 9. Since the use of domestic interpretation may give unwanted results, the context requires an alternative way of interpretation. By giving the notion of control an autonomous treaty interpretation that reflects the purpose and context of Art. 9, the problem is avoided.</p>

The aim of this diploma thesis was to outline the issue of transfer pricing, especially under the conditions of the Czech Republic and to elaborate the documentation for specific company carrying out relationships with related parties. The individual methods of assessment of these prices were introduced in the theoretical component. The possible obstacles connected to its usage were described and most important information needed for transfer pricing documentation were summarized. The practical component includes functional analysis of specific company. Furthermore, all the transactions from the year 2015 amongst related parties were identified and described in detail. In relation to the main production activity the method of net range was used for transfer price verification. The Albertina database was used for elaboration of comparative analysis. To verify the profit margin applied by the company for production, it was used the multi-criterion and gradual weight schedule with subsequent application of point method. This thesis revealed defects that have been presented to the representatives of the company's management. It was stated that it is necessary to perform the revision of profit margin because of profit misinterpretation and lower tax payment of corporate income tax. It was clearly demonstrated that the elaboration of transfer pricing documentation is not a useless administrative burden. On the contrary, it is an important base for mapping and analysing inter-company transactions. Correctly elaborated documentation can be used also a negotiation argument with related parties that are usually in a stronger negotiating position or in dealing with financial administration regarding tax inspection.

This diploma thesis is focused on international tax planning and tax optimization of relaties parties. In the first part of the thesis are written theoretical bases, which are important for understanding the whole work. In the analytical parts are stated the factors that are decisive for international tax planning. At the end of the work is presented the process of international tax planning and tax optimization on a specific subject.

我國移轉訂價查核制度，係為防止營利事業與關係企業或關係人間藉不合交易常規之安排規避或減少納稅義務之制度，及為使我國所得稅制與國際潮流趨勢接軌，財政部於93年12月28日訂定發布「營利事業所得稅不合常規移轉訂價查核準則」，建立不合交易常規之認定標準暨相關調整方法，使徵納雙方有共同遵循之依據，乃我國所得稅查核之一項重大建制。 移轉訂價，指營利事業從事受控交易時所訂定之價格或利潤。其查核制度，為徵納雙方辦理所得稅申報及核定時，評估受控交易之結果是否符合常規共同遵循之依據。制度規範不僅是企業應負之協力義務，為創造企業本身更大價值及降低稅務風險，似應善用移轉訂價分析文件，使其成為衡量管理績效之利器。 本論文以採用可比較利潤法之公司為例，主要探討可比較對象一致程度，作為移轉訂價分析可信賴程度之判斷指標。研究建議如下： 一、申報書增列受測個體、受測活動、常規交易方法、可比較對象、利潤率指標、常規交易範圍及集團企業總利潤分配情形等欄位。 二、受控交易之結果達所得額標準以上，即以其原申報額為準核定，若同時符合避風港法則之主體要件者，得以其他文據取代移轉訂價報告。 三、對採用可比較利潤法之公司，於專案查核時，應注意利潤率指標之計算錯誤或誤植及年數誤用，其他資料漏列及資本調整錯誤等情形。 四、以可比較對象一致程度與受控交易結果在四分位距兩者之落點，作為移轉訂價分析可信賴程度之判斷指標。 五、若判斷指標顯示移轉訂價分析可信賴程度偏低者，建議以重組後可比較對象，建立四分位距範圍，測試有否藉更換可比較對象操作受控交易之結果。 關鍵詞：移轉訂價、關係企業、常規交易方法 / The purpose of our transfer pricing investigation system is to prevent a profit-seeking enterprise and its related parties avoid or reduce its income tax liabilities by means of arranging non-arm’s length transactions. For past few years, more and more countries had already planned and set up a transfer pricing investigation system. In order to make our tax regulations more correspondent with international trends, the MOF promulgated “The Regulations Governing Assessment of Profit-Seeking Enterprise Income Tax on Non-Arm’s Length Transfer Pricing” on 28th December, 2004. The established identifying standards and corresponding adjusting methods of non-arm’s length transactions provide taxpayers and tax authorities a common basis, so this is an quite important system. Transfer pricing shall mean the price or profit in controlled transactions conducted by profit-seeking enterprises. The regulation provides a common basis to assess whether the result of controlled transactions corresponds with the arm’s length principle while filing and assessing an income tax return. Except imposing obligations on enterprises, the regulation also adds values and decreases tax risks of enterprises. Furthermore, since it seems to be able to enhance the altitude and breadth by making good use of these analytical data, it can be a good tool to measure management performance. As an indicator of transfer pricing analytical reliability and auditing depth of tax authorities, this essay chooses enterprises that adopt Comparable Profit Method as exploring samples to analyze the consecutive-three-year consistency of their comparable objects . The suggestions are as follows： 1.We can add columns in tax returns for taxpayers to fill in arm’s length methods, comparable transactions, tested parties and tested activities, the arm’s length range, and total profits distribution among group companies. 2.Where the results of controlled transactions are higher than the standards of income, tax authorities can directly assess the transfer prices according to taxpayers’ filing data. 3.Where the results of controlled transactions are higher than the profit standard of the same trade and qualified for standards of safe harbor, the transfer pricing report can be replaced with other evidentiary documents. 4.We can take the consistency of the comparable objects and the range between the 25th to the 75th percentile of the results of controlled transactions as an indicator to judge the reliability of transfer pricing analysis. 5.When auditing enterprises that adopted Comparable Profit Method, we should notice the miscalculation of profit level indicators, misusage of time period, and the wrong ways of capital adjustment. Key words：transfer pricing, associated enterprises, arm’s length method

The master thesis deals with the issue of transfer price of a controlled transaction between associated enterprises. Part of the master thesis is definition of basic theoretical concepts associated with the issue of transfer pricing with a focus on domestic, international, and European Union law. The master thesis deals with the analysis of case law, whose subject matter is transfer pricing. The theoretical starting points of the thesis are applied to a practical example, which deals with the issue of determining the transfer price for specific controlled transaction between associated enterprises.

Diploma thesis deals with the issue of loan interest taxation between associated enterprises which are Czech residents. The basic theoretical concepts are described in the first part of thesis. The second part is focused on the analysis Czech law connected with interest taxation. The practical part is based on forming methodological tool for associated enterprises. This methodology can help to set the right loan interest rate. There are also practical examples solved in the end of the diploma thesis.