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Essays on the theory of auctions and economic rentsArikan, Ilgaz T., January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2004. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xi, 179 p. : ill. Advisor: Oded Shenkar, Business Administration Graduate Program. Includes bibliographical references (p. 128-153).
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Auction markets as a method of marketing livestock with an analysis of the auction marketing system in IdahoCaton, Douglas D. January 1953 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 19. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [118]-120).
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Determinants of seller choice between auction and negotiation an empirical application to cattle markets /Swanser, Kole. January 2005 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (M.S.)--Montana State University--Bozeman, 2005. / Typescript. Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Randal R. Rucker. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 93-96).
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Essays on Internet auctionsOnur, Ilke, January 1900 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2005. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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A uniform-price method for contract auctionsYang, Kangle. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.
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Posted price offers in internet auction marketsSeifert, Stefan, January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Karlsruhe, 2005. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. [171]-178).
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Monotone Equilibrium in Multi-Unit AuctionsMcAdams, David 16 August 2002 (has links)
In a large class of multi-unit auctions of identical objects that includes the uniform-price, as-bid (or discriminatory), and Vickrey auctions, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists in monotone pure strategies whenever there is a finite price / quantity grid and each bidder's interim expected payoff function satisfies single-crossing in own bid and type. A stronger condition, non-decreasing differences in own bid and type, is satisfied in this class of auctions given (a) independent types and (b) risk-neutral bidders with marginal values that are (c) non-decreasing in own type and have (d) non-increasing differences in own type and others' quantities. A key observation behind this analysis is that each bidder's valuation for what he wins is always modular in own bid in any multi-unit auction in which the allocation is determined by market-clearing. This paper also provides the first proof of pure strategy equilibrium existence in the uniform-price auction when bidders have multi-unit demand and values that are not private.
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'n Mikro-ekonomiese ontleding van die algemene veilingstelsel van Pretoria11 March 2014 (has links)
M.Com (Economics) / Please refer to full text to view abstract.
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Étude comparative des ventes aux enchères publiques mobilières (France et Angleterre) /Vigneron, Sophie. January 2006 (has links) (PDF)
Kent, Univ., Diss.--Nancy.
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Three essays on auction, retail risk management and market share evolution /Hu, Xiaorui, January 2000 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 109-112). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.
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