Experimental economics is often called upon to inform theory and aid in explaining real world behavior. As such it is important to carefully design laboratory experiments to test the validity of new theories and to reexamine results that demonstrate robust anomalies of classic theory. My first aim is to design an experiment that will allow me to test the propensity of subjects to use CaseBased Decision Theory (from now on referred to as CBDT). I carefully design a setting in which the predicted choices of CBDT are deterministic and unique to CBDT (i.e. different from the predicted choices of other relevant decision making processes). I examine how well CBDT organizes subject choices when subjects are asked to make thirty independent decisions each with a fixed and given history. I find that some subjects do appear to be using the information given to them in the form of CaseBased Decision making. My second goal is to revisit traditional firstprice private values auction experiments with the idea of making the priceprobability tradeoff, the central consideration in auctions, more salient to subjects. I approach this in two different ways. First, I use a customdesigned graphical interface which displays all results both visually and numerically. In this treatment I find that subjects bid more aggressively than predicted by riskneutral BayesNash equilibrium. Second, I restructure the presentation of the idiosyncratic reservation value. Subjects are now engaging in some economic behavior and earning their total consumer surplus each period. This differs from traditional firstprice private values auction experiments in which subjects only earn a payoff if they win the auction. Here I observe that market prices in a sealedbid implementation are significantly lower than those reported using the standard auction setup.

In common-value auctions and contests economic agents often have varying levels of information regarding the value of the good to be allocated. Using theoretical and experimental analysis, I examine the effect of such information asymmetry on behavior. Chapter II considers a model in which players compete in two sequential contests. The winner of the first contest (the incumbent) privately observes the value of the prize, which provides private information if the prizes are related. Relative to the case where the prizes are independent, the incumbent is strictly better off, and the other contestants (the challengers) are strictly worse off. This increases the incentive to win the first contest such that the sum of expected effort over both contests increases relative to the case of independent prizes. Chapter III experimentally considers the role of asymmetric information in first-price, sealed-bid, common-value auctions. Bidders who observe a private signal tend to overbid relative to Nash equilibrium predictions. Uninformed bidders, however, tend to underbid relative to the Nash equilibrium. Chapter IV examines asymmetric information in one-shot common-value all-pay auctions and lottery contests from both experimental and theoretical perspectives As predicted by theory, asymmetric information yields information rents for the informed bidder in both all-pay auctions and lottery contests.

Thesis (Ph.D)--Computing, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2010. / Committee Chair: Vazirani, Vijay; Committee Member: Kalai, Adam; Committee Member: Mihail, Milena; Committee Member: Tetali, Prasad; Committee Member: Thomas, Robin. Part of the SMARTech Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Collection.

In this dissertation I study bidding behavior in Internet Auction Markets. I focus on practice called "multiple bidding" which occurs when a single bidder places numerous bids throughout the same auction. Multiple bidding appears frequently in the data but the incentives that motivate it are not well understood. In the first chapter I develop a theoretical model in which multiple bidding is an equilibrium behavior by rational bidders. The model has a dynamic auction with two bidders who can search for outside prices while bidding in the auction. Each bidder has a search cost which is her private information. When outside prices are private (independently drawn and identically distributed), then, there is an equilibrium in which bidders with the lower search costs bid only late and always search, while the bidders with higher search costs bid both early and late and search as if they coordinated their search decisions, i.e., the bidder with the lower search cost searches and the other bidder does not. This equilibrium by itself provides an explanation of two frequently occurring bidding patterns (late and multiple bidding). In the second chapter I study experimentally the effect of early bids in dynamic auctions on how bidders search for outside prices. The design has two bidders participating in an ascending clock-auction during which any one of the bidders can pause the auction clock. This I interpret as placing an early bid. Once the auction is paused both bidders can simultaneously search for an alternative outside price. Results indicate that pausing decisions by subjects impact their subsequent searching for outside prices, i.e., whether a subject decides to search or not depends on whether she has paused the auction or not. Subjects behave as if they coordinated their searching decisions: the bidder who pauses the auction also searches with high frequency and the other bidder does not. Because this type of behavior increases both the efficiency and the profitability of the auction we favor the use of policies that promote early bidding in practice, such as, longer auctions and lower public reserve prices.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - James Cook University, 2007. / Typescript (photocopy) Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Watson School of Engineering and Applied Science (Systems Science), 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--George Mason University, 2008. / Vita: p. 156. Thesis director: Bart J. Wilson. Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed July 3, 2008). Includes bibliographical references (p. 153-155). Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Indiana University, 1983. / Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 226-236).

Thesis (M.Phil.)--Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-75). Also available in electronic version.